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SECTION II
T R A N S C R I P T  OF  
P R O C E E D I N G S
PUBLIC HEARING OP THE 
ACCOUNTING OBJECTIVES STUDY GROUP.
May 15, 16, and 17, 1972 
The Americana Hotel 
New York, New York
4.1
TUESDAY AFTERNOON SESSION 
May 16, 1972
The meeting reconvened at two o'clock, Chairman 
Trueblood presiding.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: I think we're right on target,
and Mr. Defliese is right on time. Phil, it's your podium.
MR. PHILIP L. DEFLIESE: Very good. Thank you very
much, Bob .
I'm Philip L. Defliese, and while I'm managing 
partner of Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery and Chairman of 
the present APB, I'm here to present my personal views. My 
firm and I will present a formal paper at a later date, perhaps 
within a month. That paper will expand upon the views that 
I'm expressing now, so to some extent there will he consider­
able similarity.
I'd like to say at the outset that I don't envy this 
Croup its chore. It's probably one of the most momentous 
undertakings that we could do in this half century, and as a 
result of the challenging aspects of it I think that the Croup 
certainly ought to consider seriously the implications of its 
report. And to that extent I respectfully submit a number of 
procedural suggestions which I would suggest that they at least 
attempt to follow, in order to give consideration to those 
important aspects.
The time element, of course, is a very important re­
striction. I don't know how a subject of such far reaching
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importance could be accomplished within the time limit the Group 
has set for itself. But because of that, it must restrict its 
emphasis by a considerable extent to the most pressing needs, 
and those which no doubt gave rise to the issue itself; and 
that is the needs of the public investors.
And when I speak of public investors, I include not 
only those who invest in equity securities but also those who 
invest in debt securities, because for the most part both are 
essentially public investors, and look to and rely upon the 
same data for their investment decisions. Therefore, I see no 
distinction whatever in terms of the information that they need.
Of course, I'm talking not only about individual in­
vestors but institutional investors, and to some extent the 
indirect investors such as policyholders and the like; but 
basically, the needs of these public investors are paramount.
The needs of private creditors, such as banks and vendors are 
somewhat secondary. These people are usually in a contractual 
relationship, making it possible for them to obtain additional 
data and additional information upon which a decision can be 
made, and therefore the same statements are not as important.
Of course, government, taxing agencies, and regulato­
ry commissions also have needs; but here again, because these 
are special-purpose-type needs, they can be fulfilled through 
additional input or perhaps through supplementary information 
designed for a specific purpose.
So the concentration should be on the public investor.
The Group should also spell out in its report those 
objectives which they consider to be long range, short range, 
and intermediate range, because whatever we do in the field 
of accounting cannot be accomplished overnight. Some of it 
may take a considerably long period of time, and therefore in 
making recommendations we need to distinguish between the short 
long, and intermediate range.
Some of the problems that are involved will require 
a considerable amount of concentrated applied research, and 
only upon the completion of that research can we really deter­
mine whether or not the objectives in each of these areas are 
in reality desirable, and whether or not adequate techniques 
can be established in order to determine if they are workable.
Again, recognize the importance of moving as rapidly 
as possible. You should concentrate on the precise definition 
of the short range goals and the means of implementing, and 
defer any in-depth consideration of the other two. I think 
that more will be achieved in this way than to attempt to cover 
all three areas in greater detail.
And finally, after it has sifted through the material 
that I’m sure is presently descending rather rapidly, and 
contemplating it, and reaching some tentative conclusions, 
those tentative conclusions should be exposed for public com­
ment and possibly public hearings. Our experience on the 
Accounting Principles Board indicates that until a tentative 
solution is proposed, it’s difficult for interested parties to 
focus adequately on the many problems that they create. And
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since the results of this report will have such far-reaching 
implications toward the final resolution of this problem, we 
would certainly want to have an opportunity to express views 
concerning the specific proposals that are being made.
As to the needs of the public investors--and I think 
this is the thing that should be concentrated on--no doubt 
the Study Group will carefully analyze the needs of these users, 
since they constitute such a large segment of our population, 
particularly with 32 million shareholders and the many indirect 
holders such as those in pension groups. But the question is: 
these needs have to be defined, as simply as possible, and the 
data categorized rather carefully, because, essentially, inves­
tors are required to regularly make timely decisions as to 
whether or not they will buy, sell, or hold a particular in­
vestment.
I mentioned before that I don’t distinguish between 
a stockholder and a bondholder in this frame of reference, 
simply because the data upon which a decision of that sort rests 
is essentially the same. But, of course a decision has to be 
made as to whether or not an investor wants to invest in debt 
or equity securities. But usually that determination is based 
on considerations other than the financial data of the company 
itself. So we have to focus on the decision-making data for 
this purpose.
Now, of course, in the process we should also recog­
nize that there are many other factors that are involved in 
making such decisions as to whether to buy, sell, or hold, and
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this relates to the state of the art, the character of the in­
dustry, the movements in the economy, the competitive position 
of the company, the strengths and weaknesses of management and 
their research expertise, their relationships with labor, and 
their relationships with regulatory agencies. All of these 
have an equal and sometimes a greater weight in determining 
whether or not an investment should he made.
And so I would assume you will certainly put that 
in as a caveat.
Now looking at the data that the public investor or 
potential investor needs to know--he needs to know, first, 
what are the prospects for an adaquate yield on his investment, 
in terms of dividend or interest, and for capital appreciation. 
And essentially that translates into a need for a realistic 
determination of periodic income--past, present, and particu­
larly, future.
So as I see it, the need for a forecast of at least 
one year, and possibly several, is paramount.
The second thing he needs to know are the factors 
he can rely upon for the safety and return of his capital.
In the bondholder situation, it's just as important that he 
know what the market for his bonds may be, as well as the abil­
ity of the company to pay off at maturity. Very few public 
investors investing in bonds actually look toward maturity 
for return of their capital. They are looking for the ability 
to move in and out of that investment, and even many of those 
insitutions that manage substantial portfolios look upon debt
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securities in somewhat the same fashion. So the return or 
safety of capital is not necessarily dependent upon the archaic 
concepts that we have of financial position, hut upon market­
ability.
To that extent, I think that in addition to the 
realistic determination of income that I mentioned, he needs to 
know what the liquidity-viability condition of the company may 
be; so some of our archaic concepts of balance sheet presenta­
tion should be remodeled to give cognizance to that.
The fund statement likewise may need some restructur­
ing in order to portray adequately these factors.
Third, a more helpful indication is needed of the 
value of an investment, so that a proper choice can be made.
And here, of course, is where accounting frequently leaves him 
very much in a vacuum— again because our balance sheets and 
financial statements are not structured to make any realistic 
portrayal of value. That means we might need to reflect current 
value rather than historical values in some areas, and to give 
recognition to intangible resources and some personnel resour­
ces.
Now, of course we have to recognize that accounting 
will never be able to establish the true net worth of a company. 
That can only be determined by the usual criteria of what a 
buyer will pay or a seller will take. We can only hope, I 
suppose, to provide more meaningful financial data as a guide.
Now I’d like to break down the three types of object­
tives as I see them, and discuss what might be done about them.
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As the long-range objective, we should probably consider the 
introduction of current fair values, intangible values, and 
personnel values. This has been proposed many times, and we 
all recognize that presently it’s highly impractical. What we 
have to do first is to determine whether or not this is theo­
retically possible, and then whether it can be implemented.
I can't see how that can be done without a concentrated research 
project--lasting at least three years by a sizable, full time 
research group, which should be comprised of particularly un­
biased people of diverse disciplines and philosophies, so as to 
make sure that we have all views presented.
I don’t know whether you could ever get such a group 
as that to live together, but I don’t see how we can really do 
the job well otherwise.
And of course it should be approached rather slowly 
and carefully.
Personally, I have an open mind on this. I doubt 
if fair values can be applied across the board, and I don’t 
know whether they are necessarily needed for the determination 
of income as such. For example, I have a real question as to 
whether plant and equipment should be fair valued regularly, 
because this is not an asset that’s intended to be sold or 
realized, but instead, to be used up in the production of income. 
And consequently, the need for applying current values in that 
instance is somewhat less.
Obviously, in other areas involving inventories and 
other resources that are intended to be put into production
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or to be sold, fair values can have an important effect.
Now part of the study of this long range objective 
would be to make a closer analysis of periodic income. As I 
said before, this is a primary investor tool; and of course 
this means that we have to refine our realization concepts.
We should recognize that income is comprised of a number of 
elements. It first arises out of the ability to provide a 
product or a service at a price in excess of cost. That's 
pretty basic; and of course here we use traditional cost ac­
counting concepts to establish that basic profit. Of course, 
those concepts need some reexamination.
Second, another element of income is the effect of 
economic forces upon our resources, such as market fluctuations, 
which sometimes may be fortuitous and beyond our control, or 
at other times may be premediatated and controlled to a certain 
extent. I have in mind here particularly the marketable se­
curity problem that we are presently struggling with in account­
ing.
We know that when a security is ultimately sold, and 
a profit is made, we have a profit, and it's the difference be­
tween the cost and the selling price; but the question is: when 
is that income realized? Is it realized at the time of sale, or 
is it realized over the period over which it appreciates? Ba­
sically, that has to be established before we can really deter­
mine periodic income on any reasonable basis.
Another factor affecting income is the effect of dis­
covery and research. One look at the oil and gas industry tells
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you, of course, that income is certainly derived out of the 
discovery of oil, hut the question is, when should that he re­
flected in accounting? And shouldn't our concepts of realiza­
tion give some cognizance to the fact that income is being de­
rived as the oil is discovered?
Likewise, in the research area, when a new product 
or a new element or a new method of something is derived as a 
result of considerable research, is there an income factor?
Of course, that translates itself into sales of the new product, 
and therefore one element of income is that effort.
Finally, we have price level changes that enter into 
the determination of income. At the present time we give no 
cognizance to this, and we reflect the income at the time of 
sale, when in reality it may he the result of nothing more than 
a price level change. The question is, is that income, or isn’t 
it?
At some point, accounting perhaps ought to he able to 
provide investors with an analysis of his periodic income along 
these lines. How much of it is attributable to price level 
change, and how much of it is attributable to a discovery or 
new research? These will take a long time to develop, and 
that's why I think the long study should be made in that area.
Jumping to the short range objectives, we have to 
recognize that until we can get the long range ones defined and 
implemented we have to concentrate on improving our historical 
cost accounting concepts so that the user's needs will be sat­
isfied as well as they can be within the confines of this frame
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of reference.
We should recognize that the alternatives that we 
have in accounting today grew because of differing industry 
practices and circumstances that frequently were borrowed by 
other industries. In our attempt to narrow these alternatives, 
we have tried— rather unsuccessfully--to find fundamental truths 
that can be applied across the board, and I don’t think we're 
going to find that Holy Grail.
Instead, I think we need to concentrate on refining 
our realization concepts again, industry by industry, and not 
concern ourselves with inconsistencies that result from this.
For example, it’s rather foolhardy to consider that the same 
realization concepts should be applicable to land development 
companies as to a steel company, or to an oil and gas company, 
or an insurance company, or as to timber land. Even within 
these industries, we might find that circumstances are differ­
ent, and therefore they need to be recognized.
I think the thing that has brought this home to the 
present APB more than anything else has been its current study 
of marketable securities, where we find that there’s a differ­
ence in a company--say an industrial--that might have a tempor­
ary investment in a marketable security, or perhaps a long- 
range investment in a security that happens to be marketable, 
as against an insurance company that manages a tremendous port­
folio of equity securities. And to say that the same realiza­
tion concept should be applicable in each case is not to give 
recognition to the differing circumstances, intentions, and
4.11
mode of operation of these two different companies. Therefore 
the question is whether or not income realization concepts 
should be the same or different in that instance. I don't 
believe they should be the same.
In the whole process of this reassessment of realiza­
tion concepts of industry by industry, we should sublimate the 
balance sheet to the proper determination of income. We recog­
nize that the balance sheet does not in any way present fairly 
financial position today, and therefore to attempt to make it 
so is a futile exercise until we have assessed the long range 
goals that I mentioned, to determine whether or not they are 
feasible.
We should provide a balance sheet, and nothing more 
than a balance sheet, of resources and responsibilities that 
will provide a better appraisal of liquidity and viability. 
Right now our balance sheet doesn't attempt to do that very 
well. Our concepts concerning current assets and current liab­
ilities are rather fuzzy.
The fund statement, of course, has attempted to put 
some light on this area, but that too needs some reassessment 
to see whether or not it will provide a better picture of 
liquidity and viability as to the future, because this again-- 
is what the investor is looking for: How will his company sur­
vive in the next few years and in the long run?
In this respect the Study Group's largest contribu­
tion can be the refinement, as I see it, of the realization of 
income concepts, sublimating the balance sheet in the process.
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Now, the intermediate range objectives are of course 
those things that we might be able to do between now and the 
time we get to the long range, and I would think that perhaps 
what’s needed there is to provide some mode of supplementary 
information to furnish the investor with additional information 
in making his decisions. Certainly, such things as a price- 
level statement, such as has been recommended by APB, would 
provide better perspective to the income statement, because 
it would at least attempt to neutralize the effect of price 
levels to some extent; second, perhaps the provision of some 
current values--management estimates, if necessary--of other 
resources, other liabilities, perhaps those that are particular 
ly intended to be liquidated or to be placed into production, 
such as inventories of land for a land development company, and 
of course, the effects of discovery and research. And in the 
oil and gas field we need supplementary data to provide the 
investor with a better concept of the resources available to 
the company.
Now this is not going to be an easy task, but never­
theless, such supplementary information would certainly bridge 
the gap between our short range and long range objectives.
And with that I hold my peace.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Thank you very much again, Phil,
for a lucid, complete, and helpful presentation.
I’d like to start out with a question which kind of 
ties to some testimony we heard this morning, having to do
with the long range versus the short range versus the inter­
mediate range.
First I’d like to say that we certainly agree--all 
of us, I'm sure--with everything you say about the horrendous 
size and frustrating nature of this task and the time table 
that was imposed upon us. Success may be reasonable or zero.
The statement was made this morning that objectives 
and goals should be rather pervasive. Let me just try an ex­
ample. Financial statements should be useful for predictive 
purposes. Then, if you take that as an overriding goal, would 
you agree that the distinction between the short range, the 
intermediate, the long range, becomes more of an implementing 
process than a goal stating process
MR. DEFLIESE: I would agree with that, certainly.
Assuming that we can agree on the long range objective and re­
cognize the need to move from here to there, this will be an 
evolutionary process, hopefully at each step--providing the 
reader with more of a basis for prediction.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: But would that not make it more
possible, if we adopt that point of view, to come out with some 
kind of reasonable set of large, pervasive goals on realization 
and predictive capacity and so on, and give the profession time 
to work on the research and the decision-making process at the 
sublevel, which is really your breakdown--as I understand it—  
of the long range, short range, and intermediate?
MR. DEFLIESE: Well, as I indicated, obviously to
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refine these long range objectives in a true sense, some long 
term research is going to be necessary, because the implementa­
tion aspects have to be dealt with. They are not going to be 
so readily obtainable. And without those you get nowhere.
And you may ultimately wind up nowhere if in the pro­
cess of researching implementation it just is impractical. And 
so while it's fine to establish a pervasive concept of a long 
range goal— and assuming that for the moment it’s fair value—
I don't think we can say that we’re going to have to go there unless 
and until we have researched it adequately to know that it is a 
practical answer.
We’ve always said regularly that we would like our 
financial statements to more adequately portray the economic 
facts of life. Well, if we can get ten economists to agree 
on what the economic facts are, we'd be in a good position to 
move in that direction. But because we have set ourselves some­
what of an elusive goal, it’s almost impossible to get there. 
Therefore there is a need for researching the goals as well as 
the implementation.
MR. GELLEIN: Gould I just follow that up a little
bit, Phil? Because I think it’s pretty critical.
Do I interpret you correctly when you say, therefore, 
that perhaps our group cannot--or should not at this point—  
even attempt to state what the long range goals are?
MR. DEFLIESE: I think you can attempt to state what
you think they should be, recognizing that it is subject to re­
search and implementation factors.
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MR. GELLEIN: Well, that gets...
MR. DEFLIESE: ...I don't see how, in the time limit,
you can go much beyond that.
MR. GELLEIN: You see, that gets to the point in the
paper where you say, for instance, that what needs to he done 
first is to determine whether it's theoretically feasible and 
then whether it can be implemented.
MR. DEFLIESE: Right.
MR. GELLEIN: Now, it seems to me that it would be
rather presumptuous to state a long range goal if it weren't 
theoretically feasible.
MR. DEFLIESE: Well, I grant you that there is a
dilemma to that extent, but I think every research starts off 
with a premise.
MR. GELLEIN: It would be a hypothesis, wouldn't it?
MR. DEFLIESE: A hypothesis or a theoretical start­
ing point. And I have no problem starting with that and then 
saying well, we need to research this not only from an imple­
mentation standpoint, but from a theoretical standpoint, be­
cause there are elements here that might put the theory in 
question. We don't know whether users would be at an advantage, 
or whether their ability to make investment decisions would be 
enhanced by this data. It might be more confusing, and to that 
extent it can't support a theoretical user need. You can create 
a theory In vacuum, perhaps, but I don't think we want to do 
that. I think we want to create a theory in context, and un­
less we can be satisfied that the contextual and the theoretical
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hang together, there’s no point in moving in that direction.
DEAN DAVIDSON: Well, I followed what you were saying
with great interest, except that I tried to go through a trans­
lation process, both in what you were saying and--in fact--what 
people were saying this morning, as I got going on this. And 
that is, whenever you said "current value," I would substitute 
"historical cost" and see how that would make the statement 
sound.
So--for example, you said the need for current values 
on plant is somewhat less, and I translate that to say that the 
need for maintaining historical costs on plant is somewhat less.
Why don't we just expense plant as we buy it?
MR. DEFLIESE: Well, because our concepts of income
require a certain matching of costs and revenue.
D E M  DAVIDSON: Ah, yes, of values expired, and re­
venues produced.
MR. DEFLIESE: Right.
DEAN DAVIDSON: And so I can't help but wonder, if
we're seeking to measure income in this realistic sense, if 
we may not be better off with current values than historical 
costs. Let me ask you if you do not feel that it would be 
useful to always ask ourselves this: Whenever we say something
about current value, to ask ourselves the same question about 
historic cost.
MR. DEFLIESE: Yes. I have no problem with that.
But I think that to amplify my comment concerning plant--and 
this relates to other things too, such as other intangibles,
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R&D, and the like; to upgrade, or to revalue upward--
DEAN DAVIDSON: ...or downward--
MR. DEFLIESE: ...or downward--those items which
essentially are going to enter into the income stream on that 
basis--that is, they are not going to be realized at a higher 
value--to then insist on a higher value being entered into the 
income stream, thereby, perhaps, in the case of a plant that’s 
appreciated, to reduce income--is not realistic in terms of our 
realization concepts of income.
Now, maybe in the process of your long-range goals 
you are going to change some of that, but I think until you do 
you can’t automatically assume that current values should be 
applied across the board.
DEAN DAVIDSON: I would always say ”or historic cost.”
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Well, I think the point was made
somewhat this morning--and yesterday too, Phil--that part of 
our preoccupation with historic cost has to do with its con­
venience as a proxy for some kind of value. So if you go Sid’s 
suggested route, I fully agree that it’s interrelated with our 
realization concept.
But many of the things you suggested it seems to me 
by way of example would require some significant change of our 
objective with respect to realization, at least on an industry- 
by-industry basis.
MR. DEFLIESE: Absolutely. I think we have already
done that, for example in industries like land development, 
where there is a realization concept quite different from, 
let’s say, retail sales, or oil and gas, or any other industry—
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the recognition of the fact that income is predicated basically 
on the result of an effort; even though you might inject the 
statistical evaluations of that effort, the fact remains that 
to apply any other industry concept of realization to that 
situation creates distorted results.
For example, if you were to apply installment account­
ing to that situation, we know that it would be unrealistic, in 
terms of what the actual efforts and results of that company 
may be.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Do you suspect that this may go
so far as to have different realization standards for various 
industries?
MR. DEFLIESE: Precisely. That’s why I feel that the
realization concepts have to be reassessed industry by industry.
Certainly, we have three basic areas in the extrac­
tive industry— oil and gas, mining, and timber land. And to 
say that the same realization concepts should be applied to all 
three, within almost the same industry, is not recognizing 
their totally different ways of operating.
These things need to be reassessed. When is income 
realized in these industries? In timber, you have a growth 
situation. In mining, you have a combination of processing 
and discovery. And in oil, principally you have the discovery 
aspect, which is the major element, and then of course it's 
combined with a refining and marketing operation. So we have 
in that area alone reason to depart from any pervasive concept
of realization.
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CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: But I still would personally
grope for some overriding concept of realization which would 
he applied industry by industry, with differing practices as 
distinguished from differing objectives.
MR. DEFLIESE: I understand what you are saying, yes.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Oscar?
MR. GELLEIN: Phil, you have been on the Board for a
number of years when it’s gone through the resolution of some 
pretty difficult problems, and I frankly think--considering 
the circumstances— in a very satisfactory way. My tenure 
on the Board has been shorter, but I have seen some of these 
things happen, and this is what I wanted to ask about. I 
don’t expect a specific answer, but I think any comments you 
would have would be helpful.
Regarding every important issue that's been up before 
the Board, in my judgement— the diverse views that were there 
were in part attributable to deep seated, honest, sincere 
differences of opinions on conceptual matters. You can go 
right straight through. I think in all the important opinions 
that the Board has issued, from the accounting for pension 
costs, to allocating income taxes, to business combinations, to 
good will--right through the list--there were deep seated, 
sincere, honest differences of opinion, all within the frame­
work, you see, of a historical cost framework.
I don’t want to ask a question. I just want to ask 
whether you have some observations--because I don't think there 
is an answer to the question, really. What would have been
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helpful to the Board within the historical cost framework to 
have minimized some of these deep seated conceptual differences 
in views?
MR. DEFLIESE: Well, I agree with you, Oscar. I
have lived through all of these; and as I have, I have, shall 
we say, developed my own philosophy, and I think I have sort 
of emphasized it briefly this morning. Let me emphasize it again.
I think our hangup has been our concern over the 
articulation between the balance sheet and the income state­
ment, particularly by calling the balance sheet a statement of 
financial position, which we know it is not. Let’s face it, 
the balance sheet originated as nothing more than a trial bal­
ance of what was left over after somebody determined what 
profit and loss was; and that’s all it ever should be in the 
present context of historical cost accounting.
The result is, we have developed some rather fine­
spun theories— take income tax allocation— as to whether or 
not the deferred tax account is a liability, or whether it’s 
a deferred credit, or whether it’s a net-of-tax approach, a 
reduction of the asset to which it may pertain, or whether it’s 
equity. And, frankly, I don’t care which you call it. It 
could be any of them or all of them. The fact is, what we are 
attempting to do is determine income--periodic income--properly; 
and to that extent we match our taxes with our accounting, and 
as a result of that, whatever is left goes into the balance 
sheet as a balancing factor.
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That is why, I think whether or not the deferred tax 
account is a current liability or a noncurrent liability is not 
a big issue. If I restructure the balance sheet and eliminate 
that problem, I'll get to the heart of the question of whether 
the company has some liquidity, which right now isn't shown.
It is the same as to our debt-equity ratio, which a 
lot of people have made Into a sacred cow. Billions of dollars 
today are being financed in Wall Street today on the basis of a 
debt-equity ratio, when we recognize that we don't include all 
of the true debts, such as the leasing aspects, but at the same 
time we don't include all the assets, like the oil and gas under 
the ground, which essentially is part of equity.
To create a debt-equity ratio, for example, for an 
oil and gas company that might be leasing to a large extent, is 
a real abortion of any concept that you can make from an account­
ing theoretical standpoint.
And so we have made a real fetish of getting this bal­
ance sheet to show assets on the left side, which really aren't 
assets in many cases, and liabilities on the right side which 
aren't in many cases liabilities, and then omitting many assets 
and liabilities. We need to stop concerning ourselves about 
this articulation between the income statement and the balance 
sheet. I think that's been the major hangup, rather than the 
question of historical cost.
We keep blaming historical cost only because we have 
nothing better, and of course it's an easy thing. It's a good 
whipping boy. But we're trying to keep our theories straight
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as between the statements, because we have a feeling that the 
balance sheet should present financial position.
The question is, should it? And if so, how can it? 
And we certainly ought to reexamine the question of the balance 
sheet function.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Before I recognize Don and Reed,
who want to be heard, some of the things you said in this last 
statement relate directly to a question from the floor which I 
want to recognize. In effect, it says: Is there some defini­
tion of periodic net income unrelated to value change?
And if I may go on from there to indicate that (as 
I understand) what you are saying is that there is on the asset 
side— whatever they are, in our present practice--a different 
series of values; in the current section, more or less the 
lower of cost or market; in the fixed asset section, some kind 
of amortized cost; and then all of those things which aren’t 
there at all.
So we have a completely inconsistent valuation.
MR. DEFLIESE: Right.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: So you would answer this ques­
tion that periodic income can best be determined if we have a 
more consistent valuation scheme?
MR. DEFLIESE: Not necessarily.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Not necessarily?
MR. DEFLIESE: No. Absolutely not.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: And how do you get to that
conclusion?
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sistency in the balance sheet, I'll never get anywhere in my 
income statement. I think the income statement has to be dealt 
with, and whatever is left--throw it into the balance sheet.
Then you let the reader know what the purpose of the balance 
sheet is--not to present him with a picture of financial posi­
tion, because it's never going to show that (at least in hist­
orical cost) but will merely show him those assets that are 
available to pay off debts, and the debts he has to pay off.
And that gets to the viability and the liquidity of the company, 
which is the other thing he's looking for.
He's looking for two things— income, which is going 
to produce his yield, one way or another, and the viability- 
liquidity of the company. Is it going to stand up and live 
forever, or is it going to die within a year or two, on the 
basis of what he sees?
To me, the balance sheet should be nothing more than 
the repository of our income statement determinations.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: So, then, you put your empha­
sis on realization and matching...
MR. DEFLIESE: Right.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: ...as distinguished from valua­
tion?
MR. DEFLIESE: Right.
DEAN DAVIDSON: That's what guides you in the income
statement?
MR. DEFLIESE: Because if I concern myself about con­
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DEAN DAVIDSON: Realization and matching.
DEAN EDWARDS: Phil, what pervasive objective might
you have which would permit you to develop realization concepts 
industry by industry, and would permit you to keep this separa­
tion of the current financial reporting structure?
MR. DEFLIESE: I think you have to start with the
mode of operation of the industry; in other words, when do 
they think that they have made their money? When an insurance 
company invests in equity securities and has billions of dollars 
in portfolios along this line, we have to ask: When do they
think they have made their money that results from the apprecia­
tion of those securities?
It's not easy, but if they think hard and long about 
it, they’ll come through and say: Well, we expect this to
grow over a period of time, on some basis. In fact, they have 
all told me: We invest for a five-to seven-year pull, and it’s
over that period of time that we expect to make the money.
Now we all know they don’t make it the day they sell 
the security, and the question is: When and how? That has to
be determined; so you have to take each industry and decide how 
it applies its resources and what its intentions are, and then 
analyze it from a realization concept.
It’s not easy, but it needs some rather deep study.
DEAN EDWARDS: We realize it’s difficult, Phil. If
we didn't in the beginning, we do now. But what set of objec-
MR. DEFLIESE: That's what guides me.
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Maybe, going back to my original question— is there any all- 
pervasive objective for financial accounting and reporting 
that would permit you to develop these industry by industry?
Are you saying there is none?
MR. DEFLIESE: I say that the realism within the
industry practice is the only guideline that you could set 
from a top theory standpoint.
MR. PARKER: I wonder if you haven't in some ways
given a partial answer to Don’s question. I gather from what 
you said that the income statement is the more important, and 
we sublimate the balance sheet to that. And accordingly, we 
start presumptively with historic cost, because historic cost 
does represent one thing all the time, which current cost may 
never do, and that is an actual cash outflow from the company.
MR. DEFLIESE: It’s an absolute investment of re­
sources, yes.
MR. PARKER: It sounded to me like what you might
have been saying, then, is that the time when you begin to look 
to current value is when it tends to become significantly 
different from original cost, but most importantly when it 
attaches to an asset which is severable, and by golly is al­
most assuredly going to be severed sooner or later. This fits 
the marketable security in the insurance company. It fits the 
tree in the forest. If fits a number of these things.
tives would you establish for any one of these industries?
MR. DEFLIESE: Yes.
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MR. PARKER: You operate on the historic cost assump­
tion, because it does represent the cash flowed out, and that's 
what has to get related in the income statement when the cash 
is flowing in from revenues.
MR. DEFLIESE: Right.
MR. PARKER: And only if and when you begin to de­
velop some values on assets that are all but assuredly going 
to be sold, and revenues flow in therefore--
MR. DEFLIESE: Right. Realized by sale or produc­
tion.
MR. PARKER: That's right--which significantly differs
from the original cost thing.
Now, that begins--doesn't it, Don--to be some kind 
of a test as to when you begin to apply this?
One question beyond that would be: How do we handle
these things in the income statement— the marketable security, 
or one of these things--that is, the change in value? It 
happens on the balance sheet. What do you do with it in the 
income statement?
MR. DEFLIESE: Well, that's the real hangup, this
articulation that I mentioned before. Do you have the balance 
sheet reflect historical cost at all times, or fair value at 
all times, or something in between? And I have no problem with 
something in between, if in the process you get a better de­
termination of income.
MR. PARKER: But would you segregate this, at least
on the income...?
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tion. I haven't touched upon disclosure. Certainly I think 
that once you move to any basis other than historical cost, 
you have a number of disclosure problems.
MR. GELLEIN: Phil, is it fair to say--you know, I
sense this running through this, and I just wanted to know how 
you would react to it--that perhaps accounting ought to get 
geared more to the way in which decisions are made.
In other words, take leverage leases. Even take the 
matter of depreciation. Maybe it's, you know, a rate of return 
sort of approach. So maybe the sinking-fund method is the bet­
ter method, because it gets geared more to the way people make 
decisions in business.
MR. DEFLIESE: Absolutely.
MR. GELLEIN: This seems to be running through what
you are saying.
MR. DEFLIESE: Absolutely, and I'll take that one
step further. You mentioned leveraged leases. Real estate in 
particular today--the financial statements of investment real 
estate companies, those that invest in apartment houses, office 
buildings, and the like are totally unrealistic as to what 
their income truly is, because they are required to use standard 
depreciation concepts which, coupled with high interest in 
early years, give distorted results, when we recognize that in 
many cases in the early years those buildings are appreciating 
rather than depreciating.
There's no real indicator of income in that instance,
MR. DEFLIESE: Oh, I think disclosure is another ques­
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and yet they are locked into an all pervasive concept of de­
preciation giving no cognizance to industry characteristics.
So it's for this reason that I say we have to examine 
the realization concepts and the approaches for each industry, 
and give them a more realistic portrayal of what income is for 
that company.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: One more question. Dick?
DEAN CYERT: It seems to me that a good hit of what
you are saying, and your whole position, really comes out of 
any lack of definition of what income is.
MR. DEFLIESE: Yes.
DEAN CYERT: You are really saying income is what
the particular industry, through practice, happens to say...
MR. DEFLIESE: Well, that's putting a loose in­
terpretation on it. I think it's what we say an industry 
should reflect as income. Let's put it that way.
DEAN DAVIDSON: Yes, but what guides us in saying
that?
DEAN CYERT: You see, this is the thing that I'm
searching for. It seems to me that what we should be looking 
for is an over all definition, and then try to apply that in 
the particular case of the industry.
MR. DEFLIESE: Well, I think we have an over all
definition in the matching of costs and revenues. I think we 
start with that as a basic premise.
DEAN CYERT: I’m not sure that gives you a definition
of income.
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versus what you receive--that’s income. We’re never really 
going to determine periodic income on a realistic basis until 
a company liquidates. Until then, anything else is nothing 
more than an estimate. And so, as long as we’re estimating, 
let's estimate as pragmatically as we can, and not concern 
ourselves about the conflicting theories that we frequently 
have. That really results through the articulation problem 
with the balance sheet.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: We have one seriously written,
formal input which would cure all of our problems, Phil. It 
says: Forget quarterly statements. Annual statements are
impossible. Pick a cycle of fifteen to twenty years, and 
you don’t have any accounting problem.
MR. DEFLIESE: Well, I think that the example of
Lloyd’s of London is a good case. To say that the one year 
cycle is a good one for the measurement of income is really 
unrealistic. They operate on a three year cycle, and that 
makes more sense.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Well, helpful as this may be,
I think we must move on. Thank you very much, Phil.
MR. DEFLIESE: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Accept our gratefulness for
your extended service on the Board and your considerable ac­
complishments. Thank you.
The American Valuation Consultants next. Will you 
introduce yourselves, please?
MR. DEFLIESE: Income is the result of what you spend
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MR. DONALD R. BRINKMAN: Certainly, Mr. Trueblood.
I'm Don Brinkman, President of American Valuation 
Consultants, and joining me today is Lawrence Gooch. Larry 
is our Manager of Valuation Services, and of course one of our 
more in-depth inputters to the materials we have available 
today.
Our purpose here, basically, is not to discuss or 
debate the pros--and cons, of course— of using current values, 
or not using current values, versus those of historical costs. 
We're here only to present at least an approach that is used 
currently in the valuation business to measuring current values 
if that becomes a need or something that the accounting profes­
sion feels that it can use.
In reviewing the presentations that have been sche­
duled for these hearings, it was interesting to note that of 
the twenty four presentations, we reviewed seventeen written 
papers and found that they broke down somewhat as follows:
Six presenters said there was a definite need for current 
value information. Four, including ourselves, requested fur­
ther research into this area. Four requested the status quo. 
And three said "No comment."
That means that out of seventeen, at least ten are 
suggesting that something be done is this area. We fall into 
that category of asking for further research.
Here I reiterate our purpose. It's just simply to 
ask that research be considered before any venture be made into
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this area, since it obviously gets to be a very complex ques­
tion.
In terms of our definition, we like to think of 
current values in terms of what might be synonymous with a 
market value; but let's try and bring it down to more specif­
ics. In trying to value things, we think of valuing, let's 
say, fixed assets in terms of a market value--or, let's say, 
a current value. So we are not really concerning ourselves 
immediately with liabilities, current assets, et cetera.
And, of course, in these hearings it's been said 
many times that this whole valuation question surrounds the 
question of time; that is, the reporting time period, and also 
the time period or life of the assets being questioned. If 
we take a closer look at this in terms of coming up with cur­
rent value measurements, we find that current values within 
an enterprise constitute three different types of measurement, 
which obviously operate over a time continuum.
The first of these is: If I am under a time pres­
sure to dispose of something, I have to consider current value 
in terms of forced liquidation, or the current period of time. 
Second, I think of something in terms of orderly disposal, I 
can consider it in terms of a time continuum, and of course the 
value will change as that time frame changes. And third, of 
course no assets within an enterprise can exceed the value of 
the entire enterprise. So that puts a maximum on in terms of 
the measurement question, when it comes to current value mea-
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surement.
In the valuation business, for years there have been 
procedures developing--probably most heavily in the last three 
to four decades--that start putting a measurement technique 
together based on three approaches to value. These values 
can basically be summarized as what we consider replacement 
cost less depreciation, discounted cash flow, and market 
comparables. You have all heard these terms before. I'd like 
to define them briefly.
Replacement cost less depreciation means to figure 
out what it would take to replace the asset, and then consider 
depreciation from all causes, whether they be economic, obso­
lescence factors, et cetera.
In terms of discounted cash flow, Mr. Sprouse and 
Mr. Moonitz put it very well in earlier years when they said 
that the value of an asset is the future economic benefits to 
be derived, or what you might say the present worth of the 
future economic benefits to be derived that can be measured.
That really gives us the impetus for measuring, based 
on discounted cash flow.
In the market comparable area, of course, we’re just 
talking about simply that— trades in the open market.
Individual assets, of course, can be valued on these 
bases, using one— or all three of them, hopefully--depending 
on the type of data that’s available, and depending on the 
techniques or the numbers available, to derive the answers.
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But in any case as we have briefly said, the assets themselves 
cannot exceed the total value of the enterprise. Therefore, 
in order to make true measurements, we really have to take 
into consideration what the value of the entire enterprise is 
at that point in time.
If we expand the three techniques of valuation, we 
can simply say that the replacement cost less depreciation 
technique becomes, in effect, the current value of underlying 
assets measured by the previous technique. The discounted 
cash flow technique is the discounted cash flow technique ap­
plied to the entire enterprise. And the market comparable 
technique can be derived from financial information on the 
open markets, the securities market, and sales of similar com­
panies in an open economic environment.
Then, and only then, can we really support the under­
lying asset values, if we are going to measure them based on 
current values; but before we do that, a critical question 
arises. In measuring the value of the enterprise, we have to 
consider risk factors, because unless we can quantify the 
risk analysis, we are going to find that our measurements are 
going to be very volatile.
We can measure that risk by breaking it down into 
its finer components. Basically, we talk about the three 
components being the risk-free, which is synonymous with 
government securities; the business risk rate, which is really 
the risk of being in a given business; and the financial risk, 
which is the risk of having a given financial structure.
Then we can apply that risk analysis to come up with 
the value of the enterprise, to check the current value mea­
surements of the underlying assets within the enterprise. I 
might point out that these techniques are currently being 
utilized quite widely. They are quite accepted in terms of 
generating what we call market values and current values for, 
let's say, tax purposes. In terms of purchase accounting, 
sometimes they are being used in coming up with current values 
of assets.
If they are being used now, why couldn't they be 
further refined and researched, and possibly the accounting 
profession if they wanted to employ them could use them?
Along with that, though, we find that there are also 
other uses of this information once it becomes available; and 
a dichotomy exists now, in the sense that management is mea­
suring its investments on one basis and reporting on another 
basis. It's measuring whether or not it should invest in a 
new business or a new plant, based upon the return it's going 
to get from that investment; and yet, in looking back on its 
old investment, it says: What is the current investment that
I've got? So the numbers are generated to try to generate a 
current value, and then investment analysis is generally made 
on that base. Yet the balance sheet does not reflect this, and 
the reports, as we know, do not reflect this type of informa­
tion.
Another area of usage, if these numbers were employed 
would be in the taxation area. We're all aware of what munici­
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palities and other goverments do in terms of ad valorem taxa­
tion. Most of these laws have a myriad of interwoven problems 
because of the question of value, and most of them are based, 
or should be based, on what is considered fair value, current 
value, market value; but all generally should have the same 
definitions.
So here we see that there are three major uses of 
this type of information, if it were generally available.
We here again reiterate that this information, be­
cause of the current situation, needs further research and 
further refinement, and we have heard everyone speaking rela­
tive to long-range and short-range goals, in terms of putting 
together the requirements and the needs for accounting. And 
we would say that, in terms of doing the research, in this 
area at least, steps should be taken to determine implementa­
tion. We all are aware that specific price indices exist for 
given types of assets that can be employed in generating re­
placement values, but further research is required to define 
these more specifically and to simulate their effects, to try 
to put them together.
In the building cost area there are available in 
this country many data banks already on computer to generate 
current replacement values of buildings based upon detailed 
labor and material rates, and this information requires fur­
ther research into its potential use.
The third key area in terms of an implementation 
step for research is that in commom property items. Of course,
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if you begin looking through the myriads of types of assets 
that industries are now usings you will see that there are 
common assets among all industry, there are noncommon assets 
among all industry, but there needs to be a further refinement 
relative to where the significant cost items are, and the num­
ber of frequencies of their usage, et cetera. Once that in­
formation were available, we could have the market data com­
parable information available for measuring current values on 
that basis.
Of course, I’m not an accountant. I'm really an 
aeronautical engineer. In designing a new aircraft system, we 
find that designers simulate the effects of what’s going to 
happen when that design is completed. They will input their 
basic parameters to a computer, build a model of that aircraft, 
and then make variations--or, you might say, a sensitivity 
analysis— to see whether the plane is going to crash or not, 
in terms of putting that system together.
So we say here that this same thing is possible, 
using these tools in terms of the research area, to answer a 
lot of questions which have been asked of the witnesses so far 
in these hearings, to find out whether or not these things are 
feasible and what their effect would be. There would be no 
reason why, for instance, a given company or a given industry 
could not be put onto a computer model, and that information 
could be modeled and simulated and sensitivity checked to see: 
what if this happens? what if that happens? And it should 
be able to be determined what these effects are before imple­
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mentation is proceeded with.
You never fly an airplane until you have checked all 
these things to make sure it's not going to fly apart while you 
are in the air in it, and I think the same thing applies here 
with the accounting business.
In summary, what we are saying is that current value- 
measurement techniques are available. They are being widely 
used nowadays; and as such, we feel that further research is 
required into this area. Of course, one of the key areas of 
research would be, simply, economic feasibility. Maybe it's 
not economically feasible to ask a company to be making these 
measurements, but why not test that and determine what the 
economics of it are?
The second area, of course, is in determining objec­
tivity and whether or not these quantifications are available 
to a degree that we can objectively measure them, so the ac­
counting profession would be able to audit them in terms of 
completing their audit function.
Those are, basically, the conclusion of our remarks; 
we have submitted our formal paper dealing with all these 
areas in more specific detail for further reference.
MR. GELLEIN: Thank you, Mr. Brinkman. This is the
sort of input this Group needs— among others you know— and we 
appreciate very much your well prepared and organized paper.
Let me start the questioning with this approach.
Among the overall objectives that have been stated for finan­
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cial statements, the one of verifiability--meaning that two 
experts independently take the same data with an understanding 
of purpose and come up with somewhat similar numbers...let’s 
take replacement cost new, less depreciation, as a measure 
of a current value. What would be your observation about the 
range of values that might be developed by two experts in your 
field with the same data, the same purpose, independently?
MR. BRINKMAN: Well, it's been my experience, in
terms of actually using that kind of data, that if they are 
using the same sets of data in terms of replacement cost new, 
less depreciation, if they are using the same mathematical or 
arithmetic formula, that they generally will come out with the 
same answer, unless somebody has changed the numbers or changed 
the formulas.
MR. GELLEIN: But doesn't the market value feature
enter into the depreciation, as you view it?
MR. BRINKMAN: Yes. In fact, I was just going to 
allude to that part of it, and the other part of it is in 
terms of what we consider economic obsolescence. That is where 
the variability arises in the differences of opinion.
If you took three experts in a given area of valua­
tion and asked them basically the same question, they generally 
are within a range of five to ten percent on that answer. If 
you then said, well is it possible to further quantify this 
information?— you will find that it is, when we take into ac­
count the other techniques of valuation. If we use three 
approaches to valuation, if one of them is way out in left
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field somewhere, we know we have done something wrong in that 
technique, and we go back and recheck it thoroughly to be cer­
tain.
Once the three approaches are brought together, ob­
viously the answers should reconcile and be similar or the 
same.
MR. GELLEIN: Do you find great variations in your
experience in this regard, depending upon the type of property 
involved?
MR. BRINKMAN: Well, there has been a lot of research
done in this area. The Group that's currently looking at the 
question of variability is the Appraisal Institute— which is 
concerned basically with real estate appraisal; and they have 
over the years been taking every court case where they have 
appeared as witnesses, and trying to put together a compendium 
of the types of variability that arise. And whenever there is 
a variation of, I guess, more than 10%, they have to reconcile 
those differences out of court, to determine whether or not 
they used the same techniques, and invariably they have been 
finding a very nice incidence of these things being in error 
in cases where they are off. Consequently, they have been 
trying to pull these together. This is the best research I 
know in this area of trying to reconcile this variability, 
because it does exist. There is variation, obviously.
MR. GELLEIN: Would there by anything in the way of,
let's say, written papers and studies that you might make 
available to this Group that would help us--for the record,
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at least--in terms of the variability factor, that would not 
be in the general literature?
MR. BRINKMAN: Only what the Appraisal Institute is
doing. I don’t know of any other studies that have been done 
in this area. And that would be a matter of collecting all 
their information that they would have available.
MR. PARKER: You made a point that management uses
the techniques that you described when they are contemplating 
a purchase, but isn’t it true that when they do that, they 
make the valuation for the purpose of that purchase and add 
that purchase to the existing business?
Accordingly, you have to consider any synergistic 
things that can come out of the purchase. They don’t go 
through this kind of study to work on the on-going results 
of their own business.
And if that be so, then what would be the utility 
of these procedures in working with a business not contempla­
ting purchase?
MR. LAWRENCE GOOCH: Well, first of all, management
currently uses this information on an on-going basis because 
they need to get insurance coverage, so they have to have in­
surance appraisals.
MR. PARKER: Well, they make that for the purpose of
the insurance appraisal, though, not for the purpose of making 
that a value of the business for any other purpose, do they?
MR. GOOCH: Well, your point is well taken. There
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is a difference in let's say, fair market value. One company 
may have greater value in buying it than another company be­
cause of profit protection, for instance.
MR. PARKER: Or because they have some cash that
they could use some place, or a plant they could use some 
place--all of which is unique to that particular valuation of 
that new company versus this existing company.
MR. GOOCH: Well, this is true. Primarily, what we
are talking about is fixed asset valuation, and not so much 
valuation of the entire enterprise.
MR. PARKER: Is that what all of your comments were
devoted to--fixed asset valuation?
MR. GOOCH: Primarily fixed asset, although, as we
mentioned, to value fixed assets you have to look at the value 
of the enterprise as a whole, because obviously some one is 
not going to make an investment in fixed assets unless they 
get a return commensurate with their investment. So you have 
to look at the total enterprise value to be able to prudently 
value fixed assets.
MR. PARKER: How do you get to this total enterprise
value? I thought you were talking about using the same tech­
niques to get that.
MR.GOOCH: The main thing is that fair market value
means that there would be many buyers, or many sellers, at this 
value; and this is the criterion that you have to use. If 
there is only one buyer that would buy it at this value, then
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that doesn’t constitute fair market value.
MR. PARKER: Well, let’s get to another part of this
You said that these techniques were applicable for valuing the 
whole enterprise— this market comparable technique, which 
sounds very interesting. For publicly traded companies, of 
course, each one has one already established in the market.
Do you suggest that the proper valuation for, let’s say, the 
Ford Motor Company is based on extrapolation from the stock 
market price of General Motors?
General Motors sells twice as many cars, and General 
Motors sells for a total market value of thus-and-so-much. 
Therefore, Ford should be worth half that amount. But, of 
course, that isn’t ture, because Ford happens to make much 
less money per car than does General Motors, and Ford’s ag­
gregate market value is actually much less than one-half that 
of General Motors.
But that market price is already there. The market 
comparables are right in front of people. So how would this 
market comparable technique in valuing the whole company for 
publicly owned enterprises advance our process here of account 
ing and financial statements?
MR. GOOCH: Well, first of all, there are really two 
components to consider that would go into a market comparable 
approach; and we did talk about financial risk and business 
risk.
Now, obviously the business risk of General Motors
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is less than that of Ford, because of the fact that they are a 
larger corporation--more secure.
MR. PARKER: Why would that necessarily be so? In
some cases, the second company in the industry is the more 
profitable one, and the more secure.
MR. GOOCH: Well, these are the factors in each
case that would have to be considered. In other words, there 
are certain parameters that would go into business risk-fi­
nancial size, operating margins, items of this nature that 
would change the business risk factor.
Now, as you say, there may be companies that are...
MR. PARKER: But these are already reported in the
financial statements— the size of their revenues and their 
operating margins.
MR. GOOCH: Well, as far as doing the market compara­
ble, you are correct, but they are not put together in terms 
in which the user is going to need them.
MR. PARKER: Well, the user is quite interested in
the stock price, because that's exactly what he's going to 
buy or sell.
MR. GOOCH: Okay. I agree with you. How does this
affect our situation here?
In other words, what we are trying to say is that 
we can come up, using various valuation techniques, with cur­
rent or market values for fixed assets.
MR. PARKER: Now we're back to just the fixed assets
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part.
MR. GOOCH: Well, as I say, we have to look at the
value of the enterprise to be able to determine the value of 
the fixed assets, because you can’t say that the value of the 
fixed assets exceeds the value of the enterprise. That 
wouldn't make sense.
MR. PARKER: I guess my question is: How is it that
you’ve prepared to develop the value of the total enterprise, 
in a way that’s different from what’s being done already?
MR. GOOCH: Well, I think, realistically, we’re not
going to be able to come up with a market comparable approach 
for an enterprise, and probably not for a number of specific 
other types of assets. For example, is it feasible to value 
land by having a massive data bank, and just plugging in?
The answer to that question may be no.
MR. PARKER: Well, then, you say that the market-
comparable technique, then, is out for valuing the total 
enterprise?
MR. GOOCH: Probably, because there are too many
subjective factors that would enter in; but what we're talking 
about is the fact that for many types of assets, like buildings 
and machinery and equipment, this would be feasible.
DEAN CYERT: "This” being what? The market compara­
ble approach?
MR. GOOCH: The market comparable approach. Now,
as I say, the market comparable approach is only one approach 
to value, because there is current replacement cost less de­
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predation as another, and also an income approach.
MR. PARKER: Current replacement cost less deprecia­
tion sounds to me very much like just fixed assets.
MR. GOOCH: Yes. That's what we're primarily direct
ing our presentation toward, the fixed asset side.
MR. BRINKMAN: Reed, I might also comment there.
You could apply this across the board, and you could actually 
do it even in terms of management, or a research group— what 
it would take to replace that group--the training-development 
costs, the recoupment costs, and everything else, if you want­
ed to apply it. We're just saying that these theories and 
these techniques have to be refined, to even eventually use 
them in some of these other areas.
We have seen this done in some purchase acquisitions 
where the company would actually value things on that basis.
MR. PARKER: Do you have any idea to suggest as to
what the relevance of that would be, though, to the figures 
we're talking about here?
MR. BRINKMAN: Well, in terms of coming up with cur
rent values, we're just talking about the means of measurement 
We are saying here--and we have prefaced in this manner— that 
if you want to use current values, the means of measurement 
are available, but even they need more research.
MR. PARKER: But you have nothing to suggest as to
whether they would or would not be relevant?
MR. BRINKMAN: No.
MR. WESTON: This may sound like more of the same,
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but on pages 38 and 39 of your paper you display a series of 
formulas which start with enterprise valuation, and as I under­
stand them, deduct the present value of the cash flow of vari­
ous items— receivables and cash and inventory— and then you 
get down to the area that we have been concerned with for a 
couple of days, the fixed assets, or the land and buildings, 
machinery and equipment, and you deduct the present value of 
the cash flow of those.
Now, I have two questions, I guess: How do you
determine the cash flow of particular machinery or equipment, 
or a building? And if you then go to replacement cost, as 
you have just alluded, do you replace the service utility of 
the item, or do you price level the purchase cost, based on 
price changes?
I guess the first part is, I don’t understand on 
page 38 how you determine the present value of the cash flow 
of a building, apart from the other assets.
MR. BRINKMAN: Basically, Mr. Weston, what we're
doing here is, we're imputing that; and that is to say that if 
you look at any given building or piece of land or equipment, 
it can be leased and you could generate from that an imputed 
lease cash flow. Basically, we would be applying that same 
technique here to look at these kinds of assets.
Within an enterprise, though, we would find that we 
could impute this as, hopefully, a group, for a given type of 
company; and these are some of the areas requiring some fur­
ther research in developing a mathematical model for pulling
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these together and seeing how these variabilities would work, 
if we made certain fluctuations or sensitivity analyses in 
this area.
MR. PARKER: Well, to help on Prank's question, how
would you impute the lease value of U. S. Steel's complex of 
steel mills?
know.
MR. BRINKMAN: That’s a good question. I don’t
MR. GELLEIN: Is it an incremental approach, basical­
ly, or...?
MR. BRINKMAN: What we are, in effect, doing in this
set of equations on page 38 is, we are presupposing we can 
generate an imputed lease flow, and then go through the pre­
sent worth analysis for the present worth of the future dis­
counted cash flow, plus a residual at the end, to come up with 
the current value.
Now, we really don’t even know how these things in­
terrelate, until you put this on a computer and start modeling 
these effects and figuring out what’s going to happen when you 
start making these variations. This is an area which requires 
further research, and that’s why it appeared at one of the 
last pages of our paper.
MR. GELLEIN: If I could go back to a point that
Reed made, the thing that’s kind of concering us a little 
bit— and I’m not asking for an answer to it, but an observa­
tion— is that if current value becomes a determinant of income,
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but if in turn income is a determinant of the current value- 
having to look to the value of the business as a whole then 
we're in sort of a vicious circle.
MR. BRINKMAN: That's right. Yes, that's why what
we say is that if we look at it on the basis of applying three 
approaches in every case, in once case you are looking at his­
tory, which is replacement cost, and which you would be genera­
ting from past history; in another case you would be looking 
at a discounted cash flow, which is future information; and in 
the third case it's market comparability, which is what's hap­
pening today. And you do all three of them— past, present 
and future— in that analysis.
MR. GELLEIN: (Temporarily assuming the chair) Are
there any other questions from members of the panel? (There 
were none.)
Thank you very much for a very fine presentation.
MR. BRINKMAN: We appreciate the time of you
gentlemen.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: All right, Arthur Young & Com­
pany. We'll let Mr. Gillette go right ahead.
MR. CHARLES G. GILLETTE: Well, Mr. Trueblood and
gentlemen of the Group, you are in possession of our written 
statement, and we won't take time to repeat it or summarize 
it today. Rather, we would like to comment on a few points 
on which there seemed to be conflict of views among those 
who have made written submissions.
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Some of the papers you have received, generally those 
which are considered conservative, have emphasized the steward­
ship of management and management’s fiduciary duty to its stock­
holders. There is an implication in this view that financial 
reporting should not concern itself with prospective investors, 
stockholders or creditors, as distinguished from present stock­
holders. By contrast, our explicit view is that financial re­
porting should he responsive without discrimination to both 
present stockholders and future stockholders, as well as to 
present and future creditors.
We think a realistic view of today's corporate life, 
with a billion shares of stock changing hands every year and 
public offerings being ground out by the hundred, must recog­
nize that management constantly has its eye on the marketplace, 
populated by the prospective investor, and whatever anyone may 
say about how it should be, financial reporting is, in fact, 
directed to that audience.
That being so, financial reporting should serve that 
audience well rather than poorly. Management has a public re­
sponsibility to the investing public as well as a fiduciary re­
sponsibility to its shareholders.
This leads us to the different question of public-in­
terest reporting. Public interest, as that term is being used 
in the 1970's, means something very different from the interest 
of the investing public. There is a widespread concern about 
the impact of large corporations upon those with whom they do 
not do business, concern about the impact of those corporations
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upon air, water, elections, and many other things. Those who 
pursue these subjects naturally want all the tools they can 
get, and the Study Group is importuned with proposals either 
to broaden the scope of financial reporting to deal with such 
matters, or otherwise to apply the skills of the accounting 
profession.
We would like to note that there is a major distinc­
tion between broadening the scope of financial reporting to 
encompass such matters and applying the skills of accountants 
to those matters outside the context of financial reporting.
We reject the idea of including such matters within financial 
reporting, first because it is a distraction from the primary 
objective of financial statements, as we see it, and second, 
because we do not believe that financial statements have been 
demonstrated to be the appropriate vehicle for reporting on 
such matters.
The profitability of a company and its impact upon 
our environment are both fruits of the corporate activities, 
but they are fruits no more alike than apples and bananas, 
and each should be handled differently, just as apples and 
bananas are.
As to whether the skills of accountants should be 
applied to measuring and reporting on such matters outside the 
financial statements, we doubt that there is a single general 
answer. Some of the questions involved may be matters that 
we accountants could handle skillfully, and some of them cer­
tainly are not. Our profession should not be hesitant to
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tackle new problems, but neither should we be flattered into 
the belief that we are the world's leading experts in all types 
of measurement and reporting.
It is interesting to note that those critics who are 
quickest to question our motivations, or our morals, at the 
same time express the most unqualified, blind faith in our 
great skill. Apparently, we, the accountants, are capable of 
anything, in both the favorable sense of that phrase and the 
derogatory sense.
Another issue which seems to cause some division, or 
at least some confusion, is the matter of comparability; that 
is, the question of whether comparability should be an objec­
tive of accounting. There are those who call for uniform 
rules of accounting in order to establish comparability, and 
on the other hand, there are those who say a shipyard is so 
different from a grocery chain that the two cannot be compared, 
and therefore that comparability is a false goal.
We believe that the truth lies between these two 
positions. It is true that a shipyard and a grocery store 
are different in many ways, and comparisons are difficult; but 
it is also true that they have certain attributes in common. 
They both require capital. They both strive for profit. And 
they both compete in the marketplace for the investor's dollar.
The investment community decides if and under what 
terms it will invest in one or the other, and this necessarily 
means that they are compared. Thus it is a proper and neces­
sary objective of accounting to minimize the difficulties of
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this comparison, insofar as possible.
To this end, the accounting concepts applied to one 
should be compatible with the concepts applied to the other.
In spite of the fact that net income is an imprecise concept, 
it should be an objective of accounting to make net income 
mean the same thing for a shipyard as it does for a grocery 
chain, insofar as that is possible. The result will of course 
be imprecise, but it will be better than if we don't try.
We therefore reject the idea that accounting prin­
ciples should be developed independently, industry by industry, 
without conceptual consistency.
Now I would like to talk briefly about the merits 
of using replacement value in lieu of historical cost. You 
heard a few minutes ago both the hopes for and the limitations 
on the appraisal techniques of the appraisal industry. Other 
advocates of replacement value have suggested that replacement 
value can be provided, and can provide more relevant data, 
avoiding the uncertainties of the appraisal process by deter­
mining replacement values through the application of price in­
dices. This may be true with respect to certain types of cap­
ital goods, such as trucks, buildings and freight cars. We 
submit, however, that price indices are totally useless for 
determining the current value of many other categories of 
long-term assets, which in the aggregate represent a major por­
tion of the nation's capital resources.
Examples of assets whose current values cannot be 
determined by price indices include the following short but
4.53
important list: natural resources in the ground, Series 360
computers, goodwill, a l4-story midtown hotel, patents, 
Disneyland, East or West, franchises, a transcontinental rail­
road track, land anywhere, a DC-8, or deferred R&D. For assets 
such as these, replacement cost, determined by index numbers, 
does nothing for the investor.
In addition, there is a class of assets for which 
price indices, however precise, are irrelevant, because the 
financial significance of those assets is determined by specif­
ic sales contracts rather than by the open marketplace. This 
class of assets consists of all the work in process, including 
building construction in process, which is being performed pur­
suant to sales contracts. If a construction contractor has a 
half-completed dam being built at a fixed price, it is totally 
irrelevant to his financial reporting whether an index of dam 
construction costs is up 20% since he incurred his costs, 
or whether the index is flat. His profit will be measured by 
the difference between his expenditures and his price, and not 
by somebody else’s expenditures at a different time and place.
As indicated in our written presentation, we do not 
advocate attempting to state a company’s assets at current 
values, whether by appraisal, by the application of price 
indices, or otherwise; but we do advocate the use of indices 
to adjust past expenditures, in order to express them in terms 
of current dollars. In other words, we believe that a set of 
financial statements should be expressed through a single, 
uniform unit of measure, the current dollar. This means that
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in the presence of inflationary conditions, such as have pre­
vailed in this country, it is desirable to adjust historical 
dollar amounts to express them in terms of today’s less valu­
able dollars. This, of course, is not current value accounting 
it is simply historical cost accounting measured by today’s 
money.
There have been some discussions, both private and 
public, on whether the presentations to the Study Group are 
conservative. Those who are radical deplore the presentations 
which are conservative. The presentation to you by Mr. Henry 
Hill, of Price, Waterhouse & Co., opens with the words: "This 
is a conservative paper.”
We are pleased to associate ourselves with the con­
servative view. Our paper is also a conservative paper, though 
perhaps a little less so than Mr. Hill's.
Conservatism, as we are using the word, means pre­
serving those values which have developed over time. In this 
sense, the Sierra Club is conservative, and so is Arthur Young 
& Company. We believe that the transaction based, investor 
oriented accounting practices that have evolved in the English- 
speaking world are as valuable to the nation as our giant 
redwood trees, and we hope that you gentlemen will not chop 
them down to make way for an experimental farm.
And now we are available for questions.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Very well done, Charlie. And
thank you very much.
And lest I forget, let me compliment you on your
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beautifully and very lucidly done monograph.
MR. GILLETTE: Thank you, sir.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Excellent reading.
I was interested particularly in a statement you 
made which relates hack to some of the other things that were 
said earlier this afternoon and, I believe, this morning. I 
did properly understand that you are saying that there may 
well he different requirements, in the sense of practice or 
procedure, industry by industry, hut you are looking for a 
consistent, conceptual umbrella. Is that the way you put it?
MR. GILLETTE: The latter part is the way I put it,
and I have no quarrel with the first part.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Now, one further question. Are
you ready, Reed? Go ahead.
MR. PARKER: On the adjustment for changes in the 
value of money, how would you do this on the income statement? 
Would you just adjust net earnings, net per share, and divi­
dends per share, or how would that work?
MR, ERNEST HICKS: What we envision here is what I
call a full adjustment procedure. It’s been described in a 
number of contexts. It was described generally in one of the 
research studies.
I think we're not talking about just a one item 
kind of adjustment, but a process of adjusting all the costs 
in a set of financial statements for changes in the price level, 
which process would produce profit-and-loss numbers that are 
different from those that now appear.
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MR. PARKER: Would every single item be adjusted by
the same amount? That is, a change in the Consumer Price 
Index— apply that from top to bottom?
MR. HICKS: Yes. It’s difficult to look into your
mind, or you look into mine, and see what one envisions, but 
I think generally the answer would be yes.
MR. PARKER: You would find some measure of change
in the value of money, and it might be the Consumer Price 
Index, or it might be--
MR. HICKS: That's right.
MR. PARKER: ...and whatever it is, it’s applied
from top to bottom.
MR. HICKS: That's right.
MR. GILLETTE: Well, I'm not sure we are talking
about the same thing. Depreciation would not be adjusted by 
the same factor as last month's sales,because depreciation 
would be adjusted by the change in the value of the dollar 
between the date the costs were incurred and the date they 
are being amortized.
MR. PARKER: So this would result in a different
net income figure than would simply result from taking all 
past ten years' net income and adjusting them?
MR. GILLETTE: Absolutely. If it didn’t have that
result, we probably wouldn’t bother to advocate it.
MR. PARKER: What figure would you use for the price
adjustment of the dividends that were actually paid?
MR. HICKS: Well, it would depend on how recently
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they were paid, and what change there has been in the index 
since the date of payment. In the current year, the adjust­
ment of dividends would he minimal. On the other hand, divi­
dends that were paid out a number of years ago, if I remember 
the mathematics of the process--and I haven't thought about it 
for a long time--
MR. GILLETTE: Ernie, wouldn’t the APB Statement
on this subject...
MR. HICKS: Well, that’s right. I didn’t refer to
the Statement. I referred to the research study, but I over­
looked the Statement. The Statement also deals with this ex­
plicitly.
MR. PARKER: Well, as a financial analyst I was
just thinking of my treasured tool of payout ratio. If I 
am now going to get a set of figures that adjusts the dividends 
that have actually been paid in the past, by one set of figures, 
and the earnings that were originally reported in the year they 
were reported, and against which you measured the dividend 
payout once upon a time, by a different set of factors, what 
do I have?
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Well, I think, Reed, whether you
buy it or whether you don't buy it, they are suggesting essen­
tially the techniques fully described in ARS No. 6. They might 
have their own adjustments, but in effect it would be a perva­
sive change.
MR. PARKER: The dividends and earnings would be ad­
justed by exactly the same amount?
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CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: No, that doesn't follow. We're
talking about...
MR. PARKER: Yes. Well, this, then, begins to pre­
sent some real problems for the investor, I would think. How 
does he use this historic record for looking into the future, 
if you have been adjusting every piece of the income statement 
by a different percentage?
MR. GILLETTE: I'm not completely clear on my tech­
nology on this, but I think that your ratios in a prior year's 
income probably would not be changed, but if it were something 
that last year was also on this method--assuming that this 
method had been in existence over a period of time— the ratios 
you determined from the income statement of 1965 would remain 
the same.
MR. PARKER: Pretax margin and...?
MR. GILLETTE: But all of the figures in that 1965
statement would be different than if unadjusted historical 
cost accounting had been applied.
MR. PARKER: I guess the last question I'd have is:
I wonder, if the basic purpose is to help the investor under­
stand what the process of inflation has been doing, why it 
wouldn’t suffice simply to adjust, say, the earnings per 
share and the dividends per share figures themselves, and let 
it go at that? Because otherwise you are restating things the 
way they didn't happen in the first place, and if there is any 
variation up and down the line, you would be affecting the
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ratio calculations.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Reed, I think it's much sim­
pler than that. I think you are trying to get around to a 
common dollar approach which would not affect his ratio 
analysis. Is that not correct, Charlie?
MR. GILLETTE: It wouldn't keep changing it year by
year with respect to any given year. It would change it as 
distinguished from not using a common dollar figure.
MR. GELLEIN: Just one last comment. Wouldn’t it
help, Reed, just simply to say that everything would be stat­
ed in terms of a current common dollar? Everything.
MR. PARKER: Well, if so, then why not just restate
the last two figures.
I gathered there was some part of the statement that 
said pretty soon you might find that you didn't need to report 
the historic dollar figures any more--the original ones.
DEAN EDWARDS: In your Item 4, Mr. Gillette, in your
statement there's a reference there to the utilization of cur­
rent, or economic values; that these would be preferable, were 
there a practical way of measuring them. Although you go on 
and elaborate further in your document, would you visualize 
this as being an objective, subject to measurement processes, 
that would accommodate your criticism?
MR. GILLETTE: No, we do not, because we think that
the basic difficulties in determining current values are so 
overriding that we are unable to visualize the development of 
technology which would change this.
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We are willing to concede the possibility that our 
vision of the future is not perfect and complete, and some day 
it might happen, but we don't regard it as a realistic and 
practical goal for which to strive.
DEAN EDWARDS: I think you said "foreseeable future";
so your timing is, in the life of the redwood tree you don’t 
see it as a foreseeable obstacle to be overcome.
MR. GILLETTE: Well, I understand the redwood trees
are in a lot of trouble; but subject to that, yes.
DEAN EDWARDS: One other question that you referred
to— including forecasts or excluding them from financial state­
ments. Would you like to comment? I think that was under 
your Item 6. Should forecasts be a part of the basic finan­
cial statements?
Would you visualize the basic financial statements 
remaining as they are, as a part of the objectives of account­
ing and financial reporting, or would you visualize them 
changing? Do you visualize this accomplishing the objectives 
within these contraints?
MR. HICKS: Well, we don't envision changing the
structure to the point of saying that the basic financial 
statements would not be the balance sheet, the income state­
ment, the changes in financial position, and a forecast. We 
think the financial statements ought to continue to be the 
first three, plus— in some cases--a couple that I didn't men­
tion, and we think that in some cases it would also be useful 
to present a forecast; but we think this is a different process
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than reporting on the past, and partly for that reason and 
partly because we don’t believe that in every case it would 
be useful to present a forecast, we don't believe that the 
forecast should become one of the basic financial statements.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: This gives me a chance to bring
up a question which I had to pass over this morning, because 
it didn't quite fit the conversation then.
The question that came from the floor was: When we
do talk loosely about forecasts— and we have talked somewhat 
loosely in these meetings about forecasts--are we really talk­
ing about earnings per share, sales, or net income, or are we 
contemplating, even though it’s not a part of the basic set-- 
which terminology I think I understand--a rather detailed 
breakdown of revenues, costs, expenses, and so on?
MR. HICKS: Well, for one thing, I think it would
vary from case to case, depending on what is practical to pre­
sent. As we point out in the paper, for some companies what 
would amount to a full forecast profit-and-loss statement 
could usefully be prepared; and the question of whether it’s 
useful or not depends upon how reliable it can be. Other 
companies could perhaps reliably predict sales, but wouldn’t 
be able to predict other factors.
So we don't have in mind any single format, such as 
earnings per share or net income, or a complete statement.
And yet it would just seem to me that if a relatively complete 
statement could be prepared, this would be the more useful 
format, for perhaps the same reason that a full income state-
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merit is— in the minds of all of us, I guess— better than a 
single figure of earnings per share.
DEAN DAVIDSON: Well, I applaud your conservative
stance and your reference to the redwoods and your unwilling­
ness to depart from the time honored historical cost and com­
pleted transactions approach, even though there have been some 
difficulties in recent years.
It reminds me of a session that I attended at Ox­
ford College a few years back where there was some discussion 
about the financial plight of the University. Someone had 
given them a fairly large gift, at least for those days, back 
in the l600' s, and it had been invested in agricultural land 
in the north of England. This had not been producing very 
much income for them, and there was a fairly general berating 
of the man who had made this decision, until finally someone 
rose to his defense and said: But isn't it true that the
last 300 years have been unusual?
Now, it seems to me that aside from what's time 
honored and been acceptable, I'm made uneasy by your statement, 
and maybe I'm quoting you out of context here, but your 
statement where you say: "Even if we accepted the current
value goal, however, we would think it inappropriate to pursue 
that goal piecemeal." That is, whether we ought not to be 
substituting current values wherever we can get reliable esti­
mations of these amounts, even though we do do it in a piece­
meal fashion.
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In a way, it almost seemed to me that that phrase 
was inconsistent with what appeared on the page before; and 
so I would really ask, if we get demonstrated dissatisfaction-- 
perhaps not 300 years of it, but some reasonable period-- 
whether we ought not to seek piecemeal substitutions of cur­
rent value.
MR. GILLETTE: Well, we certainly have no objection
to partial solutions to problems. Our objections to a piece­
meal approach in this particular context relate primarily to 
the difficulties of separating the values of individual assets 
from the enterprise value. We think in many cases there is 
very little meaning to going through an elaborate ritual to 
restate depreciation on a plant whose real significance to the 
investor is that it is an integrated part of a business pro­
cess.
The unattainable goal that we think would be very 
helpful to the investor would be to tell him exactly the value 
of that process, but we are not satisfied that he is helped 
by tagging appraisals on bits and pieces of that process.
The appraisal experts that talked to you just a little while 
ago talked about relating the value of components of an enter­
prise to the whole, and said that the values of the components 
must not exceed the whole--and that’s a valid test they are 
proposing--but I don’t think they told you how to apply that 
test when some of the components of the value of the enter­
prise as a whole aren’t on the balance sheet. I just don't 
visualize how you go about saying that this asset now has a
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value of X dollars more than its cost; hut we don’t know how 
that relates to the total value of the enterprise, because I 
think that relationship is essential to the validity of the 
original statement.
DEAN DAVIDSON: I’m not sure I follow all of that,
Charlie.
MR. GILLETTE: I’m not sure I could repeat it.
DEAN DAVIDSON: I'm not sure I’d ask you to.
DEAN CYERT: I think we should reverse the process.
You give an answer now, and see if he can give a question.
DEAN DAVIDSON: But I do not understand your un­
easiness where we can get reasonably satisfactory reproduction 
costs, current value numbers to substitute for the historic 
cost numbers.
To take an easy example, take the case, say, of a 
trucking company, which does have some trucks which have an 
unmistakable market value in a period of relatively rapid 
price change that might occur. It would seem to me you would 
be much better off in analyzing that firm if you had the cur­
rent values of the trucks, rather than the historic costs, 
and those current values could be substantiated by reference 
market figures.
MR. GILLETTE: If the company was a trucking con­
tractor, I will agree with you. If the company was a fran­
chised interstate trucking company, I would not agree. And I 
suggest that 90-some percent of U. S. industry is in this 
situation, more like the franchised interstate company than 
the company that enters into short term contracts to lease
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heavy equipment.
So I think there could be— and are--cases where re­
placement cost is enough more significant that it should be 
used. I suggest that that is such a tiny segment of industry 
that making it a general practice to use that data would cause 
more confusion than enlightenment.
MR. GELLEIN: I think I was most intrigued in your
paper, which I thought was very well written too, ...
MR. GILLETTE: Thank you.
MR. GELLEIN: ...by part of your point No. 2 where
you really make the pointy and I really think it gives us food 
for thought--maybe it needs considerable elaboration, this 
whole question of whether the changing nature of distributions 
by corporations from dividends to financing that comes from 
ploughing back earnings— whether, in terms of objectives of 
accounting, that causes a change, or a shift in the emphasis 
away from what you call the classical measures— book value, 
dividends, earnings.
Now, you conclude that this manifests itself in 
heightened interest for forecasts, presumably on the ground 
that, well, they are going to look more to appreciation than 
to dividends; I take this to be the analysis. And therefore 
the ploughing back of the earnings, and therefore the forecast 
of the earnings, becomes much more important in connection with 
appreciation versus dividends.
I don't know whether you want to elaborate on it now, 
but I would think this would be worthy of some elaboration at
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some point in time.
MR. HICKS: Well, Charlie may have a comment. I
would like to add only to what you said--and I think I agree 
with it--that the emphasis this gives is certainly to the 
question of forecasts, as we discussed it a few minutes ago, 
but it also runs to the predicative value of the financial 
statements. And that's perhaps the same thing, and perhaps 
a little different.
Do you want to add to that?
MR. GILLETTE: No, I don't think I'd add to that.
I agree with what you said.
MR. REINHART: I'd like to know if you could perhaps
give us some specific instances of where your proposed method 
of using these present values, however they are constituted, 
would have affected the allocation of resources in the United 
States, or would have resulted in lower cost products to the 
consumer.
MR. GILLETTE: I don't understand the question.
MR. REINHART: Well, the purpose of change is usually
to do something better. We presumably are changing the account­
ing in order to determine a better allocation of resources to 
various and sundry businesses, who are then going to supply, 
presumably, product to the consumer. So what I was curious 
about was, by making these changes you are describing, where 
is an instance where they would have affected that basic 
situation?--which is, I think, what we are driving toward, is
it not?
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MR. GILLETTE: Well, I think Mr. Defliese mentioned
a little earlier a category of companies where this would he 
applicable. I think that you would get very different results 
on companies with long term real estate holdings if you took 
inflation into account, as we suggest, and most particularly 
where those real estate holdings are leveraged.
Our present accounting doesn't reveal the benefits 
of leverage until disposition. It reveals only the cost of 
leverage. And that would continue to be true, but it would 
be mitigated.
MR. REINHART: Is it principally, however, in a very
limited area, though, that you are talking about?
MR. GILLETTE: No, I think we’re talking about effects
of a greater or less degree.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: I think Howie answered that
statement in terms of the other side of the coin this morning.
He indicated that they did an extensive price level adjustment 
in his company; and I believe you said that no internal deci­
sion would have been changed.
MR. WAGNER: ...would have been made otherwise, in a
different fashion, because of the price level changes that we 
have structured into our statements.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: One more question, Dick, if
you still have one.
DEAN CYERT: I was interested in your statement here
that financial statements must, to the extent practicable, be 
responsive to the equity security investor's interests. And
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you had three things listed here. No. 2 was in evaluating 
risk factors which may affect future earnings; and I didn’t 
see— perhaps I missed it in the statement--any elaboration 
of that.
I was interested in knowing how far you would go in 
the report in evaluating or giving information that would 
help the prospective investor evaluate risk factors. Would 
you compute variances, or beta factors, or what would you do?
MR. HICKS: Well--I don’t mean this to be flip, 
although it may sound flip--I think we'd tend to leave that 
to the Standards Board.
But thinking in terms of some things that might ac­
complish this objective, the simple matter, for instance, of 
concentration of either sales or purchases in a single customer 
or supplier is a risk factor. I don’t think of any others just 
offhand. Perhaps Charlie does; but it’s that kind of thing.
DEAN CYERT: Would you want to say something about
some measure of the volatility of earnings over time, or earn­
ings in particular divisions?
MR. HICKS: Reasonably so. I think the line of
business information falls into this category. There may be 
some blurring of lines here between the first and the second 
one in this tabulation, but I think, for instance, line of 
business information falls probably into the second category.
DEAN CYERT: Well, if we are going to set that as an
objective, we would need to spell out some guidelines there, 
wouldn’t we? Or else, we are again just in something where it
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depends on particular judgment.
MR. HICKS: Well, that's a very interesting question,
as to the extent of detail to which the Group would decide that 
it wants to go in making its recommendations.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: I'm not sure it's quite cricket,
but Prank wants to speak to his partners. And then we will 
close this discussion.
MR. WESTON: Back to the question of the trucking
industry which Sid raised--it was suggested to us this morning 
that the reporting by that industry, for example, in total, in 
terms of financial reporting and allocation of resources, would 
be much more useful to investors, and would result in a better 
allocation of resources if the entire industry were reporting 
on a replacement cost basis. Would you have any views on that? 
That is, wouldn't it be more useful to have the whole industry 
on a sound replacement cost reporting method?
MR. GILLETTE: Are you an expert on the trucking in­
dustry?
MR. HICKS: No, I'm not.
MR. GILLETTE: I'm not either, but...
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: You’ll have to defer to Sid.
MR. GILLETTE: I don't know the data that was submit­
ted to you this morning when I wasn’t here in support of that
proposition, but it would seem to me that franchises are so 
important in a major segment of the trucking industry, and the 
lives of its fixed assets are so relatively short, that account
ing on a replacement cost basis would have a relatively small
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effect as compared to the factors that really make or break a 
trucking company. But I have to again disclaim an in-depth 
knowledge of that industry.
MR. WESTON: Well, it’s not particularly the indus­
try. The franchises also would presumably be on a replace­
ment cost basis; the idea being that any industry using re­
placement cost does report a more realistic, and therefore 
more comparable, and therefore more useful financial presen­
tation than one using historic cost.
MR. HICKS: The industry doesn’t matter basically.
MR. GILLETTE: When you talk about franchises, our
views on reporting replacement cost--which has to be, I guess, 
the equivalent of market value— gets us back into the area we 
were talking about earlier, where fair value or replacement 
cost is so difficult of determination that we would question 
the reliability, and therefore the utility of the results.
And there again, I don’t know whether there is an 
open market on truck franchises or not, but I didn't think 
there was. Is there?
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Thank you very much.
We're going to do a bit of rescheduling because of 
problems we have tomorrow afternoon, and we’re going to call 
now on Mr. Koons of Shell Oil. We will then proceed to the 
National Investor Relations Institute, which means that we're 
apt to run over a bit, and we may have to cut our questioning 
a little, but we would like to make this scheduling change 
if it’s convenient with Mr. Koons.
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I know you have been here since yesterday morning, 
so you know the procedure.
MR. ROBERT L. KOONS: That’s quite all right.
Mr. Trueblood, members of the Accounting Objectives 
Study Group: I'm appearing here today on behalf of Shell
Oil Company, with which I have been associated for twenty 
five years. During this time I have had numerous financial 
assignments which in total represent practical working 
experience in essentially every aspect of the business.
I’m presently a consultant accountant to the Company. 
I am a CPA, have been for twenty years, and am a member of 
many professional organizations, including the American Insti­
tute of Certified Public Accountants.
These prepared remarks have the explicit concurrence 
and approval of Shell's executive management, and therefore are 
to be considered as my Company's recommendations to this 
Study Group.
By way of background, Shell Oil Company is an inte­
grated oil enterprise which has operated primarily in the Unit­
ed States for over fifty years. Last year our sales and total 
assets of $4.6 billion each rank us in size among the top in­
dustrial firms. We have over 33,000 shareholders, and our 
stock is listed on the New York Stock Exhange and other ex­
changes in the United States and Canada.
With this brief background on Shell Oil I turn now 
to the subject of this hearing. First, I wish to discuss the 
objective of general purpose financial statements and, second*
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the broader area of financial accounting.
We and other responsible parties believe that the 
objective of general purpose financial statements is to report 
to investors on the use of funds invested in the enterprise.
In our opinion, this objective of financial statements is 
immutable, and, although some may argue that new developments 
may call for modification of standards or of the items to be 
disclosed, the main purpose will remain the same. I question 
the wisdom of any drastic changes.
Today there seems to be an increasing tendency to 
place a disproportionate interest on ills and problems rather 
than achievement and progress. The daily fare of the news 
media is far more concerned with violence, disorder and those 
who have violated laws or a sense of fair play than it is 
with the common, daily accomplishments of the vast majority 
of society. Similarly, attention is disproportionately focused 
upon business ills rather than achievements. One aspect of this 
is a view that financial reports are woefully inadequate and 
that a crash program is necessary to reorient the objectives.
We reject this view and quesion the need of changing the ob­
jective of financial statements, for it seems that in practice 
the present objective has worked very well indeed.
There is always the possibility of abuse or intent 
to mislead. This does not mean that the system is wrong but 
merely that the standards are not properly applied. I do not 
believe there is an extension of Gresham’s Law whereby bad 
accounting drives out good accounting. There are in fact very
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significant safeguards for preventing abuse. First among 
these is management's legal responsibility to present finan­
cial statements fairly. Second, the integrity of the indepen­
dent accountants' audit and opinion is a most positive safe­
guard. In the rare cases where these fail, punitive action 
should be taken.
The importance of public confidence in financial 
statements must not be underrated. It is earned by integrity, 
consistent action, comparable treatment and a record of behav­
ior that merits faith. Therefore, in considering something as 
significant as a reordering of objectives, it is vital to con­
sider what any basic change would do to confidence. If the 
situation were out of control or operating very poorly, then 
a change in objectives might be in order. Such is not the 
case. A high degree of confidence in financial statements 
does exist. To give an example from our own recent experience, 
we believe that the facility with which we have successfully 
raised over $1 billion by debt and equity offerings in the 
last decade was made possible by the widespread confidence 
investors have in our financial statements. I am sure many 
others have experienced the same effectiveness of the capital 
markets. The confidence upon which the system works is basic 
to our free enterprise economy. Because a significant change 
in the objectives of financial statements, or in the basis of 
accounting, has the potential for irreparable harm to investor 
confidence, it must be approached with extreme care.
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Accounting Principles Board Statement No. 4 states, 
"The responsibility for the reliability of an enterprise's 
financial statements rests with its management. This respon­
sibility is discharged by applying generally accepted account 
ing principles that are appropriate to the enterprise's cir­
cumstances, by maintaining effective systems of accounts and 
internal control, and by preparing adequate financial state­
ments." We agree with this principle. We cannot envision 
management abdicating responsibility for its reports or stand 
ing by and letting a third party assume this responsibility, 
particularly in light of the accompanying obligation and 
potential liabilities.
Since management is ultimately responsible for re­
porting on its stewardship, it must have an important voice 
in establishing accounting standards. There are ample legal 
precedents to support this opinion. A great amount of assis­
tance is required from the public accountant both in the 
setting of standards and, more importantly, in ascertaining 
that they are correctly applied. However, we feel that those 
responsible for financial reports should participate in the 
standard setting process at least equally with the public 
accountants who express an opinion thereon and with the 
investors who use the reports. In many respects management 
is in a unique position to exercise a role of leadership in 
considering new standards because of its knowledge of the 
business and the accounting system. Management has an even 
greater contribution to make in setting the standards because
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the financial statements should reflect the judgments and the 
decisions that management has made. While Shell results to 
date have not been materially affected by Opinions of the 
present Accounting Principles Board, we have been active in 
the accounting profession's endeavors to establish acceptable 
accounting standards. Assuming the Accounting Principles 
Study Group recommendations are accepted, there presumably 
will be an opportunity for even greater management participa­
tion in the standard setting process. We expect to contribute 
because we believe, as managers, we have something essential 
to offer, and because in the final analysis the system will 
not run very well if we who are responsible for making it 
work do not have a strong voice in the design. It is through 
this process of research and collective participation that 
further positive improvement of basic financial statements 
can be made.
I turn now from responsibility for general purpose 
financial statements to the standards followed in their prep­
aration. The more significant accounting standards are his­
torical cost, realization, conservatism, and consistency 
with prior reporting periods. We believe any statement on 
objectives should include an unequivocal affirmation of these 
standards. They provide the most reliable criteria for meet­
ing the seven qualitative objectives of relevance, under­
standability, verifiability, neutrality, timeliness, compa­
rability and completeness. While it is difficult to judge 
specific standards in such abstract terms, the present stan­
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dards have these qualities in greater measure than any alter­
native. Assuredly, historical cost is more understandable, 
verifiable, neutral, and timely than, say, a present value 
or price level adjusted basis. Some specialist users of 
financial statements may find these other bases relevant 
for some purposes, but I do not believe the primary report 
users find profit based upon historical cost irrelevant. 
Because the present conventions are rooted in recording actu­
al transactions, they do not involve the subjectivity of other 
bases. While there are minor conflicts between qualitative 
objectives, it seems highly desirable that we retain the 
objectivity of historical cost as a benchmark.
There have been a number of proposals to adopt pres­
ent value rather than historical cost as the basis for finan­
cial statements. I believe this is impractical. Who should 
be the judge of value? Different users have a different 
time preference for money and different degrees of aversion 
to risk. Any serious attempt to rigorously and systematical­
ly obtain the present value of the many varied assets of a 
major corporation would involve a significant delay and cost 
incommensurate with the subjective results. While I have 
doubts whether a present value basis of accounting will work 
in any industry, I know that in the petroleum industry it 
presents insurmountable problems. With respect to undeveloped 
properties and unmined reserves, opinions as to the differ­
ence between the highest two bids can run into the millions 
of dollars. With the passage of time the property may ulti­
mately prove to be worthless or it may be worth many times
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the initial outlay. The exploration and the development period 
could take a decade and require further significant capital out­
lays. The determination of value is hardly easier after initial 
development is completed. Additional capital will be required 
for secondary recovery. Determination of reserves is an inexact 
science. Aside from incomplete geological knowledge, ultimate 
recovery is affected by future technology, price and governmental 
policy. Even if unmined reserves could be accurately determined, 
value is highly influenced by both rate of production and price. 
These are affected by general economic conditions, competitive 
action, and governmental controls or restraints. It is under­
standable that investors might desire to know the future in these 
respects. However, any attempt to furnish an estimate of the value 
of unmined reserves would not meet a single one of the seven qual­
itative criteria. Any attempt to ascertain short run changes in 
value of a petroleum company’s assets would be irrelevant and 
misleading.
Once accounting departs from actual transactions and 
attempts to measure all changes of value, there are essentially no 
constraints upon the subjective nature of reports. In addition, 
the accountants’ attestation role appears quite difficult. As noted 
earlier, investor confidence cannot be earned without disciplines 
and controls. The reservations as to a value basis for accounting 
have been well documented in accounting literature.
Any significant change in accounting standards would 
create most serious problems and the distortion of many relation­
ships and contractual arrangements based upon present standards. 
Indenture restrictions, debt-equity ratios, union contracts, and
bonus or incentive formulas could all be significantly affected. 
These long standing arrangements were not arrived at capriciously
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For example, a different standard might produce a result that 
would either eliminate or double what would otherwise be the 
permissible amount of an incentive bonus. Because of the con­
tractual arrangement undoubtedly presumed consistent application 
of the existing accounting standard, change would produce an 
unjust reduction or a potential windfall. In other words, changes 
in accounting standards can materially affect the substance of
contractual arrangements. The possibility of producing mul­
tiple financial statements in order to adhere to both the 
present and a new standard would only create confusion and 
loss of confidence. In addition, the cost of presenting 
multiple statements is a clear burden on investors and con­
sumers interested in efficiency and cost reduction.
Up to this point my comments have been limited to 
general purpose financial statements and have been based on 
the following broad principles which we recommend to this 
Committee:
1. General purpose statements are reports to in­
vestors of funds invested.
2. It is management's responsibility to prepare 
these reports.
3. Exercise of this responsibility requires man­
agement to use accounting standards compatible with the way 
management reaches business decisions.
without regard to the present accounting standards being used.
4. The independent accountant’s responsibility 
should be clearly defined in order that objectivity and 
independence are maintained.
5. Investor confidence in general purpose state­
ments Is vital to our free enterprise economy. That confi­
dence could be irreparably damaged by a radical new basis 
of accounting, and, finally; the conventional standards of 
historical cost; realization; consistency; and conservatism 
are so widely used and proven that they could not be discard­
ed without confusion resulting.
This Committee is also concerned with financial 
reporting; which of course is a far broader area than general 
purpose financial statements. In Shell Oil we receive many 
requests for information of a financial nature. Our finan­
cial officers; and indeed all senior management; are involved 
In the broad area of financial reporting. While many desires 
for data have little; if anything; to do with financial state­
ments; they are legitimate requests for information. When it 
is reasonable to do SO, the data are supplied outside the 
financial statements. If request cannot be reasonably met; 
valid reasons for not meeting them are normally given.
Because the nature of requests is changing quite 
rapidly; it is not possible to state as an objective precise­
ly what should be supplied. It seems obvious that some de­
sires are short lived; and new ones constantly arise. If 
this Committee feels it incumbent on them to deal with this 
area at all; we suggest that the objective should be to meet
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all reasonable requests for financial information outside the 
general purpose financial statements. Such disclosure might 
include price level adjustments and other objective data that 
a reasonably prudent investor could utilize in making his eval­
uations.
There have been various proposals that financial 
statements should include forecasts or predictions of future 
results. We oppose this view. We believe that investors are 
better served if they are provided past results and information 
on firm decisions that affect the future, so that each can form 
his own judgment as to how the future may unfold. The obvious 
objection to presenting either a specific or a generalized fore­
cast is that the forecast is subject to being proven wrong, to 
the detriment of the reader who may have relied upon it. By 
way of illustration, oil industry profits are quite sensitive 
to price, and gasoline prices are subject to frequent wide 
fluctuations. Last year we sold over 9 billion gallons of gas­
oline. A change of one cent per gallon in the price amounts 
to $90 million. After taxes that one penny a gallon in price 
amounts to about 20% of net income. I am sure you as a motor­
ist are aware that prices fluctuate more than a penny a gallon. 
Would you care to forecast net income? As an auditor, can an 
opinion on a forecast be unqualified? The addition of premises, 
strategies and a basis for a forecast might place it in a better 
perspective. However, premature publicity and disclosure could 
be detrimental to investors because competitor action would 
virtually guarantee specific plans could not be carried out.
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Aside from the practical problems inherent in fore­
casting, there is a potential liability that could arise if an 
investor is injured because he accepted a forecast to his detri­
ment that had been proven to be in error. Accordingly, it should 
not be an objective of financial accounting to publish either a 
specific or a generalized profit forecast. Each investor is 
placed on an even basis when he is given factual information 
and left to form his own judgment as to the future. Factual 
information might include, in addition to general purpose fi­
nancial statements, an approved capital expenditure budget, 
order backlogs, news of firm decision to build a major new 
facility, or a major new contract.
 A recurrent theme has been that financial statements 
should be in tune with the way business operates and reaches 
major decisions. In that connection, income from operations 
is one of the most useful performance indicators that can be 
easily disclosed, but is not now generally given sufficient 
prominence in financial statements. In general terms, income 
from operations means gross revenue minus all costs except 
property provisions or depreciation and deferred taxes. In 
theory, interest, expensed research, and expensed exploration 
costs might also be added back or, if you will, not deducted 
along with the operating costs. Income from operations is 
widely used internally for project evaluation in discounted rate 
of return or present value computations. Because shareholders 
and creditors should likewise find this indicator of performance 
or investment worth useful, it could be given greater prominence
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in financial reports by setting it out in the income statement 
and in per share data.
Gentlemen, I thank you for your patience and consid­
eration and the opportunity to appear. The basic message I 
wish to convey is that management is responsible for account­
ing to investors for its stewardship. Exercise of this impor­
tant responsibility requires consistent application of factual 
financial accounting. The present basis has been proven to 
be capable of working very well. The remedy for prevention 
of abuse is management acceptance of its responsibility, dis­
closure, and competent independent audit. Additionally, we 
favor research and review directed towards continuing the 
evolutionary improvement of financial statements. Both the 
marketplace and the courts will punish those few who abuse 
their trust or perform carelessly. It is desirable to codify 
or reaffirm objectives. Such process does not encompass any 
major reordering of objectives, as such a radical step could 
impair investor confidence. To the extent that the financial 
reporting process can be improved within this framework, we of­
fer our knowledge and experience. This is important because 
we in management believe we have a vital stake in establish­
ing sound accounting principles.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Thank you very much, Mr. Koons.
We have heard directly from only two representatives of industry 
Mr. Walter yesterday, who represents an industry that might be 
regarded as somewhat evolving in terms of accounting concepts. 
Yours is a unique industry, but not a new or evolving one.
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MR. KOONS: We feel on the firing line.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: I have a question which I think
particularly relates to your situation, in the sense that we 
must consistently consider cost-benefit ratios; that is, we 
must he very concerned about additional data if it requires 
additional cost.
But one of the questions I have about your presenta­
tion is that it seems to me that all the data you are saying 
should not be disclosed must be available internally, so I do 
not understand the additional cost.
MR. KOONS: Which data are you talking about?
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: The data on reserves.
. MR. KOONS: Well, we disclose our data on reserves
and the percent to which it's developed, so I still don't un­
derstand.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: But not in dollars.
MR. KOONS: Well, I deny that we have that data in­
ternally, that we use it for anything, or that it has any 
relevance.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: If we have inventory on hand,
and it is widgets, there is a way of pricing it, and we do 
price it in a manufacturing concern. Now, what is the vast 
difference?
MR. KOONS: Well, I recited in my prepared text the
problem in estimating the quantity of unmined reserves, the 
very long gestation period, the difficulty in estimating the 
volume. Even more important than the volume is the price.
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These reserves may last many years. We’re producing 
oil fields now that were discovered back in 1920.
What is relevant is: What is what we are producing
today worth? But that ties in with realization.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Well am I hung up on the question
of precision or parameters of approximation? As you know, I 
fully admit that there can be nothing precise about this kind 
of valuation, but in broad parameters, or reasonable approxima­
tions, is it not possible to state known reserves in terms of 
approximate dollar values?
MR. KOONS: Mr. Trueblood, I have spent quite a num­
ber of years working in this area. I have testified before the 
Federal Power Commission. I'm quite knowledgeable. Let me just 
give you an example. This goes back to studies over twenty 
years.
First, the estimate of unmined reserves on a new 
field ultimately turns out to be roughly nine times the in­
itial estimate. That's just in terms of the sheer physical 
volume.
Second, it takes quite a long period of time to pro­
duce. The decline pattern--the value depends on when you get 
it; and obviously something received tomorrow is worth more 
than something received in twenty years.
The rate of production is influenced by the geological 
conditions, politics--both international and national, and the 
price. Oil was worth 10¢ a barrel when some of these were dis­
covered. Maybe we won't see that again, but price is a two-way
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street, and we aren't always climbing uphill.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: I understand...
MR. KOONS: I can go on.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: ...not completely, but I think
maybe Reed can help clarify the problem here.
MR. PARKER: I had some other questions, Bob, but I 
think that on your point the time factor, it seems to me, is one 
of the most important, because this oil sits down there. Sup­
pose there are ten barrels down at the bottom of the hole, but 
just one way or another, by practicality, one barrel is available 
this year, one next year, one the next year. And you can state 
its present value, but there's no way that the company can ever 
sell all of it at one time, and when it does sell it, it sells 
what it can sell at the prices it can sell it for, with the 
costs of distribution that then exist.
MR. KOONS: There's one other important point on this,
Mr. Trueblood. I think the industry averages are that some­
thing on the order of 20 or 25% of the oil that is found is 
ultimately produced. What is produced is a function of the 
price.
Now, if because of demand, the international situa­
tion, the military situation, or what have you, the price were 
to be 10¢ or a dollar a barrel more, most assuredly we could 
produce much more. So when you say the volume, I must ask, 
the volume at what price? And if the market is willing to pay 
a higher price, more could be forthcoming.
MR. PARKER: At what price and what cost levels?
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You can’t have one change without the other changing.
MR. KOONS: That is correct. I mean, a real increase
in price. But when do you abandon a well? You abandon it 
when the cost of lifting it exceeds what you can get for it 
today. If you could get another 25¢, you might postpone the 
abandonment for another year.
DEAN DAVIDSON: But doesn't the investor have to go
through these calculations too, in deciding whether he wants 
to buy Shell? And would not he be helped by yours? Admit­
tedly, your estimates are imperfect, but would they be worse 
than those arrived at by someone who doesn’t know as much 
about it?
MR. KOONS: I think the investors are all placed on
an even basis when they are all provided the volume of reserves, 
to the extent that they are developed, what our plans are for 
expenditure, or development— all of which we disclose. But 
these I would put in the realm of factual, solid, hard, trans­
action type data.
I think when you get down to value, each investor is 
going to have his own judgment or feel for value; and he should 
make that judgment, not the management— and least of all, its 
auditor.
MR. PARKER: You mentioned earlier in your comments
that you don’t really believe in a Gresham's Law for account­
ing. And I think rather than talking about good accounting 
or bad accounting, usually when people talk about the idea of 
Gresham's Law of accounting, it’s accounting that realizes
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income sooner rather than later; and it seems to me we have an 
awful lot of evidence that suggests that there is such a law.
If we take depreciation accounting, the shift in re­
porting to stockholders from accelerated to straight line; if 
we take the idea of interest charged to construction, it used 
to he used only in the utility industry, and now moves to other 
industries; if we take the installment method of reporting for 
installment sales type of things, and shift over to recognizing 
all the profit at the time the sale takes place; if we take 
shifts from LIFO to FIFO inventory accounting; if we take 
shifts from chargeoffs of research and development to capital­
izing; if we take the investment tax credit--on every single 
one of these there have been numbers and numbers of shifts in 
accounting policy by companies from one to the other, almost 
invariably from the one that realizes the income later to the 
one that records it sooner.
Some of these have been stopped by the Accounting 
Principles Board Opinions, but unless and until the Opinion 
comes along, this phenomenon seems to take place predominantly 
in the same direction, and I think that's what most people are 
thinking about when they state a Gresham’s Law of accounting.
Would you really disagree that such a thing exists?
MR. KOONS: Well, I presume first, that you are
innocent until proven guilty; but let me say this— that Shell 
Oil Company has not made any changes in accounting whatsoever, 
and as stated in our audited and certified financial state­
ments—
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MR. PARKER: Well, I gathered your opinion applied
to all industry and not just to Shell.
MR. KOONS: Well, by the same token, I gather when
you say people use these--maybe you didn’t use the word "gim­
micks", but changes, or shifts, or adjustments--that you were 
applying that to all; and I’m saying it doesn’t apply to all, 
and I think we’re not the only company who takes very seriously 
their responsibility to consistently and fairly report their 
results.
MR. PARKER: Well, I don’t question that.
MR. KOONS: Okay. Well, I think the only point is, 
if the bad drove out the good, why have we not changed? Or 
why have not many other companies? It is not us alone.
MR. PARKER: Another question— you rather suggest
that forecasting, or public forecasting by the company--and 
particularly, in this case, for Shell--is difficult because 
of the sizable changes that take place in gasoline prices at 
the pump. I don't have a perfect memory on this, but how many 
times over the past twenty years, let's say, has Shell Oil’s 
net earnings changed by as much as 10% in a given year, and 
how many times over the past twenty years has there been a 
decline rather than an increase?
MR. KOONS: Well, in two out of the last three years
there has been a decline of over 10% .
MR. PARKER: How many times over twenty years?
MR. KOONS: Well, the figures are stated in our
annual report, but I would say— just to venture a guess— at
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least half. I know they were either up or down over 10% in 
probably eight out of the last ten years.
MR. WESTON: One more brief point on reserves. I
guess we all appreciate the difficulty of estimating them, 
but isn’t it true that the American Petroleum Institute defin­
ition, which I believe the industry uses, of proven reserves 
for depletion computations encompasses those reserves which are 
economically producible under today’s conditions, so that each 
company presumably makes an economic computation to determine 
the depletion base for its accounting?
Why shouldn’t that be made a part of the public rec­
ord in terms of the valuation of those reserves?
MR. KOONS: Well, you don’t need the valuation of the
reserves to make a depletion computation, and we do make the 
physical volume a part of the public record.
MR. WESTON: No, but you do make an economic compu­
tation which shows lifting costs and sales prices, to determine 
the reserves which can be economically produced.
MR. KOONS: No, we do not.
MR. WESTON: Well, that’s my understanding of the
definition--you must make a computation of those reserves which 
can be economically produced. That is the definition of proven 
reserves, and all companies--as I understand it— make that com­
putation, because if you can’t produce them economically, they 
are not part of the depletion computation.
Therefore I wonder why that information at least, 
which as I understand it--is computed by most companies,
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shouldn't be made a part of the record in terms of the valua­
tion of reserves which can economically be produced.
MR. KOONS: You say "economically produced." The
amount of reserves that we are going to produce is anything 
for which the cost will not exceed the current selling price.
MR. WESTON: That's right.
MR. KOONS: Now, if these reserves are going to be
produced a way down the road, you get involved in when they 
are going to be produced, and then you get the question of 
discounting.
MR. WESTON: That's right.
MR. KOONS: But you don't have to compute the dollar
value of the reserves.
MR. WESTON: But I understand you do, to make this
computation. You get the dollar value by computing the lift­
ing cost and the sales price, present valued, in order to de­
termine what reserves are economically producible for deple­
tion purposes.
This is from the API literature describing how 
depletion is computed, and it's my understanding all the com­
panies follow this. My question then is, why should not that 
element of value at least be disclosed?
MR. KOONS: Because we do not, and I do not believe
that any other companies make such a computation.
MR. WESTON: Then we should change the API's public
information, because they imply otherwise.
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MR. KOONS: I don't think there is a fundamental 
difference there. I think it is a matter of a play on words, 
or of understanding.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Thank you very much. We will
now hear from National Investor Relations Institute.
MR. ARTHUR R. ROALMAN: By way of introduction, I'm
Arthur Roalman, and to my left is Marvin Chatinover, and to 
his left is Gerald Parsons.
By way of precision, I would just like to mention 
that Mr. Parsons' company is no longer U. S. Plywood-Champion 
Papers, but it is now--as of last Thursday and by action of 
their Board of Directors— Champion International Corporation; 
additionally, he's a member of the Executive Committee of the 
Investor Relations Association of New York.
With those two corrections in the presentation, I 
would spend just a few moments here attempting to underscore 
a few points in the presentation. We're here to talk about 
the practical problems involved in transmitting financial in­
formation developed by accountants. We're concerned with 
clarity, and we would hope that material that is scheduled 
for, or intended for, broad scale distribution might be jour­
nalistically sound.
I think that's the sense of our presentation here.
It should be understandable. I'm sure you are all aware of 
the problems of trying to make complex information understand­
able and meaningful to large numbers of people.
We think this is going to apply more and more to
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news releases, annual reports, and proxy statements. All of 
our conversations with the SEC suggest that those are a thing 
of the past.
Two points that I would mention, in addition to 
what's in the presentation here: I think there is an oppor­
tunity and a need for more aggressive information exchange 
between accountants and what I would call the mass media.
Peat Marwick, to cite one, is embarking on a series of seminars 
with the Financial Writers Association. I think they are to 
be commended for that. I think there’s an appetite on the 
part of the Financial Writers Association for the information 
that they obtain from those meetings.
There's another organization— Irving Trust--which 
for years has been holding seminars for financial officers, 
and recently began including the financial editors of large 
newspapers. As a member of NIRI, I participated in those 
meetings, and was enlightened, to put it mildly, to see the 
interest on the part of the financial press, and also the 
appetite for knowledge that they had in the areas that the 
Irving Trust people were talking about.
We would like to underscore the importance of contin­
uity and the ready availability of information. We think those 
are fundamental to any information program of any corporation, 
and we think that there is a substantial need, particularly in 
the communications process, for integrity, about which, as 
many of you who have been reading the financial press know, 
some of the people who are communicating financial information
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have placed themselves in a questionable position. We 
think that's a subject that needs deep and intensive ex 
exploration and concern.
That highlights most of the points that I would 
try to underscore except that I would hope that someone 
around the table here might ask us about predictions, because 
it's a subject that we think has very practical problems, and 
I think we’re in a position to address ourselves to. With 
that I’ll stop.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Do your peers wish to speak
individually at this point? (There was no response.)
On this business of financial seminars, there has 
been a rather long history directed directly to the financial 
press, as distinguished from public relations people within 
corporations. They go back as much as five or six years.
I’m sure more could be done, but the Institute 
itself has run seminars running for two to three days in 
all sections of the country with all major media.
Now it may be time to recycle that process.
MR. ROALMAN: I might add, incidentally, if you
would be interested in seminars in which the investor rela­
tions people might participate, I think we could be active 
in encouraging your participation in those seminars. There 
might be values in that.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: I’m just not certain of the
Institute's current program. Maybe, Paul, you might check 
into it. I have a feeling that it peaked, and most regions
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and most major media were hit, and that now we probably have 
a new crop, and we should be doing it again.
I would say that this public hearing is our last 
major formal input, but we have been working closely with the 
media, and we intend, in this process to interview major 
media on a group basis, for which we have their commitment.
I did not catch, or did not understand, one allusion 
or reference you made to integrity— was it of information, 
or of the presenters of financial information? Just what did 
you mean by that?
MR. ROALMAN: Not of the information itself, but of
people who are transmitting the information. I think it’s in 
the information process.
There have been a certain number of celebrated cases 
recently in which people transmitting information have been 
accused by the SEC or others of not being precise, to put 
it mildly. I think it's a matter of serious concern, both to 
you and to us. I think the subject of confidence on the part 
of the investor is at stake in that particular situation, and 
I think that both of us need to be seriously concerned about 
furthering the subject of integrity.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Here we have a channels problem
as it were, in that— given the affairs of a client, or the 
results of his affairs--we do not participate--and may not 
participate--in the communication of that data.
Now, are you suggesting that there is something that
we could do?
MR. ROALMAN: No. No.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Except to exhort our clientele?
MR. ROALMAN: No, I would not suggest that you would
have a piece in that process, no. I’m just saying that it's 
a matter of concern, in the sense that, to the degree the 
process of transmitting of information is undermined, I think 
that you do have a concern there. That's all.
MR. GELLEIN: Is it possible that we do have an
educational task to perform, though? I mean, maybe that's 
our responsibility.
MR. ROALMAN: Marvin, would you care to comment on
that?
MR. MARVIN CHATINOVER: Yes, I would like to ad­
dress myself to that among other things, and I have a particu­
lar concern here. I edit a publication known as The Investor 
Relations Newsletter. I also teach investment analysis, and 
I'm extremely concerned about meaningful communication of 
accounting data. I attended one of these seminars this morn­
ing, attended by Peat Marwick, and I believe that one of the 
things the accounting profession has to be terribly concerned 
about is the fact that the nature of the accountants' letter 
in an annual report is, I think, basically misunderstood, and 
by and large, a great deal more imputed liability may be 
attached to that than should be.
Now, I think that's part of an overall problem that 
concerns you. I understand the nature of these forms, and I 
think you are going to lose something in the process. I know
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that you have to pay very clear attention to the formulation 
and review of accounting principles, hut I think that you 
have to he terribly concerned as to how these are viewed in 
the public eye, and particularly in the investor eye.
While you may not have, for example, particular and 
direct responsibility for the contents of the President's let­
ter in an annual report, I know that very frequently in per­
sonal contact I have found the cooperation of professional 
accounting personnel to be a very valuable weapon in hitting 
management over the head and saying: Now, look here! I It is
one thing to have meaningful communication of data qua data. 
In other words, many of the pieces of literature here have 
said the numbers are the important thing.
Gentlemen, I agree with you that this is a first 
professional obligation. I suggest to you that there is 
another very significant corollary that you may not be direct 
ly engaged in, but in which you have a vital personal and 
professional as well as public interest; and that is that the 
public understand what the meaning of the data is.
I am considerably disturbed by comments I hear to 
the effect that: Well, they won’t understand the complicated
matters. Baloney. That is usually an excuse which means,
(1) I as a professional communicator am too lazy, or have 
not the capacity to understand it; and (2) I do not have 
the self-discipline to sit down and put it into a meaningful 
and interesting form.
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I suggest that much can and has been done in this 
field. I’d like to cite one example I gave this morning in 
discussion over at Peat Marwick.
The 1955 Annual Report of General Electric— and this 
year progress certainly was one of their most important prod­
ucts--had a five paragraph discussion in English--not simply 
in numbers--as to the difference between LIFO and FIFO, the 
fact that the Company was changing their accounting method 
of inventory valuation, and what that meant. It was equally 
meaningful to a sophisticated investor, a professional se­
curity analyst and any layman who had had a high school educa­
tion.
It's that sort of thing that I think we together, 
as professional men and women, have to strive to work for, 
because I think we all have a vital interest in that--a 
sense of public integrity, and awareness of it.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: I couldn't agree with you
more, and I happened to read just last evening a speech by 
Mr. Casey which hits upon this point. I don’t know if you 
saw it or not. It's right off the press.
He is saying in effect that we have had forty 
years of too much legal haggling over weasel words. It’s 
now time to start saying what people can understand. So 
we’re certainly with you.
MR. PARKER: I don't know whether this is a fair
question to put to you, but we have had some discussion earli­
er in the hearings and in the papers that have been submitted
to us about the auditors’ certificate and whether perhaps it 
should be revised to say that the statements are a fair pre­
sentation of the transactions they record, rather than a fair 
presentation in line with generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples.
Would any of you have a comment to make on that sub­
ject?
MR. CHATINOVER: I would answer to this. I don’t
see any need for a change. I think there is a definite need 
for communication as to what GAAP is and what the nature and 
limitations of accounting statements are.
I want to say that here again, I must address my­
self to substance rather than form. I listened very closely 
to the discussions today on present value auditing of fore­
casts, historical costs versus present values, current values, 
et cetera. I appreciate all of the difficulties involved in 
the formulation and resolution of these problems.
But again I’m suggesting that, underlying this, I 
felt a sense of: But you’ll deceive people.
You know, it's very interesting that the SEC has 
all of a sudden awakened this past year and is ahead of all 
of us, because all of a sudden Alan Levenson in three speeches 
has indicated that the SEC is now sensitized to the criticism 
that heretofore their administration of the disclosure provi­
sions of the '33 Act has been more negative than positive; 
that it would appear to be that the administrative intent has 
been: Guard the average, unsophisticated investor against
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his or her speculative proclivities; do not allow him to he 
unduly titillated by information which they definitely want 
at certain times, like, what is the company going to earn 
when you are putting out a new issue?
In England they told me: My God! We have been
doing this for years.
Now, I suggest that you have got to give them the 
information that they need. By all means qualify it. Yes, 
there are legal liability questions. The SEC has also said: 
We recognize this, and we're going to work toward it.
I say that now is the time to look forward rather 
than backward, and I'm going to suggest to you that there are 
many dangers— many dangers indeed!--but I think now is the 
time to make open book, because I’m going to suggest that 
your profession is on the pan.
I think also that the legal profession is on the 
pan. As I am reading securities decisions of the courts 
lately I can see they are really going to be on the pan.
And we, as you know, go on the basis of the Pig'n'Whistle 
pan. Our responsibility is now increasing at an exponential 
rate, and I'm for it, but what I am demanding is: I want
the commensurate authority.
And I will work with you, with attorneys, and with 
financial executives; but I am suggesting that it will be 
very dangerous for you--not as a matter of my professional 
pride--but to call me in as the skilled communicator after 
the important decisions have been made or, as the language
4 .100
of the trade goes, to "polish up" the message.
MR. PARKER: You are using "you" to mean the ac­
counting profession?
MR. CHATINOVER: The investor relations profession­
al. Also you.
MR. ROALMAN: I think, when he was referring to
coming in and cleaning up, he was referring to the investor 
relations professional.
MR. CHATINOVER: To the investor relations profes­
sional, hut we have--
MR. PARKER: But not the accounting profession.
MR. CHATINOVER: Well, no— not just the accounting
profession. But very often we are confronted with situations 
where we will he called in after all decisions have been 
made. We will not he asked for an opinion as to whether 
the matter will he easy to communicate, what the public 
relations implications are. I’m not suggesting to you that 
I or anybody in my field is professionally qualified to 
give an accounting judgment as to what a decision should 
have been. But I am professionally qualified to indicate 
what the public relations implication of an accounting de­
cision may be. And in that case, I think I can be of con­
structive help.
MR. GERALD A. PARSONS: Could I speak to Reed’s
question?
In answer to your specific question, Reed, it seems 
to me that I agree basically with what Mr. Koons of Shell
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said, and that is: It’s management's job to communicate with
shareholders, the public, and so forth. It's the auditors' 
job to certify that everything is done according to Hoyle. 
It's not the auditors' job to do management's job, which is 
to put additional values and judgment values on that informa­
tion.
I don't think I have anything more to say.
MR. ROALMAN: Reed, referring to your point, re­
cently an analyst was in visiting with the president of a 
relatively small corporation, and picked up what he con­
sidered material information. He was concerned because he 
possessed it, that he alone had it, considering it was 
something that just happened to be dropped in the conversa­
tion. So he asked if the company would issue a news release.
What they put together was confusing. It was dif­
ficult, and it would just not be acceptable to any respect­
able publication. It was not used, was not picked up by any­
body. And he continued to be very seriously concerned that 
he was walking around with information that had not been 
adequately communicated.
I think that's a kind of problem that may be in
existence.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Reed, does that take care of
you? Dick? Oscar?
MR. GELLEIN: I have nothing more.
MR. ROALMAN: May I make a comment on the practical
problems of communicating forecasts?
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CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Yes, go ahead.
MR. ROALMAN: That is, simply, we have had--as you
have had, I'm sure— a number of conversations with representa­
tives of the SEC on this point, trying to get at what, really, 
they hope to see produced. And what we sense is that they are 
looking for gross volume; they are looking for profits; and they 
are looking for per-share earnings.
W e ' r e  dreadfully concerned with the practical prob­
lems in communicating that to large numbers of people. Do you 
do it in the annual report? Because if you do, I think you have 
substantial problems of secrecy. That's going to be a much 
sought after number.
If you do it in a news release, I doubt in practical 
terms that the news media are going to use it--anything but 
the per-share earnings; and they are not going to use all the 
assumptions that go into that per-share earnings figure. I 
think it could be grossly misleading to a number of people.
I don't say that we shouldn't use projections, but 
I think these are practical problems that ought to be looked 
at. How do you communicate this information to large numbers 
of people, and not give them a very, very small piece of the 
iceberg, in the hope that they are going to make a rational 
investment decision on the basis of that very, very small piece 
of the iceberg?
MR. PARKER: Mr. Roalman, I think that's a very im­
portant problem. It seems as though there has got to be some 
way out from under the problem as it now exists, where the
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sophisticated analyst does communicate with management represen­
tatives about this, and to greater or lesser extent, ideas that 
are in the form of forecasts and assumptions that support them 
are communicated orally.
Looking at a lot of the material in our shop with my 
brothers, who then, report in writing what they have heard--al­
most invariably this can be squeezed into a paragraph or two 
that, at least on the surface, looks to be representative of the 
basic points that were discussed, and it's certainly an amount 
of material that could be included easily in almost any quart­
erly report to shareholders that I have seen.
And I just wonder if it wouldn't make it easier, both 
as regards the legal liabilities of the company and for the 
analysts involved, and for the general commonweal, if this 
kind of material couldn't be presented.
I think I would be one who would argue that elaborate 
rules for presenting it should not be prepared, but it should 
just be attacked from the point of view of the management who 
does feel it wants to communicate something and wants to com­
municate it in a fair and complete fashion to all comers. Isn’t 
there some way that your communicating art can do that, and get 
it in the quarterly report?
MR. ROALMAN: I would suggest that you may be asking
the impossible there, from a very practical standpoint. I 
think it is dangerous to give away a little bit of information 
and hide a lot of it; and, I think, unless you are going to...
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MR. PARKER: But usually the management only wants to
give a little. For example, a company may be willing to say to 
an analyst who calls: Yes, we feel the odds are that our re­
venues will in fact rise this year eight to ten percent, and 
as long as three or four things that can be said in five or 
six words each don’t happen, we would expect the natural result 
of this would be for our earnings to rise from ten to fifteen 
percent.
At other times you get down to the end, and they 
say: Well, we do not forecast earnings, but our reasonable
feelings about what normal, ballpark estimates would be is 
for earnings to be up ten or fifteen percent.
It seems to me there's no great difficulty in com­
municating that, in writing...
MR. ROALMAN: To whom, however? Are you suggesting
that each time there is a material change in the earnings fore­
cast, there be a comprehensive mailing to each shareholder? How 
about those people who are potential shareholders?
MR. PARKER: I don't know that there would be anything
drastically wrong with doing it once a quarter, and not more 
often.
MR. ROALMAN: To each shareholder?
MR. PARKER: Well, with his quarterly shareholders,
communication that you already mail to him.
MR. CHATINOVER: I wonder if I might add a note
here. I know the pratical problem you are citing, and I wonder, 
though, if it's any worse than what we live with right now as
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professional communicators.
One of our great problems--and we have discussed this 
with the SEC— is the absolute shortage of media space in getting 
material news out. It's almost an irony, and I don't blame the 
media for this, but maximum news space is allocated to those 
corporations which obviously have the greatest number of share­
holders, and which generally are in the highest public view.
And that's understandable from a news standpoint.
I don't think there is any answer to that, whether 
we are dealing with earnings predictions or any other corporate 
matter, but on the subject of earnings predictions per se, I 
think there is a qualitative area in which we can do some very,
very responsible baselining. Whether we ever get to codified
standards of audited forecasting— and I don't know how soon we 
are going to get there--I do have the feeling, and I garner
from the remarks of SEC officials on this subject in the past
few months, that what they are really telling us quite explicit­
ly is: We'd like to see you do what you are doing anyway, in a
slightly more responsible fashion— specifically an allusion to 
the ballpark remark.
And I think that one of the things I'm forcing down 
clients' throats in news releases, for example, is non-quantita­
tive material--in other words, an explanation of why the earnings 
are going to be what we think they are going to be, even if we 
don't use a prediction.
I had this just yesterday: Because the company is
going to have larger earnings this year due to acquisitions
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made on a proper accounting basis last September, nevertheless 
it should be realized that most of the profit realization--be­
cause of the nature of the operations--is going to be shifted 
to the last half of the fiscal year.
It's rather important that that be put down in writing. 
I don’t know how much space it's going to get in the newspapers. 
There is that problem. I think we have it with all news.
But I think that we should start indicating to people 
what the trends are that affect earnings, whether we are dealing 
with numbers or not. In other words, again I say: The numbers
are one thing. But understanding how the numbers get there is 
the most important thing that you and I have to be concerned 
with ultimately, because it’s upon that that we are going to be 
judged by the public, justifiably or otherwise.
Pete poses an absolute dilemma but I think it’s one 
we’ve got to wrestle with anyway.
MR. PARSONS: I want to give an example in our company.
We do just about follow the concept that Reed suggested in our 
quarterly statements; but as an example, last summer our Chair­
man spoke before the Los Angeles Society of Security Analysts, 
and he talked about 1972 possibly being a record year. He 
reiterated this in the quarterly for the third quarter.
In the month of December we realized that one segment 
of our business— namely, the paper business— had fallen out of 
bed in November. It was completely unforeseen. We knew it 
was bad, but we didn’t think it was going to get any worse.
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We got out a news release to this effect. Our stock 
price was adversely affected. We had to conduct a communica­
tions campaign to get people to begin to estimate lower earn­
ings for 1972. They overcorrected.
Now we're in a position where we have seen a turn­
around in the paper business, and we're faced with the dilemma 
of: How good is it going to be? And we do our forecasting on
a monthly basis.
I have a feeling that our company does a fairly good 
job of measuring and forecasting, but we don't know the future.
I work for a multi-billion dollar company that is par excellence 
in professional management. The executive office had a pool 
on the earnings, and the Chairman, the President, the Treasurer, 
and the Comptroller never won it.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: I want to ask one more question
which may help us in terms of our ultimate objectives.
I think you alluded to the problem— listening to 
some of the mass of jargon on our technical issues about: We
can't do it because we can't achieve precision.
Now, when we get to our overall objectives, I think 
we are going to have to come to some statement about: The
accounting process can yield only certain approximations.
And, whether we turn statistical on this, or whether 
we do it by an educational process, I do not know. But do 
you not agree that we ourselves have a significant communica­
tion problem in terms of our entire audience?
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MR. PARSONS: I neglected to mention one thing, which
I believe is the basic concept of our organization— that is, the 
National Investor Relations Institute--that it is in the best 
interests of the company and the public investors in general, to 
have a good understanding of what's going on in any given business 
in which they may wish to invest, and that is our job to communi­
cate the kind of information that will give them a good, balanced 
judgment on what the outlook is for our respective companies.
And that's the business we’re in, day in and day out. 
We’re trying to do the best job we can with the tools we have at 
hand. We'd like to see the tools improve, and we would like to 
have a better flow of information.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: But even amongst ourselves you
would agree that a deterrent to evolution— not revolution--is a 
preoccupation with precision which does not really exist.
MR. PARSONS: I agree.
MR. ROALMAN: But I think what is being offered to
investors as a potential is being held up to investors as some­
thing that might be made available to them. And, Reed, I think 
that’s the thing that we would be very much concerned about. We 
would be very much interested in making available the assumption 
that the agency investors make their decisions solely on the 
basis of earnings per share.
MR. CHATINOVER: Can I offer a note? It may not
be much solace, but we all have a shared problem.
Your specific question really addresses itself to a
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problem that a lot of us face. Unfortunately, we live in a 
socioeconomic climate in which everybody, for reasons we don’t 
have to discuss, is reaching for certitude whenever or wherever 
he or she can find it, and you happen to be suffering in that 
it's at a particularly inopportune time.
The rash of court suits leveled at accounting firms... 
we know the public relations implications of this, but I think 
you are going to have to tell the public in your own way what 
the SEC is finally admitting in their own way, that the ’33 
Act was not an insurance policy, but a disclosure act that would 
give everybody a fair chance, but they could still strike out 
themselves.
You are going to have to say accounting is very im­
portant— and, indeed, it is--but is like so many other things 
in life. It cannot be all things to all men and women. It’s 
a limited tool, and it's a very valuable one, and I can only 
tell you what I’m going to tell my students in about fifteen 
minutes. There is no one answer. There are a lot of things 
that determine the multiple, and don’t ask me how to get to 
it, because that’s what you are supposed to spend fifteen weeks 
in here trying to find out how to do, all by yourself.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Thank you very much.
(The session adjourned at five twenty o’clock.)
5.1
WEDNESDAY MORNING SESSION 
May 17, 1972
The meeting reconvened In the Imperial Ballroom 
at nine-twenty o'clock, Chairman Trueblood presiding.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: We will continue to follow
our operating plan of the past two days with questions to 
come to the table from the floor.
We found yesterday that a full 45 minutes was not 
required in each case, possibly in large part because we’re 
getting to some point of redundancy on the questioning; and 
so we are going to try to reschedule today just a little 
bit, if it is convenient with Price Waterhouse and the 
Technical Audit Associates. We’re going to hold each seg­
ment down to 40 minutes and run through until one o ’clock, 
with no scheduled afternoon session, if it all works out.
We have not yet been able to reach Price Waterhouse. 
They have been in the meetings every day, and I’m sure 
they'll be around and be available. We’re not certain about 
Mr. Jewett of Technical Audit Associates but we’ll try to get 
that settled.
So tentatively, we will run to conclusion this 
morning which we expect will be about one o ’clock, and then 
the Study Group will meet in a contemplated session immedi­
ately after lunch. But so far as the public hearings are 
concerned, we’re anticipating ending them without the 
scheduled twelve-thirty break.
5.2
First on the schedule, the New York Stock Exchange 
— we have Mr. Wick and Mr. Foster.
MR. WILLIAM FOSTER: Thank you, Mr. Trueblood.
The New York Stock Exchange is pleased to partici­
pate in the deliberations of the Accounting Objectives Study 
Group. We wish to commend the American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants for rising to the challenge, forming 
the two Study Groups, and attacking the credibility gap head 
on.
We had communicated our grave concern about the 
credibility gap to the American Institute for a number of 
years. The gap was manifested overtly by the increasing 
legal involvement and court involvement of the accounting 
profession. It was also, from our perspective, manifested—  
perhaps subtly— in the relative lack of participation of 
the individual investor in the securities markets.
Len Savoie characterized the problem as one of a 
craving for credibility. Now, however, a superior process 
for developing standards has been set forth by the Wheat 
Study Group.
We endorse the Wheat Study Group recommendations. 
We will do all in our power to aid the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board in its work.
With this as an introduction, we can now turn to 
the second half of the problem, namely, the objectives of 
financial statements.
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We believe that the primary objective of financial 
statements has not changed since the l860’s. In 1860 the 
New York Stock Exchange first sought publication of certain 
financial information from its listed companies. In 1890 
its persistence was rewarded by the appearance of a balance 
sheet in an original listing application.
In 1909 the annual report became a requirement. In 
1933 the New York Stock Exchange and the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants hammered out the current, 
standard short-form auditors’ report. The New York Stock 
Exchange was the first to suggest— and later to require-- 
quarterly reporting, consolidated financial statements, and 
comparative financial statements.
Drawing upon our historical experience, it is our 
conclusion that the primary objective of financial statements 
is to inform investors fully and fairly. We emphasize 
"all investors." We reject the notion--that the financial 
statements should be geared to only certain investors, like 
financial analysts and institutions.
We hark back to the original purpose of the annual 
report, which was in essence to inform all investors fully 
and fairly.
In order to fulfill the objective of informing all 
investors fully and fairly, it is necessary to achieve cer­
tain specific objectives. The specific objectives I have 
in mind are somewhat as follows. There is a great need to
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define materiality. What transpires under the banner of 
immateriality is a source of great concern to us at the New 
York Stock Exchange.
There is a great need to improve product line 
reporting. We believe that financial management can do 
better in this area.
There is a great need to resolve the deferred 
charge issue. We believe the public is tired of the huge 
writeoffs that seem to be reported daily in the Wall Street 
Journal and other publications. As a matter of fact, we be­
lieve this has contributed significantly to the growing credi­
bility gap.
We believe it is necessary to define extraordinary 
items. We believe it is necessary to divorce financial re­
porting from political and other pressures. We believe there 
is a great need to improve quarterly reporting. Finally, it 
would seem that it is well within the province of the account­
ants and management to provide simpler footnotes.
The topic of fair value accounting has occupied the 
minds of accountants in recent months and years. We believe, 
however, that more heat than light has been shed on the sub­
ject. Fair value accounting does not seem to us to be a 
panacea. It does not seem to be the solution to all the prob­
lems of the accounting profession. In this area we would 
counsel the profession to make haste slowly.
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This is probably the last opportunity to keep the 
formulation of standards and objectives in the private sec­
tor. It is our earnest hope that management and the account­
ing profession will work together better in the future than 
they have in the past.
Given superior standards, which we believe will 
be forthcoming as a result of the labors of the Wheat Commit­
tee and the Financial Accounting Standards Board, and superior 
objectives which we believe will be forthcoming as a result of 
the labors of the Trueblood Committee, we believe there is one 
problem--one grave problem— that still needs to be resolved 
and to which neither Committee has really addressed itself 
fully. The need that we see is for superior enforcement to go 
along with superior standards and superior objectives.
We believe that all will be lost if superior stan­
dards and objectives are formulated and they are not imple­
mented and enforced.
To discuss this topic more fully, I’ll turn the 
microphone over to Merle Wick, Vice President of the New York 
Stock Exchange.
MR. MERLE WICK: Well I certainly think that Bill’s
characterization of the progress that has been made thus far 
and seems to be en route is an accurate one, and we’re delight­
ed to see these things going on.
I guess that the essence of our strongest recommen­
dation today is that a new, third committee is probably indi­
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cated, a committee on enforcement; and this committee natu­
rally needs to he somewhat broader than just the profession 
because the profession cannot be blamed for all of the prob­
lems that we find in the financial reporting area.
On the other hand, certainly enforcement has to 
start with the profession, and there is certainly a grave de­
ficiency in its performance in this area at the present time.
As a matter of fact, there is almost no performance within the 
profession in this area, to the best of our knowledge.
Actually, we don’t think that accounting principles 
are as bad as the principles of the accountants and some of 
the other users of these so-called accounting principles. I 
guess that maybe the profession needs to move the same way 
that the Stock Exchange has, in terms of setting up a staff 
group that has the power to conduct hearings, assess fines, 
and mete out discipline, and give publicity thereto. For it 
to be handled by a committee of practictioners is likely not 
to lead to any better results in this area than it has in other 
areas.
As a matter of fact, in some ways the profession 
seems to be following the precedent of the Exchange. The 
Exchange used to operate, basically, under the direction of 
committees of the Board of Governors which were composed of 
members of the business and members of the Exchange, just 
as the Institute has operated in the past, basically, with 
the authority vested in Institute committees.
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In times gone by perhaps one could depend on the 
puritanical morality and the relatively conservative viewpoint 
of management, but if this hasn't disappeared, it has become 
a relatively rare characteristic these days. The rule of the 
road seems to be: If you can get it by your accountants; if 
you can get it by the SEC; if you can get It by the stock ex­
changes; and I suppose, in the final analysis, if you can get 
it by the stockholders, why, anything that goes is fair. It's 
someone else's responsibility, not management's.
I was particularly struck by Jim Needham's comments 
when he was addressing the Financial Executives Institute. He 
said: If you keep up your pressure the way you did with the
investment credit, I guarantee you that you will have a feder­
al agency writing the rules.
One of the comments— analysis of what has been hap­
pening in the profession— is that there was a gradual change 
in the composition of the APB from the managing partners to the 
policy partners composing the Board; and I suppose there's no 
question but that this brought a greater technical knowledge 
to the deliberations of the Board. The question is whether it 
didn't at the same time undercut somewhat its support within 
the profession. At times, in our experience, it seems like 
some of the policy partners are like voices crying in the wil­
derness within their own firm. And so maybe they are prophets 
without honor in their own city.  
But, on the other hand, certainly, we can't make this
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a one-way criticism of the accounting profession, and I 
thought that the quote in the Robert Morris paper to the ef­
fect that "It is our opinion that the selection of the best 
and most appropriate general accounting principles to be used 
ought to be determined by the independent auditor" was an in­
teresting one. They went on to say: "In our opinion, there
can be and often is an inherent conflict between the execu­
tive’s role as a manager and the task of measuring his own 
performance." And most of the cries that have arisen about 
the rules and policies of the APB from the public sector have 
been about those which would restrict the reporting of higher 
profits. I don’t recall any great issue being raised on some­
thing that would allow higher profits to be reported.
Now, to go from the formal financial statements to 
another area which also needs attention by our suggested Com­
mittee No. 3, there is the question of the accounting princi­
ples used in the financial statements being largely disregard­
ed in the historical summaries and the President’s letter. I 
suppose that the worst examples involve the use of unusual and 
nonrecurring charges, to which Bill has previously made refer­
ence and I think it well could be that 1972 might be the last 
year that private industry is going to have an opportunity to 
redeem itself in this area. When one looks at the reporting 
of a lot of companies in the nature of the items included in 
unusual, extraordinary, nonrecurring, nonoperational charges, 
one gets the impression that anything that represents progress
5 . 9
--that is, new products, improved efficiency, better plant 
operation— anything of that nature must necessarily be regard­
ed as unexpected, unusual, and nonrecurring. And so maybe, 
unlike GE, progress is an unexpected quality or product of 
many of these companies, if you are judging it on the basis of 
the financial reports and the President's or Chairman's com­
ments thereon.
With a few companies, whose names will go unmention­
ed, the one certainty is that each year will see another un­
usual, nonrecurring charge occupying a prominent place at the 
bottom of the income account.
Just a little over a month ago the SEC made a re­
lease which suggested greater diligence in the release of quar­
terly and annual results, and pointed particularly to the area 
of unusual, nonrecurring, after-operations-level charges. And 
I might remind the accountants that as far as listed companies 
are concerned there is a requirement in the listing agreement 
with the Stock Exchange that these items be reported and given 
some prominence in the reports to shareholders in quarterly 
releases; also that one of the actions that we found necessary 
to take with respect to financial reporting resulted in the 
president spending some time in jail.
Now I have been making some rather broad accusations 
here. It's clear that the comments that I have relate to a 
relatively small percentage of both the accountants and the 
companies— relatively small, to be sure. I don’t know what it
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is— 10%, 20% . On the other hand, I'm sure that the percentage 
is far too big to he acceptable to the public, and thus the 
results of these two committees are going to be weighed in 
the scale of public opinion.
One of the approaches to give greater independence 
to the accountants might be the endorsement of the idea of 
audit committees, to which the accountants would report, those 
committees to be comprised exclusively of outside directors 
of the corporation. I think that it might be appropriate to 
point out that not all of the top management people are the 
kind of sophisticated financial executives that people often 
say are necessary— that that kind of knowledge is necessary 
to have in order to be able to interpret financial statements 
properly— and there has been more than one management that has 
been led down the primrose path into disaster by virtue of its 
lack of understanding of the financial results being reported 
to it by its own internal accounting people with the blessing 
of its outside auditors. So it's not just the public that 
gets involved; it's the internal management of at least some 
companies.
Also in the area which is somewhat outside the scope 
of influence of the profession, although we obviously have 
something to say about it, is the question of product line re­
porting; Bill made reference to that previously. I think 
that the recommendation of the Financial Executives Institute 
in this respect was made in good faith. I think that the re­
sults, though, of the reporting— particularly by some of the
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conglomerates--has been worse than useless. I've always re­
sisted the use of the word "misleading." I think it’s one of 
the most misused words that one hears with respect to finan­
cial reporting and accounting. It's often used to dismiss any 
kind of an argument that the speaker doesn't particularly take 
kindly to. But if there is one area where I see some mislead­
ing information being perpetrated on the public, I think that 
last year's and some of what we see this year of product line 
reporting is a good example.
I think Bill and I both felt that coming down to the 
operating level represented a good solution originally, be­
cause there are obvious problems in allocating a lot of the 
expenses below that line. But what has been done with these 
above-the-line figures is something that I don’t see how we 
can continue to countenance. I don't see how the SEC can con­
tinue to countenance it, and it looks like the only answer is 
to come right down to a net income figure across the board, 
with all of the caveats that have to be expressed as to how 
certain of the nonoperating figures are arrived at.
And the last point is that something needs to be done 
about forecasts, future plans. Just what can be accomplished 
in this area is a little bit difficult to pin down, but cer­
tainly investors make their decisions based more on what is 
anticipated for the future than what has been accomplished in 
the past and some method needs to be developed to get this 
word to the public.
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There's no question but that it's used any time 
there is an offering of securities. The underwriters have to 
be furnished with the information. Any time there is a borrow­
ing from a bank or insurance company, or something like that, 
those people insist on the information, find it useful and 
necessary in arriving at their decision; and while we recog­
nize the problem that exists, a way has got to be found to 
meet it.
Now I could go on, obviously, for a long period dis­
cussing alot more of these specific things, but the purpose of 
this study is neither to exhaust the subject nor the partici­
pants, and so I want to conclude at this point with the state­
ment that, as far as we're concerned at the Stock Exchange, we 
intend to take a more active role in the future than we have 
in the past. Our management has just authorized some addi­
tional help in terms of staff to make it possible for us to do 
this and instructed us that they want it done, and so we in­
tend to do our part and to support in the future as we have in 
the past the efforts of the Institute and of these fine com­
mittees that have been working so hard.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Thank you very much, Merle and
Bill. We certainly do appreciate not only your appearance 
here this morning, but also the several meetings that you have had 
with us, and we appreciate very much, professionally, the shar­
ing of our common problems over the past.
It's unfortunate that we haven't done better with
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them but I am hopeful, as you are, that maybe we are getting 
with it and will move a little bit faster from here on in.
We, I’m sure, on the Study Group share your hopes 
for the FASB recommended by the Wheat Committee when it be­
comes operational.
The enforcement concern you have continuously had.
In my personal view, it's completely correct. One step has 
been taken, of which you may or may not be aware: The re­
stated Code of Ethics, which will go to the membership this 
fall, now incorporates explicitly a requirement for conformity 
and application of all technical standards, however developed.
I think there is another important forward step in 
which we can jointly take part. I see much more activation of 
research and study and discussion of problems like forecasting, 
interim reports, and so on, by other groups, particularly FEI 
and NAA, than I have been aware of in the past; and I think 
that the interfeeding in that coordination is good; it may well 
help us in getting to solutions faster than we did in the past. 
But it is painfully slow.
I think many of the things you suggest, current val­
ue, for example, has been clearly a matter of concern without 
agreement for the past two days, with much discussion in much 
depth. I don’t think there is going to be any immediate adop­
tion of it. It must be looked at very carefully, and the im­
plementation problems are extreme.
But we look forward hopefully, to coming out with
some overriding structure into which some of these day-to-day 
problems may be more easily fitted than they have in the past. 
Whether we will be successful, I don’t know. With your help 
and the help of all of the others who have participated, maybe 
we’ll make it. We can hope.
MR. PARKER: Merle, in your statement you mentioned
that you have some criticism for radical departures from the 
cash basis in the name of accrual accounting. I wonder if you 
could expand on that point a little bit.
MR. WICK: Well, I guess this comes back to a point
that I made about the little objection to anything that would 
permit the reporting of higher profits. All of the push at 
the corporate level seems to have been in this line, and the 
industries that have gotten into serious trouble over the years 
have most frequently been those where reported income got sub­
stantially ahead of cash income. Accrual income got ahead of 
cash income substantially.
And we’re seeing it right now, for example, in some 
of the real estate fields, in the computer field. It certain­
ly occured some years back in the real estate syndications.
I suppose that it has been the single most damaging 
problem as far as investors have been concerned in the last 10 
or 20 years, and that’s just why we react to it, because too 
many investors have been taken to the cleaners as a result of 
it.
We have a pretty good batting average in terms of
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the companies which we approve for listing not getting into 
financial earnings problems later on. In the last 15 years we 
have listed about a thousand new companies. I think that it's 
fair to say that less than 20 of those have gotten into finan­
cial difficulties that resulted in their falling below our 
delisting criteria. Most of the problems that we have run in­
to have been either in the area of deferred charges which even­
tually came to create a liquidity problem, or this advanced 
recognition of income in advance of the cash receipt thereof.
MR. PARKER: Thank you.
MR. WESTON: I expect your staff probably see and re­
view more financial statements than any other group. I wonder 
if you could be helpful to us in terms of refining the objec­
tives of accounting a little more— maybe on a second level 
from your broad statement that statements should be useful to 
investors--and taking the area of deferred charges, and if you 
will, property, plant, and equipment, could you give us some 
idea of what you believe the objectives of accounting should be 
in that area?
That is, how can the objectives be phrased in de­
ferred charges, property, plant, and equipment, the computer 
field, real estate--whatever you want to call it--to be more 
useful to investors, both the buying investor and the selling 
investor?
What could the objective be, or what should the ob­
jective be?
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MR. WICK: Well, in the deferred charge area, as far
as established companies are concerned, I think that there is 
only one answer and that is that they ought to be eliminated.
We have for a number of years now suggested to each one of the 
major accounting firms that if they would take a look at the 
experience of their own attesting experience with deferred 
charges, we feel sure that they would adopt an internal pri­
ciple which would outlaw them within their own firm.
There are some problems as far as companies in the 
development stage which are somewhat different. But if we had 
to put it in the balance, we would say the abolition of the 
deferred charge concept would probably be a significant serv­
ice to investors, because it has been the subject of extensive 
abuse.
MR. WESTON: Would that move in the computer field
in terms of equipment as well? That is, what would be the ob­
jective there? Not to show anything as an asseet as to which 
there is any doubt of recovering?
I'm trying to find an objective that would obtain 
that result without being unfair to a present holder of securi­
ties.
MR. WICK: Well I suppose that you can't be that dog­
matic; but certainly, a much more rigorous test than has ever 
been applied in the past is clearly indicated by the experi­
ence.
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MR. WESTON: But how would you phrase such a test?
The possibility of recovery?
What I'm getting at is that much of this is based 
on judgment, and if we have an arbitrary rule that all of these 
debits must be written off, then that result would be less 
useful to investors than an objective which would, say, try 
to describe the inherent value in these various projects the 
best way you can.
Now I think part of the problem is that this does 
involve judgment and some of these writeoffs happen because 
people made judgments which turned out to be wrong. On the 
other hand, many of them turned out to be right. And still on 
the other hand, many of the items that were written off--color 
television, for example--turned out to be tremendously valuable 
items, and those costs were never properly deferred and account­
ed for, in the view of many.
So what I'm trying to find is an objective which will 
handle a very difficult discretionary area without being arbi­
trary and penalizing the good with the bad, I guess. Is there 
any way we can phrase an objective that will reach that goal?
MR. WICK: Well, I guess that what is needed is great­
er assurance as to the future recovery of those costs than has 
been available— than has been called for in the past.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Are you finished on that point,
Frank? Howie Wagner?
MR. WAGNER: Well, I'm not a financial analyst, nor
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am I an attester, but my concern about financial statements is 
in terms of being a preparer.
I gather from your paper that your feeling is that 
financial statements ought to be set up in such a way as to be 
understandable to what we commonly refer to as the "Aunt Janes" 
in our country. We have had lots of discussion about this over 
the past few days, and many people have expressed the view that 
financial statements cannot be directed to the "Aunt Janes" in 
our country, despite the fact that they are shareholders in 
our economy.
Many companies’ annual reports contain--generally on 
the inside front cover, or right at the very outset--a very 
condensed statistical summary called "Highlights of the Year" 
or "Results in Brief." This has the purpose of making a very 
quick summary available for the one who doesn’t go beyond page 
1 of the annual report, but also to make it simple for the 
"Aunt Janes" to grasp what we think are the key numbers which 
she might be interested in.
My first question, therefore, is: Is this the kind
of information, or is information presented in this fashion, 
in this abbreviated form, what you would feel would appeal to 
the unsophisticated investor, the one who doesn’t understand 
the details of financial statements?
And then the second question relates to page 4 of 
your presentation, where you explain that the quality and in­
formation content of quarterly reports must be examined and
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improved. I would appreciate it if you could amplify to some 
extent this summary statement also.
MR. WICK: Well, as to your first question, so far
as the formal financial statements are concerned, we feel that 
they should he addressed to the intelligent investor, not nec­
essarily to the "Aunt Jane.” This doesn’t mean that the investor 
needs to he a sophisticated accountant. That’s not the level. 
But it obviously cannot he so simplified that it loses content.
But there is the opportunity for management to pre­
sent in the highlights a condensed portrayal of what actually 
happened, and many managements do this very well, and that's 
the point at which the Aunt Janes can he addressed along with 
the sophisticated investors as well, because what needs to he 
said and portrayed is basic enough that everybody ought to be 
interested in it.
Our main problem with those highlights has been the 
tendency on the part of a few companies to ignore those things 
which reflected somewhat unfavorably on their performance. But 
the highlights and the President’s letter, properly prepared, 
is a valuable addition to the formal financial statements.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Do you want to proceed with a
comment about your intention on the quarterly statement?
MR. WICK: Oh, yes.
Well the requirements that we presently have are lim­
ited to quarterly reporting of profits before and after taxes. 
We've also for a long time recommended the reporting of sales
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volume. The new SEC forms call for more information than that 
in the quarterly reports. And so the question comes as to how 
much should be given.
Here, once again, we get back to these unusual, non­
recurring charges, changes in accounting, and things like that 
occur during the interim period, which often are ignored in the 
release. There’s a limited amount of space available in the 
newspaper for these quarterly reports. Smaller companies have 
difficulty getting even their summary figures reported. And 
it could very well be that the time is coming when quarterly 
reports in greater detail need to be mailed to shareholders, 
in order to keep them informed.
MR. REINHART: Merle, I hate to go back to an earlier
point, but just one quick question: Would your proposal to
eliminate deferred charges extend to goodwill?
MR. WICK: Andy knows that’s a tough one.
Well now, as to the future, goodwill is under some 
sort of control. The question is what to do with all of the 
goodwill of the past.
Some of the goodwill figures that are vigorously de­
fended as being very valuable are in areas where more stable 
companies with equally goodwill assets have written them off 
when it was convenient for them to do so, for various reasons.
I don’t have a good answer to that one. If I were 
operating as a security analyst, recommending things to people, 
I would take a very hard look at those goodwill figures, and
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either eliminate them or put my own valuation on them. I have 
a great deal of difficulty with some of the companies report­
ing some of the results that they do and they and their ac­
countants agreeing that there has been no diminution in the 
value of that goodwill. I find the logic to that kind of po­
sition very elusive.
MR. POSTER: I think, Mr. Reinhart, if you’re wor­
ried about what to do with goodwill, you could write off re­
troactively over forty years. That might be a good solution.
MR. REINHART: Retroactively over forty years?
MR. FOSTER: That's right. Any goodwill that was
acquired prior to 10/31/7 0.
MR. REINHART: I ’d be happy to write off anything
retroactively.
MR. POSTER: That's been one of our problems too.
Also, in the annual report area, I think that one 
point we made was simpler footnotes, and I think this might 
even help the intelligent Aunt Janes. I think the management 
and officers can write simpler footnotes, and I think, upon 
occasion, an effort is made to write them particularly complex 
and long so that the reader will only spend fifteen minutes.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Any other questions around the
table? (There were none.) Thank you very, very much.
May I ask again if Frank Jewett, of Technical Audit 
Associates is in the room, or any representative of that group? 
(No one responded.)
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We'll move then to MAPI's presentation.
MR. GELLEIN: (Temporarily taking the Chair.) Would
you introduce yourselves, please?
MR. CHARLES I. DERR: Mr. Chairman, shall I proceed?
MR. GELLEIN: Yes, please.
MR. DERR: Members of the Study Group on Accounting
Objectives: My name is Charles Derr. I'm Senior Vice Presi­
dent of the Machinery and Allied Products Institute. My asso­
ciate at the witness table is Mr. Prank C. Roberts, Vice Presi­
dent and Controller of the Eaton Corporation.
With your permission, I should like to tell you very 
briefly something of the Machinery and Allied Products Insti­
tute— that is, MAPI--and of its interest in the very important 
work of this Committee. MAPI is a national organization of 
capital goods and allied industrial product manufacturers. The 
output of such companies consists for the most part of highly 
engineered, high-technology products ranging from off-the-shelf 
consumables to entire manufacturing plants, such as steel mills, 
petroleum refineries, or chemical plants with a very long pro­
duction or construction cycle.
As will be apparent to the members of this Committee, 
this means that our membership includes both high volume, mass 
production companies and low-unit-volume-job shop operations 
with all that that range implies for differences in accounting 
practice.
The Institute and its members have long participated
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in the consultative process of the Accounting Principles Board 
and to the extent that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
has chosen to exercise its authority for the prescription of 
financial accounting and reporting procedures, we have also 
reviewed and commented on proposed regulations of that agency.
In view of all this, MAPI welcomed the initiative of 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in es­
tablishing the Wheat Committee to conduct a study on establish­
ment of accounting principles, and this, the so-called True- 
blood Committee, to undertake a study of accounting objectives.
In our judgment, the stakes are very high. The failure of re­
forms sought to be obtained by these two studies could well 
lead to increasing governmental intervention, with disastrous 
results on the necessarily evolutionary character of account­
ing principles and practices.
Such a result, with all that it would likely involve 
in the loss of managerial discretion, would be equally calami­
tous from the standpoint of industrial management. The creation 
by federal statute of a cost accounting standards board to pre­
scribe and enforce cost accounting standards for application 
to the bulk of negotiated government contracts suggests to us 
that this is not an empty threat.
The Wheat Committee has completed its study and has 
published its report and its recommendations. We have general­
ly endorsed the Wheat Committee’s report in a recent letter to the 
President of AICPA. Because of our deep interest in both of 
these studies, and because of the inescapable interrelation-
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ship between the two, I now ask leave of the Chair to file a 
copy of that letter, along with our other testimony, as part 
of the Committee’s record of this hearing.
(Mr. Gellein nodded his head to indicate acceptance.)
MR. DERR: Thank you, sir.
As you know, MAPI responded to this, the Trueblood 
Committee’s invitation for comments, by filing a written state­
ment of our views on the subject, under date of January 28, 
1972. My oral comments today will be very brief, with the 
bulk of our testimony presented by Mr. Roberts.
Our earlier written statement emphasized our view 
that the principal purpose of the corporate financial state­
ments is, and should be, to report clear and reliable finan­
cial information to the shareholders concerning the results of 
the corporation’s operations, its financial position, and its 
prospects. I want to reemphasize that central point and add 
very briefly to it.
The need for reemphasis is suggested in part by one 
central proposition in an otherwise excellent and most useful 
statement to this Committee by the Financial Analysts Feder­
ation. That proposition holds: "The objective of accounting
and financial statements should be to serve the needs of equity 
investors, actual and potential." In a limited sense this is, 
of course, true, but we do not believe that potential investors 
do, or should have, the same standing as actual investors. As 
Ernst & Ernst has said in its written statement to this Com-
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mittee: "The requirements of potential or only possible in­
terests must be regarded as secondary." There may, in fact, 
be a genuine conflict of interest that must, in our judgment, 
be resolved in favor of the actual investor; the present share­
holder, one of the owners of the company, has his investment 
at risk.
Reporting disclosures of the type sought by non­
shareholding users of financial statements— product line re­
porting is a good example— may adversely affect the competi­
tive position of the company, and by that very fact discourage 
investment by the potential investor or by the financial anal­
yst who acts as his servant. We believe the principle should 
be clearly adopted that regular financial reports of a cor­
poration ?re designed primarily for stockholders, and seconda­
rily for bankers, security analysts, and others.
Adoption of that guiding principle at once suggests 
a need for brevity, simplicity, and clarity in the basic fi­
nancial reports, with supplementary detail and analysis of the 
type sought by other users of corporate financial statements 
relegated to appendices and supporting schedules but not in­
cluded in the regular financial reports.
In his remarks at the Annual Meeting of AICPA last 
October, the distinguished Chairman of this Committee said:
"So far we have formally invited each state society, over fifty 
governmental and professional organizations, 100 international 
accounting organizations, 100 institute member firms, all com­
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panies listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges, 
and scores of universities to participate in our work." This 
is an impressive roster of participants, and characteristic of 
the painstaking care which the Committee has approached its 
most important assignment.
But there appears to us to he one significant omis­
sion: the common garden variety of shareholder, the man who
has put up his money to finance the enterprise. We think the 
Committee should consider questioning, by interview or ques­
tionnaire or both; a cross section of stockholders, in order 
to see what it is that they desire in financial reports.
In that same progress report to AICPA last October, 
the Chairman of the Committee indicated, among other things, 
that the Study Group was considering objectives that might 
sanction "disclosure of the impact of social costs and social 
benefits in financial statements.” We would oppose the en­
graftation of any such disclosure requirement on the establish­
ed pattern of financial reporting. The impact of such costs 
and benefits is necessarily conjectural, and therefore not sus­
ceptible to measurement in financial terms.
If need for the reporting of such matters can be 
justified--and, frankly, we see no justification for it--then 
such reporting should be excluded from the principal financial 
statements and included only as a supplement to such state­
ments.
Similarly, we oppose the Inclusion of forecasts and
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budgets in basic financial statements, a suggestion to which 
our next witness will devote principal attention. As I said 
before, our next witness is Mr. Frank C. Roberts, Vice-Presi­
dent and Controller of the Eaton Corporation whO, incident­
ally played a major role in the preparation of our earlier 
written statement. It will be his purpose to extend and elab­
orate upon certain of the points made in that earlier state­
ment. As I have suggested; he intends to emphasize and to re­
late to the study of accounting objectives his company's work 
in forecasting, budgeting, and in the use of financial controls 
as an example of how such matters are dealt with in a typical 
capital goods manufacturing company. If you please; Frank.
MR. FRANK C. ROBERTS: Thank you, Charlie.
Good morning; gentlemen. Preceding the comments I 
am about to make, I would like to make clear that I am not an 
accounting professional in the public accounting area. I am 
not a CPA; nor do I have any public accounting experience.
When I need this type of guidance; I contact our independent 
accountants and rely upon their advice. I am here today be­
cause I am concerned about some of the changes being considered 
in the information normally included in published statements and 
the potential impact these changes could have on Eaton Corpo­
ration.
I ask that you accept that I am not opposed to change 
or innovation as such. Change is a way of life in our company; 
and since we are well aware of the necessity for providing ade­
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quate, understandable information in our published reports, we 
welcome any constructive suggestions which will help us achieve 
this objective.
While most of what I have to say may appear nega­
tive--and I realize this is not helpful to your Committee as 
it will not help develop a positive response to your commit­
ments--I feel strongly enough about certain of the proposals 
that I am willing to appear here today and discuss the subject.
For a number of years, Eaton has prepared forecasts 
as a means of ensuring that the various segments of the busi­
ness prepare detailed operating plans and use such plans as 
an operating tool. We feel that this practice has given us a 
reasonably good capability to recognize the strengths and weak­
nesses of forecasting techniques.
To develop our forecasts, we draw upon the expertise 
of our customers, our outside professionals, and internal ex­
perts. It is our considered opinion that forecasting, properly 
used, is an excellent operating control. Our experience also 
leads us to believe that inclusion of forecasting in the ac­
counting statements issued to shareholders and the public may 
not only be inadvertently misleading, but actually can provide 
the vehicle through which overly optimistic opportunists can 
reach the investor when they feel that the recorded historical 
performance is not sufficient to maintain the investor’s inter­
est at the desired level.
To illustrate my point, I will give a brief descrip­
tion of the forecasting techniques used by Eaton, and review
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the degree of accuracy which we have been able to attain while 
using this information as internal control. Since this inform­
ation has been regarded as strictly confidential by management, 
it has not been influenced by any consideration which might 
have crept into it if it had been subject to public disclosure.
Obviously, the more accurate such a planning and con­
trol tool can be made, the more useful it will be to management.
Our forecasting starts with a five year forecast which 
is prepared in the spring of each year. We have quite a detail­
ed procedure on how that is to be accomplished by each operat­
ing division or subsidiary. This plan encompasses all aspects 
of the business. The plan is evaluated by applying values to 
each element of the plan, but the true emphasis of this program 
is placed on the planning of strategies.
These plans are first reviewed at a meeting of the 
group vice president with the general manager and the general 
manager’s staff; so it does get into some degree of depth with­
in the organization. If it’s acceptable to the group vice- 
president, a second critical review meeting is held which in­
cludes the corporate Executive Policy Committee and appropri­
ate members of the corporate staff.
The second major step in our procedure is the develop­
ment of a one year profit plan, which is prepared in the fall 
of the following year, or covering about a six months’ span.
And here again we have quite a detailed, elaborate procedure 
that goes out to each operation. If these would be helpful, we
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can leave them for the record.
MR. GELLEIN: Yes, they would. Would you, please.
MR. ROBERTS: The emphasis here in the one year plan 
is on the financial results, with assurance that the underly­
ing strategies developed in the five year plan are being im­
plemented. This one year plan is compared with the previous 
forecast for the same period as included in the five year plan, 
and deviations must be explained.
As a part of this plan, we include what we refer to 
as turnaround plans. Now if we were dead certain that we could 
set up a plan that was truly going to hold throughout the com­
ing year, there would be no need for such a thing as a turn­
around plan. This type of plan, again, is formalized, with 
specific instructions as to what is to be developed. It out­
lines specific actions which are to be taken in the event that 
the actual economic conditions differ from the planned level.
Generally, the program provides for about a 7½ and a 
15% increase and decrease from the planned level, so we are 
considering a possible 30% range of deviation. Occasionally, 
a special turnaround plan must be prepared for a division or 
subsidiary which falls outside of this range.
Using the financial data developed for these five 
levels of activity, we develop break-even charts which can be 
used to measure the anticipated profit at any sales volume. 
Deviations from the profit level are explained in a monthly 
analysis report submitted by each operation. Each volume lev­
el of the plan is subdivided into a monthly schedule, so as to
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permit monitoring the monthly results.
The third step in our forecasting procedure involves 
what we refer to as a monthly rolling forecast. I have samples 
of those particular forms here for that subject.
This consists of a four month projection by month 
of sales, profits, and inventory levels. It also includes our 
current projections for the full calendar year. It shows vari­
ance from plan and from the previous year’s actual for both the 
full year and the current year to date through the period includ­
ed in the four month projection. For the full year, it shows 
the variance from the prior month’s projection, and notes and 
comments are required for significant changes.
A comparison is made of the three months previously 
reported in prior months, as a means of ascertaining the trend 
and whether the reporting operation is consistently optimistic 
or pessimistic about the future. We do run credibility checks 
on the figures that are submitted.
Explanations and comments for any significant devi­
ation from prior forecasts and plans are again required.
The last step in our forecasting procedures is re­
ferred to as an interim forecast. Three times during the month, 
sales, profits, and inventory levels are projected for each di­
vision and subsidiary. The first forecast is due at World Head­
quarters on the fifth working day of the month, the second on 
the sixteenth, coinciding with the rolling forecast, and the fi­
nal on the fourth working day of the following month.
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This final forecast is expected to he very close to 
the actual hook results which will he reported later in the 
month. Again, pertinent comments on deviations are a part of 
the information submitted.
I believe the comments I have just made indicate 
that we have a rather thorough approach, and do not take the 
subject of forecasting lightly. Now let’s examine how well we 
have been able to meet the forecasting objectives.
You will recall that I mentioned that the prepara­
tion of our five year forecast took place in the spring, and a 
closer look at the next year was taken in the fall of the same 
year, or about six months later. I have here some charts. It 
might be helpful if you had these as I talk. (Papers were dis­
tributed to the Study Group.)
This first chart shows the deviation from the follow­
ing year’s forecast, as prepared first in the spring of the pre­
ceding year, and then in the fall of the preceding year. To 
illustrate, in the 1970 year sales actually were projected to 
be a little higher in the second forecasting, but profits were 
quite a bit lower.
In 1971 we were off roughly 8% in sales in that peri­
od, and about 19% in profits.
I have also charted our actual performance against 
the one year plan for the period 1967 through 1971. I believe 
the results are indicative of the difficulty and potential mis­
understanding which could result from disclosure of the forecast
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figures. In 1967 sales were off about 16%, and profits were off 
something in excess of 40% . Our profit leverage to sales is 
quite extensive.
Another interesting chart indicates the trend follow­
ed by our monthly rolling forecast, which indicates an updated 
forecast of the annual results as it is viewed each month. In 
other words, we have updated our annual forecast and matched 
that against our original profit plans. On the third chart we 
have a profit plan which said that we thought our sales were go­
ing to be $1,155,000,000. As of February, that had declined 3%. 
These figures do not show on your chart; they were an after­
thought on my way down here.
In March they had declined by 5%; in April, by about
MR. GELLEIN: I think we can see it here.
MR. ROBERTS: O.K. In any event, we’re off 10% when
we get down to the bottom.
Looking at the next chart, we see what happened to 
the profits during the same period, and again it was much more 
pronounced. Profits were off about 26% when we finally came 
down to a realistic level.
One of the interesting things in looking at this par­
ticular chart is that once we had recognized a downward trend, 
we didn’t stop till we went completely under what we finally ac­
tually attained.
MR. GELLEIN: Mr. Roberts, I don’t want to cut it off,
5.34
but thinking of our schedule, could you some way kind of bring 
it down to...
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. O.K.
MR. GELLEIN: ...perhaps highlights?
MR. ROBERTS: Based on the information available dur­
ing the development of some of these figures, I don’t believe 
independent auditors would have revised the forecasted figures. 
And yet, look at what happened.
In our reporting we have at times attempted to satis­
fy the need for forecasted information by including in the re­
ports a simple statement as to the anticipated business trends. 
Following are some typical examples of comments made and a com­
parison of the implications of the comments with the results 
later obtained.
Back in 1965 the annual report noted that the back­
log of unfilled orders on December 31, 1965 was at record levels, 
and 40% greater than the total of 1964. The 1966 actual results 
did include an increase of 13% in sales, and 17% in profits.
In the 1966 annual report you will find the comment: 
"Although sales are favorable for 1967 to date, profits have de­
clined in part due" — ■ etc. "For these reasons, as well as the 
possibility of a higher tax rate, we cannot accurately predict 
what 1967 will bring for your Company." The actual results for 
1967 were a 6$ decline in sales and a 38% decline in profits
We have similar statements in our interim and annual 
reports of subsequent years. Our current first quarter for ’72
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contains a statement that we think business looks much better 
this year.
Statements such as those quoted indicate that, de­
spite our best efforts, we cannot predict the future with any 
great degree of reliability, but an honest effort is made to in­
dicate the economic trend, as it affects Eaton. Any require­
ment to make such statements more precise and to express such 
observations in specific economic values can only lead to a 
growing credibility gap between business and the investing com­
munity.
I have a couple of comments that I'd like to make 
on fair-value accounting, although I must confess that at this 
point I'm thoroughly confused.
MR. GELLEIN: About how much time do you think you'd
need for this, now, Mr. Roberts?
MR. ROBERTS: A minute or so.
MR. GELLEIN: Oh, fine.
MR. ROBERTS: With the variety of current value con­
cepts from which to choose, it is apparent that no one presen­
tation is going to satisfy all the users of accounting state­
ment. In fact, it appears that none of the restatement of value 
plans has any great number of converts. There are apparently few 
users of accounting reports that feel handicapped by the lack 
of a restatement of historical values. I find it especially 
difficult to understand the need for a more precise measurement, 
when the fixed assets -- which in many instances constitute a major
5.36
portion of any such adjustment —  are appropriately depreciated 
using a wide range of rates and methods. While a depreciation 
charge against operations may be proper under those circumstances, 
it does not necessarily follow that the residual net book value 
is in any way typical of the market value of the fixed assets 
involved.
Under these circumstances, the use of a conversion 
factor to determine the fair value will not bring the net book 
value back to market value, and any attempt to adjust to market 
on a specific appraisal basis will defeat the original intent 
of charging cost with what was deemed to be an appropriate de­
preciation cost.
All of the revaluation methods have a specific pur­
pose, and are used in various types of special studies. It is 
doubtful that the cost of making such conversions on a continu­
ing basis can be justified through practical application. Most 
of us are not in the business of going out of business.
While a case can be made that cost in an inflation­
ary economy may be understated in terms of current value, the 
gradual adjustments of selling prices over the period do reflect 
the cost imposed by normal equipment replacement. Admittedly, 
this is not a timely cost-price relationship, but it has been a 
reasonably constant relationship and as such has influenced the 
profit margins required for a satisfactory performance.
Eaton’s capital expenditures in the last ten years 
equal about 70% of our fixed asset value. If we are truly con-
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cerned about a continuing inflationary impact, then it would 
appear that our attention should be focused on tomorrow's costs, 
and even current values would not be an appropriate measure for 
guiding the investor.
I wonder if we are not overreacting to criticisms 
which really should be directed at specific instances of faulty 
and misleading reporting.
I'll chop it off there.
MR. GELLEIN: Thank you, Mr. Derr and Mr. Roberts.
We especially appreciate your well-prepared paper that you put 
into the record, and the case study that you presented will be 
helpful. Reed?
MR. PARKER: I noticed you indicated that one of the
primary purposes of statements ought to be to clarify and sim­
plify financial information for the unsophisticated primary user; 
and yet in another part of the statement you seem somewhat sensi­
tive on the idea of further improvement in the comparability of 
accounting data from one company to another. And yet, perhaps, 
the primary objective for the investor is to be able to compare 
one company with another, and it rather suggests to me that, 
rather than trying to be of maximum help to the unsophisticated 
holder, you would rather like to leave more advantage with the 
sophisticated financial analyst on this score.
Could you comment on that?
MR. DERR: Do I detect that you are accusing us of
inconsistency, Mr. Parker?
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Well, perhaps it is inconsistent, because life is 
inconsistent.
No, I think I would answer this in this fashion that 
we have some very serious doubts as to how much real compara­
bility can be achieved without straightjacketing management by 
prescribed, unvarying, inflexible accounting rules and proce­
dures. This, we think, in the larger scheme of things is proba­
bly undesirable. Certainly it is necessary to achieve compara­
bility, but as I understand it— and I am not an accountant—  
there are two kinds of comparability. There is comparability 
as between Company A and Company B. There is comparability with­
in Company A as between Accounting Period A and Accounting Peri­
od B and Accounting Period C.
It is my impression that the accounting profession 
has sought thus far to achieve the latter form of comparabili­
ty, and achieve so far as possible the first form. This is not, 
perhaps, a very good answer, but I think this is what you were 
getting at.
MR. PARKER: Well, I ’m not an accountant either, so
we can talk on equal terms. But in areas like depreciation, in­
stallment sales, inventory accounting, and investment-tax credit, 
consolidation, the present status of generally accepted account­
ing principles allows a very considerable degree of latitude, 
and it seems difficult, I think, especially for the unsophisti­
cated investor, to understand why one company can use a thus- 
and-so kind of depreciation method, and another one another,
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when they have relatively similar kinds of assets.
It’s this kind of problem that we're facing, and it 
has become a fairly serious one for the investor trying to com­
pare across company lines, and one wonders what the usefulness 
of this extreme amount of flexibility is to management, especial­
ly if the management finally wants to compete in the capital mar­
kets and wants to have the confidence and the understanding of 
both the unsophisticated investor and those of us who can be 
hired by institutional people and take care of all this complex­
ity and undo it for them.
MR. DERR: Let me add one further comment, if I may, 
Mr. Chairman. As most of the people on this Committee undoubt­
edly do, I own a few shares of stock, and on occasion I receive 
these annual reports of corporations. I am probably an unsophis­
ticated investor, so I qualify for the character that we are 
talking about.
It seems to me that most of the annual reports I re­
ceive exhaust me before I exhaust them. I wonder, really, if 
the typical unsophisticated investor is really capable of making 
the comparisons. I would prefer to have a sophisticated finan­
cial officer comment.
Frank, have you a comment on this question?
MR. ROBERTS: An unsophisticated one.
I think the study of depreciation, of course, is a 
problem all unto itself. Over the years nobody has satisfacto­
rily come to grips with it. There are certain times when de-
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predating an item at an accelerated basis is more than justi­
fied. If you have a product line that appears could become 
obsolete, but you don’t definitely know that it’s going to be­
come obsolete, you are confronted with a judgment problem as to 
how fast you write off that particular investment.
I don’t think these cases are unusual in our busi­
ness, and I doubt if they are unusual in many businesses.
MR. PARKER: It was pretty unusual, though, to have
large numbers of businesses shift from accelerated methods to 
straight line methods in a single year when there wasn’t a great 
deal of change in the economy or in the status of technology.
MR. ROBERTS: I agree.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Frank, you had a question, I be­
lieve.
MR. WESTON: Well, I was interested in a comment in
your written paper that the rights of the shareholder--the exist­
ing shareholder— take precedence over those of any other claimant 
to the use of corporate financial information. Many people in 
talking to our Group have observed that once a corporation lists 
its securities and goes public, in a sense, potential investors 
have as much right to that type of information as existing in­
vestors, and there is a section of the Securities and Exchange 
Act which many lawyers say also contains the thought.
Do you believe that the present shareholder should in 
effect get information that others do not receive? It’s on page 
5 of your paper.
5.41
MR. ROBERTS: I believe that any information which
is made public must be made public in a way that it's available 
to all people who are interested. Any time that we issue any 
information in our discussions with security analysts, for ex­
ample —  we will say nothing that we are not willing to quote to 
the Wall Street Journal.
MR. WESTON: What do you mean on page 5 in your paper
when you say that the rights of the shareholder take precedence 
over those of any other claimants to the use of corporate finan­
cial information?
MR. ROBERTS: We're talking specifically about the
design of the statement itself, and this would mean that in cer­
tain instances we think the shareholder can be injured by the 
publication of given information in situations where it might 
aid a competitor of the company or put us in an awkward posi­
tion with our customers. And we think those interests come 
first before any others, and therefore we wouldn't expect to 
publish that information in a statement.
MR. WESTON: Even though a potential investor should
be alerted to this adverse type of situation?
MR. ROBERTS: The existing investor is not alerted
to it.
MR. WESTON: You do on that page, just to take one
more second on that particular issue, recommend the use of a 
rule of reason to decide what sort of information shall be made 
public and what is detrimental. Who, in your view, would be
the arbiter for determining such a rule of reason? Who would 
make that decision?
MR. ROBERTS: I think it’s a management decision that
would have to be concurred in by the independent accountants.
MR. WESTON: Do you think both of those parties are
capable of making those decisions today?
MR. ROBERTS: I have never encountered a case where
I didn't feel that was so.
MR. WESTON: In the public interest, I'm saying.
MR. DERR: Could I comment further on that, Mr.
Weston?
I think, unquestionably, the ultimate responsibility 
for the determination of accounting principles and practices 
has to rest with the professional accounting societies, the 
American Institute, and so forth. I think what we were suggest­
ing here with reference to a rule of reason was addressed pri­
marily to the accounting profession, suggesting that the pri­
mary purpose of financial statements, in our opinion, is to re­
port to the share owners. Obviously, there is no intent to ex­
clude appropriate disclosure to everyone else in the public who 
may be entitled to it. Certainly bankers, creditors, govern­
ment agencies by law, potential investors, and what have you, 
as Mr. Roberts said— if any public disclosure of a fact is made, 
it ought to be available to everyone.
But the guiding principle that we were suggesting, 
and the step toward the rule of reason, which we leave to you
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to devise, is that primarily financial statements are for the 
share owner. In our judgment he is the person first to be 
served— let me put it that way.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: We will take one more question.
Andy?
MR. REINHART: I was curious, Mr. Roberts— when you
deal with security analysts, all of whom generally would make 
forecasts with regard to what your company will earn, how do 
you deal with their forecasts?
I mean, we all have this problem. They will come in 
and say "I’m going to forecast that you will make X dollars."
Do you say "Gee, that’s a little high," or "gee, that's a lit­
tle low"? How do you react to forecasts that they make?
MR. ROBERTS: Generally, if we find an analyst whose
forecast we think is way out of the ballpark, compared to the 
things that we are looking at, we will ask him to give us his 
reasons for arriving at such a forecast.
If he has things in mind which we think are based on 
misconceptions, we may discuss the misconceptions, but we leave 
the arriving at the final forecast to him. And if he wants to 
put out a forecast that we would not put out, and he has good 
reason for doing so, we think that's up to the financial analyst.
MR. GELLEIN: Mr. Roberts, it's clear that your ex­
perience in forecasting is extensive, and I'm sure that the mem­
bers of the panel would like to ask further questions. I would 
like to hope that we might come back to you after we look at
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this material, in the event we would want to talk with you about 
certain aspects of it.
MR. ROBERTS: Peel free at any time.
MR. GELLEIN: Thank you very much.
MR. DERR: Thank you kindly.
MR. GELLEIN: Mr. Borst, of Inland Steel Corporation.
MR. DUANE R. BORST: Gentlemen, let me introduce my­
self. I'm Duane Borst, Comptroller of Inland Steel. My friends 
prefer to call me Dewey. And generally, when they are friendly, 
they call me Dewey; when they are hostile, they call me Duane. 
Perhaps I'll get an indication in the response to my comments.
Now, my company is— and I personally am--very pleased 
to be invited here today and have the opportunity to comment 
further on the current status and the future course of corporate 
financial reporting. Considering all the confusion and contro­
versy surrounding financial reporting today, we were delighted 
with the bold step taken by the AICPA last year in establishing 
the Wheat Committee and the Trueblood Committee.
In passing, we would like to express our strong sup­
port for the recommendations of the Wheat Committee, as it has 
in our opinion successfully accomplished a very difficult task.
The proposed structure for establishing accounting principals, 
or standards —  if you like —  is a, good plan. It achieves balance
among all of the concerned groups, and should work well..
We, like many of our associates in the non-CPA field, 
felt the previous Board was too heavily weighted with the CPA
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profession. They are pleased that the AICPA has now approved 
this proposal— as I understand, just last week— because it can 
prove to those not directly involved that the accounting pro­
fession can develop a system of self-policing that will serve 
the public interest. We hope the new Standards Board will re­
ceive strong support from all quarters of our society.
And I'm delighted to inform you that our Chairman,
Mr. Fred Jaicks, has publicly pledged financial support of our 
company to the new Board in a speech he made to the FEI group 
just last week.
Now I'd like to turn to this Committee's task of es­
tablishing the objectives of financial reporting. We submitted 
a brief position paper, and we deliberately made it brief; but 
I would like, in turn, as background, just to brief that brief 
report, covering simply some of the conclusions that we arrived 
at, without going through all the rationale.
First, we feel that the basic goal of reporting is 
communication between management and the various publics it 
serves. It seems from the testimony I have heard and the other 
position papers that there is considerable unanimity on this 
point, with the possible exception of the points raised in their 
previous discussion.
Second, since communication is directed to diverse 
interests in these various publics, we have come to the con­
clusion, as preparers of reports, that no single one type of re­
porting is appropriate for all these needs. Therefore, we think
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management has a primary responsibility to its owners, both 
present and prospective; and perhaps I disagree with my col­
leagues in MAPI in this respect.
Third, reporting should realistically reflect manage­
ment’s actions, plans, and performance, and we think some of the 
things that have happened in the past few years are departing 
from that trend -- which I will comment on later.
Fourth, the concept of value, we think, is funda­
mental for your Study Group. Should value be based on actual, 
or historical cost, or on some theoretical or economic value.
We have concluded from our studies that a departure from his­
torical cost, at this time at least, is fraught with more pro­
blems than it would solve. Here I would agree with the testi­
mony of the MAPI people. More research is needed before the 
profession should move in the direction of current value account­
ing.
Fifth, the philosophy of conservatism should be re­
examined and evaluated. We support the continuation of the con­
servative convention which our company has historically always 
supported. However, in reading over the papers, I think it was 
one of the Big Eight firms that made the point of objectiveness 
rather than conservatism, and I rather liked that. As another 
devotee of profit planning and budgeting who has spent many years 
in this field, I have always answered the question of the users 
of our system, "Which way should we lean in the forecast?" by 
saying:" Call it what you really think it’s going to be, as
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close as you can do it. Don't lean to one side or the other.”
However, we do lean in the direction of booking losses 
as soon as we see any trouble up ahead, and not of anticipating 
profits. We have followed that, and continue to believe that 
is the valid approach.
Sixth, the role of social costs, which is a hot sub­
ject today, should be evaluated in terms of its relevance to 
financial reporting objectives. We are very concerned with the 
whole social area in our company, and have been for many years, 
but we don't see at this point that financial reporting is a 
proper place for this to be included. However, we would recom­
mend major research of this issue be completed before anything 
is done adopting this as a requirement in corporate reporting.
Further, we don't believe accountants, particularly, 
are qualified to make the measurements of this social cost area.
An article just out in the Conference Board by George 
Steiner, at UCLA, on social audits is interesting. He doesn't 
even include accountants at all in his list of people who have 
the expertise to do this job. And I think accountants should 
have a place in the setup, but I don't think it should be a pre­
dominant role.
The role of flexibility must be examined. This has 
bothered our friends in the Financial Analysts Federation, and the pub­
lic at large, and I think with good reason in some cases. But, 
perhaps to the point of considering a different approach to pub­
lic accountants' attestation function, we are particularly in-
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trigued by the proposal made by Mr Tietjen, of Price Waterhouse, 
in his recent paper in the January issue of Price Waterhouse Re­
view, in which he stakes out a different posture for the CPA. I 
think that’s really for the Committee’s investigation.
Now, we also recognize the need for narrower limits 
in accounting standards. We agree there is far too much lati­
tude in current practice, but experience within our own family 
of companies— and this may surprise many of you, that our com­
pany, along with most of the other major steel companies are 
now becoming more conglomerates than they are steel companies. 
It’s just that the steel companies are still an overwhelmingly 
large part of the total numbers. We’re everything from housing, 
and the whole spectrum of housing and mobile homes, to large 
condominium and apartment-type projects, we’re in the machine- 
tool business in a small way, in service centers and warehouses, 
as well as basic steel and mining.
In all these there are tremendously different ac­
counting problems, and we have had very little luck in trying 
to get uniformity even within our own accounting structure in 
the family of companies.
I find very hard to refute the argument for report­
ing earnings forecsts. Especially, as some of my friends who 
are in this audience are aware, I was espousing this in the 
very early days, along with Dave Green and Sid Davidson of the 
University of Chicago.
However, I have had a change of heart since assum­
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ing my present position, where I feel the weight of responsi­
bility as the chief accounting officer of my company, not as 
just the budget director, and, particularly, I look at the law­
suits, both litigated and those that have been threatened, and 
this gives me great pause, for reasons that were pointed out in 
the previous testimony by the MAPI people. At this stage of the 
game, until we can solve the potential liability problem, we 
better be careful because the best of us are going to miss our 
forecasts by a wide margin in some years.
Therefore I 'd recommend additional research and a 
great effort in public education, at least to the investing pub­
lic, before we adopt this risky step.
All of these points were discussed in our position 
paper, and we urge that the Committee consider them most care­
fully.
Now I ’d like to turn to one particular point touched 
on in our paper, and elaborate on it what I call the role of 
management in financial reporting.
I believe management's primary responsibility is to 
utilize the resources entrusted to it by its stockholders in the 
most effective and efficient manner possible, in order to pro­
duce the best possible return on the investment of the owners. 
Now, I deliberately eliminated the words "maximize" or "optimize, 
because in our company we recognize our social and public respon­
sibilities, which are constraints on maximization; but our em­
phasis is still there.
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If. this were not true, we feel there would be no 
corporation, because -- after all -- profits are the engine that 
drives the economy, and without them we couldn't do all these 
nice things for the community and the public at large.
Of course, we recognize secondary responsibility to 
the other publics, including the employees and their labor unions 
which represent them, our customers, the communities in which our 
Corporation operates, and the public at large. Responsibility 
to these groups may require reporting, as I have commented, on 
social costs in particular, but not necessarily financial reporting. 
We don't think financial reporting is the appropriate vehicle for 
dealing with the social costs that are coming up out of society.
We think such an application would cloud and distort the basic 
purpose of financial reporting. Therefore in our minds, this 
leads logically to the statement that financial reporting should 
be oriented toward management's primary responsibility —  its 
stewardship.
The value of the investment to the investor, poten­
tial or present, lies primarily in management's skills and ex­
pertise and the company's future earning potential. Therefore, 
the reporting should first be relevant and, second, a reflec­
tion of reality, and not some what-may-be, what-might-have-been 
situation.
As one illustration of a lack of realism, I'd like 
to cite the experience at our company and another one -- a neighbor 
of ours —  and what's happened with the allocation of taxes, or de­
ferred tax liabilities, on the timing differences of taxable 
and book items —  the principal one being depreciation, of course.
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You are all familiar with that technique.
Now, we believe that those items with a timing pro­
blem, relatively short run items —  say, one to five years— that 
this makes sense, and we don't quarrel with that logic. A good 
example of that is the now defunct treatment of production, pay­
ments, or so-called carved out mineral properties which most 
steel companies and petroleum companies have engaged in over 
the years. It is now outlawed by the Treasury.
But for other items, and particularly depreciation, 
the difference between accelerated and book depreciation, where 
you are using the two different methods, has created, I think, 
just a disastrous situation. This creates a growing mountain 
of liability in the blance sheet that is meaningless in an on­
going business. As long as the business continues to prosper, 
investments in new plant and facilities will continue to be 
made in an amount that will grow.
Our company, like MAPI cited, or the Eaton Corpo­
ration, has had a similar experience. We have replaced about 
75% of our assets in the past decade, spent over a billion dol­
lars in capital expenditures on gross values of $1.5 billion.
So we think that minimized that problem.
Reflecting this accounting opinion, we now have a 
liability on our balance sheet at 12/31/71 of $65 million, and 
we project it will reach $100 million by 1974 or 1975. This is 
becoming a very significant liability, and, in our minds, will 
never be paid, and is completely meaningless.
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Sears Roebuck, a neighbor of ours, one of Sid David­
son’s favorite citations on this subject, had $680 million at 
1/31/72, the end of its fiscal year. I don’t know about their 
forecasts, but certainly they are going to reach a billion-dol­
lar level by the end of this decade. Again I ask: "Is this
meaningful or realistic information?"
Now, you might ask: What happens if the capital in­
puts decline— actually slow down or decline? Well, my observa­
tion of the business world in the past 25 years is that compa­
nies either grow or they die, and I think all you have got to 
do is look at some of the companies that have gone under in the 
past few years, and you will see what I’m talking about. Before 
that liability would ever become due, the company is going to 
be running large losses— taxable losses--that will more than 
offset potential liability. So here is one of these "what if" 
things that I think are not defensible.
The result is that annual profits are understated.
We have all been concerned by overstatement. Here’s a classic 
case of understatement, and management reporting on its steward­
ship— is required to state that it is doing a poorer job than it 
realistically thinks it’s doing.
Is this a proper objective of financial reporting?
We don't think so.
Another example of this sort of thing came up in the 
Price Waterhouse paper, which I would like to quote, because it 
also confirms our own experience in our housing business.
5.53
One of the anomalies of the business world that is 
a source for mistrust of the accounting process is the wide dis­
crepancy between the considerations that enter into decisions 
to commit corporate resources to a project and the accounting 
conventions that measure its results. The manner in which the 
most successful real estate investments regularly report a loss 
in an accounting report is a scandal.
That's a strong statement, but one of the problems 
we're wrestling with is that very one. We run financial models 
for potential investors which show the tremendous economic ad­
vantage to them and to us, and yet we have great difficulty re­
porting book income on these large syndications.
My next point is that financial reporting should 
measure management performance. There seems to be general agree­
ment on that in the papers. The only question is: Who should
do the measuring? We feel that this is management's primary 
job, although we do not object to other people stating their own 
opinions, much as a critic does of a play, or other composition.
Regarding earnings performance, I have said earlier 
that this is a most important consideration, in our view, that 
the investor takes into account in making his investment deci­
sion. In this context, the valuations on the balance sheet are 
basically irrelevant to an evaluation of how well the business 
is being operated.
Now, I was troubled with this statement, and I got 
some help just last night when I caught up with an article that
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my friend, George Sorter; wrote in a recent issue of Journal of 
Business, and I have been trying to come to grips with the same 
kind of idea that he is--that of some way reflecting the change 
in economic value; if you are going to go that way, as separate 
from measuring the earnings performance of the enterprise for 
the year. Perhaps that’s an avenue for further research.
The objective of financial reporting should be to 
provide the most realistic report possible on the operation of 
the business. My particular pet peeve; if I may say SO, in my 
advocacy today, is the lack of recognition of the tremendously 
growing use in American business of what I will call manageri­
al accounting.
I don’t want to get into a hassle on direct costing 
versus full costing. We have been arguing this for 20 years; 
and we aren't going to argue about inventory valuation when 
that’s irrelevant to my point. My point is that today our com­
pany; for instance— and it has occured in the past decade--has 
swung almost completely away from a management of the old style. 
We came up the hard way. Now something like 80 to 85% of the 
top 400 managers in our company are MBA’s or MBA equivalents; 
and they think in these terms. They make their analyses this 
way, and their decisions. We run our accounting reports entire­
ly in this fashion; and we measure the results in this fashion.
Now, what do I mean by managerial accounting? Some 
of the most central things are the recognition of fixed and 
variable costs. In filling this in for the P&L statement; I
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think it would he a great help to the analyst in particular to 
separate these, and not lump everything into a typical 10-K 
format, as we tend to do.
Then the use of marginal profit concepts, incremen­
tal value, contribution markets, and return on invested capi­
tal— these are the tools and the criteria that managements are 
using more and more.
I have observed that many analysts— and I will edi­
torially say the good analysts— attempt to recast our state­
ments in this format, and I have one particular favorite that 
I won’t name who is a steel analyst, who does this, and he comes 
amazingly close to our criteria. Many analysts are now attempt­
ing to recast their analysis information from the published 
statements into managerial accounting format, in trying to fore­
cast earnings based on their own forecasts of what’s going to 
happen. And one or two of these fellows have been amazingly 
close to our own internal forecasts and to our own results.
Therefore, this encourages me to believe that the 
use of the managerial accounting approach would serve the needs 
not only of management but of the primary users; that is, the 
owners, the investors, the investment analysts who help the in­
vestors, and even lenders.
To illustrate some of the distortions that occur un­
der present day accounting, I will say I ’m much dismayed by the 
direction that the APB, the SEC and the Treasury are going in 
this direction. They are moving more toward full costing, rather
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than direct costing.
As you know, absorption costing includes fixed costs 
in manufacturing overhead in the inventory value. There's an 
argument on the inventory valuation side that I won't go into 
here, but my point is that from a managerial standpoint and 
from an analyst's standpoint in periods of low sales volume 
management can make its earnings look better by running high 
production and gambling on building inventory, because these 
credit costs are being capitalized into the inventory account.
But an even more serious problem is the misleading 
nature of total unit costs on management's strategies and al­
ternatives. Accountants are telling the manager that under full 
costing his prices are too low, at the very time that he should 
be cutting prices because the market demand is soft, and vice 
versa.
Of course, direct costing avoids this problem by not 
capitalizing fixed costs as inventory. Thus in a period of low 
sales volume the fixed costs fall down to the bottom line of the 
earnings statement, and in my opinion reflect what's really hap­
pening.
Therefore, following this through, the valuation of 
inventory and what I call opportunity costs--or the marginal 
costs of production— would fit the managerial accounting struc­
ture of the income statement. I believe this approach would pro­
vide more relevant data for economists, analysts, and even the 
government agencies interested in tracking the movements
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of the total economy.
In conclusion, I'd like to say that in our brief pre­
sentation today we have tried to point out that management's 
primary responsibility is to produce superior earnings commen­
surate with risk. The objectives of corporate financial re­
porting should be to report on how well management is doing that 
job. Financial reporting must be relevant and realistic to pro­
vide interested users with appropriate information for their 
own investment decisions.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
MR. GELLEIN: Thank you, Mr. Borst. Thank you for a
well-written paper, and for a very fine and clear presentation.
I found it quite stimulating.
I know we don't propose to debate— and I know you 
don't want to debate— Opinion 11, and tax allocation, but I want 
to use your illustration to pose my first question.
You referred to these so-called liabilities— I'll 
call them balance-sheet credits--as being unreal, and to the 
fact that the growing magnitude of them was an indication of the 
lack of reality. You know, what seems to be real unreal so often 
seems to rest in the eyes of the beholder. Some say they are 
real, and some say they are unreal.
So my question really is this. We here, of course, 
are concerned with the development, the statement, the articu­
lation of the objectives which in turn, we assume, would lead 
to reality in accounting. Using tax allocation as an illustra­
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tion, would you have any comments on how we might state an ob­
jective of accounting which would eliminate the unreality to 
which you referred?
MR. BORST: I can only...
MR. GELLEIN: By the way, if you can answer that one,
we've got our report written.
MR. BORST: Well, one way of looking at it that I
thought of, kind of inspired by George Sorter's approach to the 
thing, is that if you use the discounted-value concept— and I'm 
talking about going concerns--nowadays large corporations are 
virtually immortal, as someone said— even if you agreed that 
that liability would occur some time in the future the discount­
ed value is so far out that its present value would be practical­
ly zero.
MR. PARKER: On this question of deferred items on
the balance sheet-— if I remember correctly, following the pas­
sage of the Revenue Act of 1954, the Inland Steel Management 
felt that the accelerated method of depreciation was the prop­
er way to report income to its stockholders. And after the rev­
enue Act of 1962, when guidelines were established, that indi­
cated going to the shorter guidelines as an appropriate way, 
and that it was appropriate to spread the investment-tax credit. 
In 1988, as I remember,the management decided that straight-line 
depreciation was right for the stockholder, and that it was now 
right to flow through the investment-tax credit.
Do I understand now that you feel that even the other 
half of the difference between what you report on your tax books
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as depreciation and what you report to your stock-holders should 
also flowed through to income? Do your ideas about the econo­
mics of the business, or the rate at which assets depreciate, 
change that much over less than ten years' time? And how is 
this to be helpful to the stockholder-to make your method of com­
puting depreciation more and more different from, say, competi­
tors for the investors’ dollar, such as Caterpillar and General 
Motors, who still report to their stockholders the same way they 
always have, using the accelerated method of depreciation? And 
how do we frame an objective that makes things fair in this area 
for the stockholder, who, I gather you feel, is the primary per­
son who is supposed to be helped by this reporting?
MR. BORST: Right. Well, that’s an excellent ques­
tion. In fact, our Chairman dealt with this very question brief­
ly in his speech last week, and the Chicago newsmen devoted two 
columns of a four-column story to a two sentence statement, and 
reopened this whole issue; so I welcome the opportunity to talk 
about it.
The answer is: Yes, we did change our minds about
what is valid depreciation. As you pointed out, in 1954 we felt 
that we were getting less of tax-deductible depreciation than 
was warranted from a competitive standpoint, and of course this 
situation was worsened in the international steel market, as you 
know.
MR. PARKER: As I remember, the reference also was
not only not enough for tax purposes, but not enough to reflect 
the economic facts of life either.
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MR. BORST: Yes. Let me get to that.
You remember in 1954 we were still using, up till then, 
Bulletin F lives, which were relatively long. As time has march­
ed on though, the lives have been cut, including the new ADR, 
which is helping to correct the original situation.
At the time we did feel that accelerated depreciation 
would be a better economic measure in 1954, but in the experi­
ence that I just described, where we invested a billion dollars 
in capital goods and equipment in the past decade— as we tracked 
this experience, we found that we were pyramiding our costs— not 
just depreciation-very heavily in the short run, and we thought 
this was distortive in the matching concept of costs and revenues.
For one, we found start-up costs were very, very much 
more expensive than we expected, and this has been noted in the 
press. And, reflecting our conservatism--and I think the whole 
industry does this--these were all expensed. So you not only 
have the heavy costs, but you have the low-volume production, 
because you couldn’t get the unit up to speed, which raised the 
unit cost once again.
So we charted these things, and we saw tremendous bal­
loons of cost in these early years. Also, even though we know 
from experience that obsolescence is a technical factor and an 
economic factor, in reality our blast furnaces are over 40 years old. 
Our newest one was built during World War II. We have increas­
ed the productivity of those blast furnaces about 300% in the 
last decade.
5 .6 1
Should we say that that should have all been accel­
erated-written off in its early years--when it’s still perform­
ing the function now? Is this the total matching-of-costs-and- 
dividends concept that I have described?
It’s true that our move was triggered by the actions 
of the marketplace, particularly when other steel companies were 
moving in this direction. I don’t know their reasons, but we 
wound up with only one other company in our whole industry that 
was filing accelerated depreciation and amortizing the invest­
ment credit. We felt that this was not being properly evaluated 
in the marketplace, and therefore as responsible managers to our 
stockholders, we felt that we had to become comparable.
This led to the study which in turn, in my mind, con­
vinced me that it was right on its own, on economic terms as well, 
and I still feel that way.
MR. GELLEIN: I wonder if we could turn to another
question. Frank?
MR. WESTON: In connection with the development of
managerial accounting and, as you indicate, the use of discount­
ed cash-flow techniques, opportunity costs, and so on, could you 
tell us whether your MBA group and your younger managerial ac­
counting types do use any indication of rate of return on value 
and opportunity costs in connection with the operation of the 
company?
MR. BORST: Yes. We use these extensively.
MR. WESTON: We have been told generally in our in­
terviews that management does not use opportunity cost and dis­
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counted cash-flow and current values in determining the rate of 
return on investment, but that they always use historical cost.
My question is: Do the new techniques pay more attention to al­
ternative investments, opportunity costs, and annual return on 
what you might call closer relative values?
MR. BORST: Let me distinguish that. At this point
in time we are heavily using these techniques for new decisions,
both short run and long run. When we are looking at a strategy
for the next six months, we look at the opportunity costs.
MR. WESTON: But do you use that to evaluate exist­
ing non-decisions? In other words, a decision not to...
MR. BORST: No, we have not got to the point yet.
MR. WESTON: Why not? Why has that happened? I don't
understand why that would be true.
MR. BORST: We have not got to the point yet in meas­
uring internal rate of return as a measure of profitability with­
in the Corporation.
MR. WESTON: You use this for new decisions, but not
for hold and don't-sell decisions?
MR. BORST: We just haven't evolved that far yet. If
we were smart enought to know how to do that in the total group, 
we would do it; but we are moving strongly in that direction.
MR. GELLEIN: We could take one more question.
MR. REINHART: I was curious about your proposal on
the use of direct costing. Would that indicate that your concern 
is more toward the income statement than it is to the balance 
sheet, since direct costing tends to undervalue inventories on
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the balance sheet?
MR. BORST: I’m not sure if I understood your ques­
tion, but let me restate the point I was making.
MR. REINHART: Well, what I was saying was: If you
follow the direct costing principle, I understand the advantages 
of that with regard to present earnings, I guess, because 
earnings react much more...
MR. BORST: Dynamically.
MR. REINHART: They are much more reactive to it.
But would that indicate that you would state your inventories 
on the balance sheet on a direct cost basis, and therefore gen­
erally understate them, as to their value— which would indicate 
to me that you think the income statement is more important than 
the balance sheet?
MR. BORST: Yes. That’s why I referred to George
Sorter’s monograph here, because that problem distresses me too. 
When you turn to the balance sheet side, for other users--lend­
ers, and so forth— who are interested in the value of your assets, 
then I think we have got a problem.
Now, I might also say that no matter what method we 
use in industry to value inventory, it does not reflect its in­
surable value. It doesn’t reflect liquidation value. So I 
think it’s an irrelevant question anyway. That’s why it doesn't 
really disturb me as much.
MR. REINHART: Although there are some relationships
between the valuation of cost of sales, if you still have that
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in the income statement and inventory terms— I mean, on a di­
rect cost, understated inventory basis--it would appear, looking 
at a statement like that, that your inventory turnover was very 
rapid, and I think it can also be misleading to the investor as 
to how much inventory you actually are sitting with, if it isn't 
related to the cost of sales number.
MR. BORST: True, I don’t have answers to all those
problems, but let me ask you in turn: How does the investor
handle the same question with companies like ours that are on 
the LIFO method, where the balance sheet figure is substantially 
below current costs, even on an absorption basis, much less any 
concept of current value? I'm not trying to use another negative 
to upset your point.
MR. REINHART: I'm supposed to have an open mind on
this committee, but I would rule out all inventory valuation ex­
cept FIFO.
MR. GELLEIN: Mr. Borst, thank you very much for your
contribution to our efforts.
The National Society of Public Accountants.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Would you introduce yourself,
Mr. Passero?
MR. RUDOLPH J. PASSERO: Yes. My name is Rudolph
Passero, and I'm presently serving as the President of the Na­
tional Society of Public Accountants. Accompanying me today is 
Miss Phyllis Borghese. She's Director of Education for our Na­
tional Society.
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I believe you all received our statement, possibly 
a little late. We tried to arrange it so that it would be here 
in time for your hearings, this past Monday morning.
By way of introduction, I'd like to make mention that 
the National Society is an organization of over 13,000 practicing 
accountants located throughout the country. There is a public 
accountants’ association in each state affiliated with the Na­
tional Society.
The members of the Society of course are, for the 
most part, either sole practitioners or partners in moderately- 
sized public accounting firms. NSPA members provide--as do 
members of the Institute--accounting, auditing, tax preparation, 
tax planning and management advisory services to individuals 
and to small to medium-sized business concerns.
Members of the Society are pledged to a strict code 
of professional ethics and rules of professional conduct, and 
we believe that they are no less stringent than those applicable 
to CPAs under the rules of the American Institute of CPAs.
In the important area of technical competence, the 
Society--in order to promote a uniform application of profession­
al standards— has adopted with the Institute's permission the 
AICPA's auditing standards and procedures for its members. All 
NSPA members are duty-bound to adhere to these generally ac­
cepted procedures for financial reporting. Also, various Ameri­
can Institute literature is made available to our members through 
our Society as new material is issued by the Institute.
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It is our belief that these comments being presented 
today reflect the views of an overwhelming number of accountants, 
including many thousands of other public accountants and local 
CPAs not affiliated with national firms, who provide virtually 
the same services through the work that they do and the audits 
that they perform, although the purposes for their development 
of reports may vary slightly.
For purposes of this group of small and medium-sized 
practitioners, then, management and enterprise owners and lend­
ing institutions constitute the primary users of financial state­
ments which form the basis for financial business decisions. It 
should be noted that often the owners, who may include sole pro­
prietors, members of family held partnerships or of closely held 
corporations, may also be the management.
For a long time, reference to financial reporting 
has been limited for the most part to reporting for large, com­
plex firms. It must be recognized, however, that there are pro­
blems peculiar to reporting for small firms.
In the average business situation where we render serv­
ices, the business enterprise is too small to require or justify 
the number of persons needed to be involved to achieve good in­
ternal controls in the accounting function. It simply would not 
be economical for the client. Or, if the system has been ideal­
ly designed, in the closely held businesses there may be devi­
ations such as shortcuts from authorized procedures. Contrary 
being an ideal situation, it does not necessarily mean, however,
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that such occurrences are unsatisfactory either. In the case 
of the small enterprise, when actions are initiated by the top 
echelon of management, such persons are also the controlling or 
sole members of the small business. Therefore, the reasons for 
such conduct is merely for expediting matters. Besides, in the 
smaller concern management is in a position to more closely super­
vise operations, though perhaps lacking conventional internal 
control. In the small firm, internal control is basically a 
tool for exercising managerial control, whereby in the larger 
entity it is used to test the effectiveness of management. It 
should be stressed that there is a fundamental difference as to 
the purpose of financial statements of the smaller client.
Characteristically, in the small-scale unit, the ac­
countant is reporting to management, which often is the control­
ling stockholder, and to creditors--more often bankers. This is 
distinguished from the usual purpose of the large audit of major 
companies, when the accountant is reporting not to management, 
but about management and management’s achievements, to share­
holders and creditors.
While large or publicly held corporations maintain a 
staff of accountants, the smaller firms with which local account­
ing practitioners deal often lack this ability internally. Thus, 
the accountant who fills this gap in his client's organization 
provides an additional valuable service.
As an outsider, the relatively small accountant in 
public practice has, we believe, greater objectivity and also
5.68
is more tuned in to the specific needs of his client.
With his broad background resulting from a combina­
tion of education and experience with clients in varied business­
es, he can offer alternative recommendations from which the cli­
ent can select a course of action.
The main third-party user also includes the credit 
grantor. Increasingly, the lending institutions play a part in 
commercial ventures.
During the past years of inflation and increasing in­
come taxes on small business enterprises, it has become more and 
more difficult for an owner of a small business to retain profits 
which might increase his net worth or capital. Each year it 
takes more capital to support a growing sales volume, to pur­
chase inventory, to give pay raises and benefits to employees, 
and to keep up with other operating expenses. Inflation, as we 
all know, has added greatly to the cost of doing business; so, 
when a suitable profit is realized at the end of the year, the 
income and other taxes siphon off a chunk of that profit which 
otherwise might have been kept in the business to increase capi­
tal. Consequently, the small businessman has become more and 
more reliant on bank loans to supplement his own capital.
In order to respond to the needs of these three prime 
groups of users of financial statements, financial reporting 
should reflect information expressed in monetary terms. General­
ly speaking, financial reporting should be based on historical 
cost and completed transactions.
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Besides the prevailing view of the accounting pro­
fession and various government agencies such as the SEC; there 
is an important factor supporting this basis. Attempting to 
measure values on the basis of forecasts of earnings and of capi­
tal appreciation most decidedly introduces an element of uncer­
tainty. Therefore, such estimates are better expressed in sup­
plemental disclosures. The inclusion of budgets and forecasts 
should not be part of the basic financial statements, but rather, 
they should be presented separately in order to distinguish these 
items from the historical financial statements which provide a 
better basis, financially speaking.
Indeed, it may be appropriate to furnish this infor­
mation not only to management but also to credit grantors, as 
such forecasts or projections are beneficial to those who need 
such information for decision making. Management, owners, and 
bankers are as interested in such supplementary disclosures fo­
cusing on what is expected to be accomplished as in what did 
happen.
Financial statements are more effective when com­
parative information covering several dates and accounting per­
iods is given. Analyzing monthly statements can disclose the 
effects of seasonal fluctuations, and so forth. Inclusion of 
statements for several years can reveal whether the entity is 
expanding or declining or has reached a pleateau, or if perhaps 
the business is subject to erratic changes from time to time.
To be useful; financial statements should be ana-
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lyzed and interpreted, for the results can be indeed revealing 
for the necessary decisions to be made.
Comparative figures and key business ratios provide 
vital data for the banker who is naturally concerned with re­
covering the funds loaned or to be loaned with minimal risk. Be­
sides indicating the ability of the borrower to repay in the 
case of the lender, such information is invaluable to the entre­
preneur.
After all, in most circumstances, the basic purpose 
or objective of organizing and operating a business is to achieve 
satisfactory profits. While the income statement shows how suc­
cessful management has been in attaining this goal, the analysis 
becomes more meaningful when net income is related to sales, net 
worth, prior years' earnings, and so on. Prom the balance sheet 
can be determined if the business is solvent, and how solvent, in 
addition to the likelihood it will remain in that state for a given 
period. The significant test consists of the ability of the en­
terprise to pay its liabilities as they become due rather than 
merely having more assets than liabilities. To measure the 
adequacy of working capital it is necessary to indicate fair market 
values of assets, maturity dates or payment terms of obligations, 
and similar information as part of the statements.
Since being able to assess the customer's liquidity 
is an important objective of those who grant credit, making a­
vailable to them cash flow information along with sources and 
uses of working capital as part of the basic financial state­
ments will certainly be of assistance in providing the primary
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basis for such determination. Such additional information is 
useful to management and others too, of course. The various 
funds statements complement the conventional statements by re­
porting changes not otherwise readily discernible relating to 
financial activities of the business.
Whereas the long form audit report is rendered pre­
dominately to large clients, it is appropriate, if not more ap­
propriate, for the smaller client to have this service. Various 
analyses, comments, ratios and additional statements would pro­
vide the smaller entity with a better understanding of the finan­
cial data. However, ironically, the client who could perhaps 
benefit greater from the long form report often is the smaller 
client who cannot always afford this type of service.
Much that has been said about big business is pre­
sumed to apply to smaller enterprises as well. On the contrary, 
the small and medium sized businesses which are so fundamental 
to our economy have their own problems and peculiarities which 
must be handled in ways distinctively applicable to them.
For example, just recently, it was announced that 
small business firms— by definition, they were taken to mean 
those which have fewer than 60 employees--with certain limita­
tions, are now exempt from the wage-and-price regulations. Sig­
nificantly, this exemption affects five million small businesses 
which account for approximately $500 billion in total annual 
sales, or 28% of all sales.
Accordingly, we must not lose sight of the fact that
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we serve the small businessman, and therefore consideration 
should be given to the role or function of the accountant in 
public practice who has a different audience and which may per­
haps result in a major difference in the purpose of financial 
statements.
The National Society shares a great many interests 
with the American Institute, and we feel this is an important 
first step today. It demonstrates the great common area of in­
terest between our two organizations.
This kind invitation to participate in these hearings 
is a big step forward and this presentation of our views today 
shows one area where working together has made a significant con­
tribution, particularly from the viewpoint of those professionals 
who provide financial statements and reports for small and medi­
um-size clients. Of course, there are other areas--the ethical 
standards, professional development, accounting principles, au­
diting procedures and standards, community services, aid to 
small businesses, and assistance to minority groups. These and 
yet other important areas are indicative of our many common goals.
Miss Borghese and I sincerely appreciate the oppor­
tunity today to express our views to this important Study Group 
and to promote a closer liaison betweeen our two organizations.
We hope that you will feel free to call on us at any time if we 
may be of some assistance.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Thank you very much, Mr. Passero,
for a very nice presentation.
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I gather that in many respects, apart from our com­
monality of interest on the broader objectives, you are making 
some considerable plea for an expansion of information to small­
er business community, which may even be in the subjective area, 
but should be supplemental as distinguished from required, and 
an integral part of statements as such. Do I understand correct­
ly?
MR. PASSERO: That’s a fair statement, yes.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Anybody on the panel who wishes
to... ?
MR. GELLEIN: Just a general question.
You referred on page 3 to the fact that there is a 
fundamental difference as to the purpose of financial statements 
of the smaller client. Now, granted, you might say the funda­
mental difference runs to the number of users and the classes
MR. PASSERO: Yes, sir.
MR. GELLEIN: And do you think that difference in the
users and the classes of users calls for different objectives, 
and therefore different basic considerations in the preparation 
of the financial statements themselves? I ’m thinking of the de­
termination of income, for example. Does it run to that, or 
does it simply run to the way in which the other information is 
disclosed? That’s what I'm trying to get at.
MR. PASSERO: I think more along the lines of the
methods that are used to bring supplemental or additional in­
formation to the attention of the management of small business
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users.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Just to make me perfectly clear
on that--inventory valuation, for example, in the sense of prin­
ciples, objectives, disclosures, and so on, would be commonly 
treated, as between...
MR. PASSERO: We would not advocate a change in that
procedure.
MR. PARKER: I noticed your reference that in some
of these reports there ought to be preparation by the account­
ant of some relevant ratios. Would you have any feeling that 
that ought to be included as a part of some kind of subset of 
general objectives for financial statements?
MR. PASSERO: Well, I believe it's probably desir­
able, to the extent that it can be brought into the basic fi­
nancial statements, to represent them along with the basic fi­
nancial statements. It it is not appropriate to work them in as 
part of the basic statements, then of course it ought to be laid 
out in the form of supplemental information.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: In addition to ratios and that
sort of thing, I belive you put some emphasis on cash analyses 
and flows, and so forth. Picking up Reed’s question about ratios 
and my observation about the cash status, would you feel that 
your members should generally attest to those supplemental data 
or merely supply them?
MR. PASSERO: Well, we would be treading on thin
ground here, indeed, when we talk about attestation of some of
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the supplemental information. I can envision some instances 
where attestation would be appropriate; in others, frankly, it 
would not.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: But the attestation form, I sup­
pose, might take a somewhat different form than the standard 
ones we use?
MR. PASSERO: Depending upon the information, yes.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Any other questions from the
panel?
MR. WESTON: I have a brief one.
We have had a bit of discussion over the last three 
days about the use of fair values in financial statements, and 
I wonder whether the type of statement that you describe in your 
paper would fit their usages, whether fair values have entered 
into any of those determinations.
MR. PASSERO: Well, certainly fair values ought to
be brought into play in the financial presentation. I think 
we’re all probably pretty well convinced of the need for pre­
sentation of fair value. It has its place in the presentation 
of financial data. Again, I don't mean to infer that it neces­
arily ought to be carried as part of the balance sheet, but 
rather to be supplied in some form of supplemental data. It has 
its place. I think it's important.
Mr. Block, from the floor, points out that on page 5 
you take the position that financial reporting should be based 
on historical cost. On page 7 you say that in order to measure
5.76
the adequacy of working capital it’s necessary to indicate the 
fair market value of the assets.
Now, may I rightly assume, or would the correct an­
swer be, that this fair-market-value indication is also sup­
plemental data, so it can be worked in but not become a part of 
the statements?
MR. PASSERO: Yes, it needs to be worked in, in some
form. It’s too important to leave out.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: But as a principle, you stand
by your page 5 statement?
MR. PASSERO: Yes, to stay with historical cost.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Any other questions?
(There were none.) All right, if there is nothing else coming 
from the floor, thank you very much.
MR. PASSERO: Thank you, gentlemen, again.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: We appreciate your coming, and
we agree completely with you on the desirability of our cooper­
ation and our commonality of interests.
Mr. Jewett of Technical Audit Associates will be next.
MR. FRANK B. JEWETT, JR.: Is this the hot seat?
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: That's the hot seat, Mr. Jewett.
I'm sorry to inconvenience you with respect to our rescheduling, 
but we appreciate very much your making yourself available.
I think it might be helpful, particularly in this case 
if you would explain just very briefly the nature and purpose of 
your organization. Some of that is included in the paper, but 
maybe just a little prelude on that, before your summary of the
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paper, would be helpful.
MR. JEWETT: Yes, sir.
I have spent my whole life at the interface between 
technology and its applications, including several years as 
President of Vitro Corporation, which had major systems-engineer­
ing responsibilities for programs like the Polaris, the Poseidon 
program, and so forth.
After a merger, where they didn’t need two presidents,
I had a sabbatical year to contemplate the forest instead of the 
trees, and during this period I began to see what I thought was 
an answer to some of the problems that were emerging in the man­
agement and control, and assessment of major development programs—  
the kinds of things that have led to all of Senator Proxmire’s 
very great furor.
It became increasingly apparent to me that one of the 
problems lay in the management structure under which these pro­
grams were run, which was something that worked pretty well twen­
ty years ago, but where a number of changes in the technical en­
vironment had changed the ground rules of the ball game, and 
essentially reduced the effectiveness of the decision maker by 
limiting his knowledge of what was really going on in his program.
This resulted from a number of identifiable changes—  
increase in size, increase in the pace of technological develop­
ment, increasing complexity of programs. Just to give you an 
order of magnitude, on the Polaris program there were somewhere 
between 10,000 and 20,000 suppliers. There were 67,000 people
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in many thousands of different organizations involved in the 
development team. This all had to be integrated, information 
had to pass, and just very simply— actually one morning while
shaving--I thought: Well, by God, the decision maker has only
one channel of information coming to him, and the things have 
gotten so complicated that he is no longer like the old director 
of a laboratory where he knew everything that was going on, and 
knew as much or more about all of the technical decisions as all 
of his people. Now you have people reading reports with recom­
mendations that are made by some other organization, people they 
don't even know, and about subjects in which they are not nec­
essarily completely competent.
The problem of the decision maker is that he is no 
longer in a position where he is a good judge of the validity 
of the information that he is getting or he may not be getting.
And if he is not qualified to judge the reliability of this in­
formation, he is neither in a position to ask the right questions 
nor to interpret the answers properly when he's asked them.
Again I go back to the fact that he tends to be de­
pendent on a single line of communication.
So it seemed to me that technology had come to need
a function which was somewhat analogue to the function of public
accounting— a competent, redundant line of communication that 
would either validate the information that the decision maker 
was receiving, by saying: Go ahead. Make whatever decision you
want; what you are getting is complete, it's objective, it's
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good. Or it would say to him: Watch out, because there are
areas here that have not been included in the information that’s 
getting to you, or the test data has not been properly evaluated.
In other words, it would give him a warning that would enable 
him to focus his attention on potential troubles early in the 
game.
I have had a lot of good ideas in my life— ideas that 
I felt were good— and usually I found they weren't much good, for a 
couple of basic reasons. Either somebody else had already undertaken 
them, and it was too late, or they were no good for some reasons 
that weren't very obvious to me.
So I started a procedure of trying to get shot down 
early with these smart ideas that I would have, and I started 
talking with a large number of people who were eminent and ex­
pert in the various areas of technical management— not just tech­
nology, but also the other things--financial management and the 
other aspects that go with it. And instead of getting shot down,
I found that more and more people agreed with me that this sound­
ed like a sensible approach to improve the management processes 
in technology.
But if you stop and think of this process, it becomes 
clear that it extends to a lot of areas. It extends to the kind 
or the quality of information that goes into prospectuses, and to 
whether you can escape trying to evaluate technical matters by 
just declaring with a caveat that there’s lots of risk in every­
thing, and so forth, and duck the issue. This is an area that 
I think demands attention, because I think there is a better way 
of doing it.
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Now, that’s a long preamble to answer your question 
as to what I’m doing. What I have done is to organize a small 
firm, and you’re looking essentially at it--although I do have 
quite a few associates in the thing in a rather informal kind 
of way— called Technical Audit Associates— to try and practice 
what I was preaching. And in my view, if I am right, I am go­
ing to try and be a pioneer and forerunner of what I believe may 
develop in some form, somewhat related to what I see as the first 
of a new profession of independent technical auditors.
That is the background.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Thank you very much.
MR. JEWETT: Now, would you like...?
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Yes, if you would proceed to sum­
marize your paper; it has been made available to the members of 
the Study Group.
MR. JEWETT: Mr. Trueblood and members of the Account­
ing Objectives Study Group: I appreciate the privilege of appear­
ing before you. My prepared statement is brief, and copies of 
it are available. I will be glad to respond to any questions 
you may have at the end of my presentation.
It is recognized that you are addressing a broad spec­
trum of subjects having to do with the objectives of financial 
statements and the relation of the public accountant’s opinion 
to them. My focus is on one restricted but important area with­
in your total context; namely, the impact of technology on the 
assessment and reporting of business activities.
The process of applying technology to the production
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of new products has undergone dramatic change during the past 
twenty years. The rate of technological development has accel­
erated. Increasing size and complexity have intensified the 
problems of integrating more diverse sciences. The time in­
terval of development processes has lengthened. These circum­
stances are at the root of much which is going wrong with the 
management, control, and assessment of technology today. The 
problems are fundamental. They cannot be ignored nor can they 
be cured by tinkering with procurement policies or other modi­
fications of surface phenomena. The difficulties lie in the 
very structure and system of technical management. The end re­
sult is that in many companies, the decision makers have been 
overwhelmed by the existing processes for assessment and manage­
ment of changing technology. No cure will be effective unless 
it recognizes the nature and addresses the fundamentals of the 
changes that have occured.
From the public accountant’s standpoint, the nub of 
the problem is that technology can make financial statements 
grossly misleading. Technology has placed the public account­
ant on the horns of a dilemma. Long-term, technically based en­
deavor has become so important in many business situations that 
technical considerations may dominate all others; yet the public 
accountant has no basis for expressing an independent opinion 
on these matters. He must rely on management’s judgment, and 
management’s self-assessment of technical matters can be faulty.
For example, when a company is building a major pro­
cessing plant or a C-5A airplane— projects that may take several
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years to complete— the capitalized values appearing in its fi­
nancial statements during the intervening years can become cru­
cial. In its 1968 Annual Report, Lockheed reported inventories 
of $775 million applicable to the development, production, and 
testing of the C-5A. Total shareholders’ equity amounted to 
$371 million, so the C-5A work-in-process inventory alone re­
presented more than twice the shareholders’ equity. These in­
ventories presumably were valued at the lower of cost or market. 
By hindsight, we now know that they were greatly in excess of 
market. This fact was far more important than any other con­
sideration used by the auditors in examining the Lockheed state­
ment. The inventory in question was not, however, a normal man­
ufacturing inventory, because the C-5A project involved substan­
tial development, and the verification of the development values 
in the work-in-process inventory dollars was a matter of vital 
importance.
As I see it, the problem for the public accountant 
is that, except for management opinions, he has no way of judg­
ing the value of the assets such companies are creating. In 
these instances, his opinion on financial statements may cover 
everything but the most important factor in that particular busi­
ness situation. This fact makes his opinion relatively meaning­
less. The public accountant may be able to avoid legal responsi­
bility by properly claiming no expertise in technology, and pass­
ing the buck to management. When management is wrong, however, 
the public accountant cannot avoid the stigma of the ensuing dis-
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aster.
If you think I am stirring up a tempest in a teapot, 
consider for a moment some of the recent catastrophies that have 
involved applications of technology. Military programs galore 
have resulted in vast cost overruns, some measured in billions 
of dollars, late deliveries, sometimes years behind schedule or 
faulty equipment, sometimes so bad that projects have been aban­
doned after millions have been spent. Other examples, in ad­
dition to the C-5A, are the F-111, the Cheyenne Helicopter, the 
Mark-48 Torpedo, the Main Battle Tank, numerous shipbuilding 
programs, and so on. Also consider the bankruptcies of Rolls- 
Royce and Viatron, the insolvency of Cogar Corporation and the 
near insolvency of Lockheed, the demise of RCA’s computer busi­
ness, the problems of the Bay Area Rapid Transit System, and so 
forth.
The various managements did not intentionally create 
these situations, but the calamities did occur. The message for 
the public accountant seems clear. First, technical matters 
have achieved an order of importance in business that the public 
accountant cannot ignore. Second, continued reliance primarily 
on management’s judgment in lieu of independent technical veri­
fication is no longer a tenable policy.
I do not mean to imply that management has suddenly 
lost either its intelligence or its integrity. Rather, what I 
see is the evolution of a new set of conditions that have made the 
existing systems and procedures for the management of technology
5.84
unreliable. These are the changes in the environment of tech­
nology which were referred to earlier.
It is necessary to recognize and understand the 
changes that have taken place in the application of technology 
in order to cope intelligently with the results. Technical in­
formation flows along organizational lines, and the decision 
maker, increasingly remote from the action as programs have 
grown in size and complexity, finds himself on the receiving 
end of a single channel of information. Remoteness and the 
broadening span of technology have eroded the decision maker's 
competence to evaluate or question intelligently the information 
he receives. As a result, the self-assessments of the doers 
have assumed increasing dominance in the ultimate appraisals and 
decisions. The proliferation of documentation abets the process 
by submerging all along the line with more than they can digest, 
and the accelerating pace of technical development exposes the 
whole procedure to a kaleidoscope of ever-changing options that 
frequently introduce serious financial consequences. To top it 
all, the information that flows up the lines of a technical de­
velopment organization to the decision maker tends to become 
biased by parochial interests that are difficult for a technical­
ly unsophisticated manager to detect.
This system tends to bury its faults as long as pos­
ible. It tends to make top management the last party to know 
the truth about the program for which it is responsible, and 
most likely to live the longest with euphoric beliefs about them.
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Finally, it tends to deny management timely information about 
problem areas, which would enable it to focus its attention on 
potential troubles while time and money still remain for cor­
rective action to be taken, and be effective.
For a vivid account of this phenomenon at work, I re­
fer you to "The Aircraft Brake Scandal", Harper's, April 1972.
The importance of this article is not the specifics of the break­
down at B.F. Goodrich, but its exposure of a management system 
that can fail for similar reasons anywhere.
Having spent my career at the interface between tech­
nology and its applications, and having contended with the pro­
blems that technical management creates for the chief executive,
I feel more than minimally qualified to propose an answer which 
in structure and philosophy goes to the heart of the difficulty.
I propose that a new professional responsibility is needed that 
will independently and competently evaluate the technical aspects 
of a program. Its function with respect to management would be 
either to validate the line generated information and assessments 
or to give management substantive reasons for questioning the in­
formation it receives. For the public accountant, the existence 
of such a body of responsible independent technical opinion would 
represent a source for independent appraisals of technical matters, 
a condition which I believe would markedly improve the meaning 
and reliability of audited financial statements.
It is my opinion that it will be necessary to create 
a new professional function--independent technical auditing— to
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accomplish what I have in mind, and I believe such a function 
is practical. In fact, to my engineering-management-oriented 
mind, financial and technical auditing must eventually come to­
gether, if financial statements are to have dependable validity. 
It is, however, premature to decide whether technical auditing 
should forever remain a separate function or coalesce into the 
overall scope of the public accountant’s function. Independent 
technical auditing will of course have to be carefully controlled 
in its ethics, policies, and standards, and those will have to be 
thoughtfully evolved. Disaster will occur if technical auditing 
becomes the happy hunting ground for any firm seeking business 
for a few spare engineers.
Many of my friends in public accounting have taken me 
to task in the mistaken impression that I am proposing a super­
human function for the prediction of the outcome of technical en­
deavor. This would of course be just as improper and impossible 
for a technical auditor as it is for his financial counterpart.
There are in technical management, however, a myriad 
of matters that are subject to qualified independent appraisal, 
and that are indicative of the condition of a development pro­
gram. By validation or exposing deficiencies in what has been 
done, the technical auditor restricts his opinion to past actions, 
the only things which can be subject to audit. His assessments 
would be against what might be defined as "acceptable standards 
of good technical-management practice." It would be up to the 
management or the investor to project the meaning of a technical
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auditor’s opinion into the future.
It is my assertion that factors exist in technology 
that are just as measurable and meaningful to persons skilled in 
technology as are the different factors that a public accountant 
inspects in reaching his opinion. What I refer to are such things 
as the thoroughness with which technical risk has been assessed; 
whether all alternative solutions have been considered and ob­
jectively evaluated; whether the development plan recognizes the 
risks and available alternatives; whether "milestones" and tests 
to prove their accomplishment are significant; whether the spec­
ifications on either side of an interface are compatible; wheth­
er change-order procedures and the justifications and approvals 
necessary to initiate a change are clear and being followed; 
whether progress to date has met its schedule when measured in 
terms of technical tests; and so forth.
It is possible for qualified people to assess a tech­
nical program in terms as I have outlined above, and the find­
ings independently arrived at would provide a good measure of 
the healthiness or sickness of a program long before the condi­
tion would be disclosed by the income statement.
This is not the time to go into the details of how 
an independent technical audit should be accomplished, but two 
cardinal aspects are worth mentioning.
First, three types of expertise are required:
(a) Mature persons with experience in the area of 
technology in question, to provide reliable, subjective judg­
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ments and the recognized expertise to make them credible. They 
would be equivalent to the senior partners in a law or public 
accounting firm.
(b) Persons who are fully conversant with what is 
happening at the forefront of science, again in the particular 
technologies critical to the project at hand. These technical 
specialists would have a knowledge of the state of the art that 
must be available to ensure that the technical audit opinion is 
based on current technology.
(c) A supporting staff that would look much like a 
miniature systems-engineering organization, to do the data gather­
ing, analysis work, preparation of position summaries, and so 
forth, so as to minimize the time required of the more senior 
people. Just as systems-coordination engineers develop the spe­
cial skills, attitudes, and procedures to execute their unique 
responsibility effectively, it can be presumed that a technical 
audit staff will develop a special expertise of its own.
Second, it is imperative to match critical technical 
areas with expertise in those specific aspects of technology.
If this is not done, the technical auditor will not be able to 
probe intelligently for and detect flaws in the underlying tech­
nical detail. If he cannot do this with razor-sharp acuteness, 
his opinion will either be in danger of grass roots error, or 
it will become too general to be very useful.
Because the spectrum of scientific and engineering 
specialties is so much broader than the variations in accounting
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specialization from industry to industry, it is in this latter 
area that the structuring of technical auditing differs most 
from public accounting.
The objective of a balance sheet, as I see it, is to 
present a fair picture of the condition of a business. The con­
dition of technical aspects which may dominate all other consid­
erations is, I believe, not dependably disclosed by the existing 
procedures for reporting and auditing.
What I believe is necessary, and what I believe pub­
lic accountants should insist upon, is a competent, independent 
verification of technical assessments and progress wherever and 
whenever this subject has significance for the condition of a 
business enterprise. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Thank you, Mr. Jewett.
As I read your paper this morning, and as I hear you 
talk now, it appears what you are really saying is that this in­
creasing technological complexity of business is producing an­
other degree of uncertainty, or a problem of imprecision, which 
becomes increasingly difficult to measure. I presume that would 
be a fair summary.
Now, is there anything in your proposal that requires 
a separation of the functions between technical audits and the 
financial audits, considering that there are indeed, internally 
to the public accounting firms and internally to business, avail­
able technical resources for analyses of this kind, which I be­
lieve are used by us presently— consultants or otherwise?
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MR. JEWETT: If I understand your question, I think
you are asking if I feel that this has to he a separate function.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: That's right.
MR. JEWETT: The answer to that is: No, it does not
have to be a separate function; and I realize that there is a 
large gray area, but I am proposing a function that goes much 
farther than, let's say, the somewhat similar function that is 
accomplished by research institutes like the Stanford Research 
Institute, or Arthur D. Little, by some management consulting 
firms, by feasibility studies of architect-engineers and engi­
neering firms, by ad hoc committees of the National Academy of 
Sciences, and so forth.
There are a lot of bits and pieces that lead in this 
direction, but I think there are faults with these things.
For instance, in the sense that I see the need for it,
I don't believe that a technical audit can really be undertaken 
effectively by an organization that does it as a sideline, which 
is essentially what a research institute does. And let me talk 
for a minute about that.
A research institute is in business primarily to do 
development work, and they find themselves with all kinds of in­
ternal conflicts when they start, as Standard Research did when 
starting to audit a part of the Cheyenne Helicopter program.
Then they find that they have placed off limits a whole area of 
work for the major part of their organization.
This type of organization also tends to do the job with 
the people they have on their staff, and that does not necessar­
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ily mean they get the right people on the job. In this partic­
ular area, matching of expertise is critical. It's like making 
a key that will turn a lock; you have whatever you call the nubs 
on a key, which are like the expertise. They have to push the 
tumblers very exactly, and if those nubs are displaced just a 
little bit, the key either sticks or it won't turn the lock at 
all.
MR. WESTON: Reading through your paper, I note in the
beginning you cite a number of financial disasters, and there is 
an inference through there that if a technical audit had been 
made back in those years, somehow these disasters would have been 
avoided, or at least would have been brought forward. But on 
page 7, when you describe the technical auditor's report, you 
say he restricts his opinion to past actions, and will only as­
sess them against acceptable standards of technical management 
practice.
I find a conflict, really, in the paper in that area, 
and I wonder if you could tell us, first, how you would visual­
ize the technical auditor would face up to the early stages of 
a very complicated contract, when the future change orders and 
cost overruns and other problems are unknown to everyone. And 
second, what language would your audit report use? Would you be 
responsible for saying that these inventories are at cost or mar­
ket?
MR. JEWETT: Well, you have asked several questions.
Let me try to address your first one, and I'll try to do it with
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an example.
Let me take the case of the Rolls-Royce RB-211 engine, 
which led to the bankruptcy of Rolls-Royce. Now obviously, I'm 
on the outside, and I can only know what I read in the paper 
about the thing, but in citing this example, I bring to your at­
tention that in this particular case, inadvertently, a little bit 
of a technical audit was made, which was quite informal and un­
expected, and it confirms what I'm saying.
I think that the problem in the Rolls-Royce case was 
that in the attempt to develop successful crescent filament blades 
for the compressor, while the very high risk was recognized, it 
wasn't recognized as thoroughly as it should have been; or per­
haps it wasn't properly recognized by the top management.
So what I'm saying is that the past action that a tech- 
auditor would have looked at would be the fact that this program 
involved a very high risk, and he could flag this for proper ac­
tion. He wouldn't have said it can't be done, but if the high 
risk had been properly recognized--and I think this is a defin­
able thing— a number of other actions different from what took 
place would have ensured.
MR. WESTON: But how would the accounting or the fi­
nancial statements differ, based on an evaluation of more or less 
risk? In other words, how would the inventory have been carried, 
if the risk were twice what someone thought it would be?
That's our problem today, the objectives of accounting. 
In stating these inventories in an area in which you say there
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is great risk, how would the inventories he changed?
It seems to me there might be more disclosure, that 
would say: These are the costs to date, and the risks are over­
whelming. But as you say, no one can say what the outcome will 
be, and I'm wondering what your opinion would say on that kind 
of an inventory.
MR. JEWETT: Well, now I've got to hypothesize here,
but I can imagine a situation where in the case of Rolls-Royce's 
statement, the technical auditor would have said, to whomever he 
says this, that he finds the development plan for the RB-211 en­
gine deficient.
MR. WESTON: And what does he expect they will do with
that information?
MR. JEWETT: Well, I expect that the sequence of events
might have been that this would have caused considerable commo­
tion in Lockheed, or with the banks that were financing the air­
planes, and that that would have resulted in the development of 
a plan for the RB-211 engine and its subsequent financing on an 
alternative course, which they would eventually have followed, 
with a quicker cutover to it.
MR. WESTON: But you're implying that this risk wasn't
known by these people, and I think that may be an unfair infer­
ence.
MR. JEWETT: I'm not saying that it wasn't known. I’m
saying that I'm sure it was known, but I don’t think it was re­
cognized with the degree of force that was necessary to cause the
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proper actions to be taken.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Does that complete your question­
ing, Frank? Anybody else around the table? (No one responded.)
Thank you very, very much, Mr. Jewett. This is a pro­
blem that is of increasing concern--you're extremely correct-- 
and we're each trying to cope with it in our own way. Thank you.
Next, and our final presenter, Price Waterhouse & Co. 
Good morning, Henry. I again apologize for rescheduling your 
day of meetings, but it's delightful that you can be with us at 
this time.
MR. HENRY P. HILL: I suppose I should start off by
saying I'm Henry P. Hill, a partner in Price Waterhouse, occupy­
ing the position of National Director of Accounting and Auditing 
Services. With me is Bob Liptak of our staff, who has accumu­
lated a number of papers while helping me, and he has very strict 
instructions to rustle those papers like mad if the questions get 
too hot.
May I start off by expressing our appreciation for the 
opportunity to be heard by the Study Group. At least, at this 
stage I'm appreciative. I know more than half of you from other 
contacts, and I know how penetrating your questions can be, and 
perhaps 45 minutes from now I will not be quite so appreciative.
I have noted from the experience of observing other 
panels conducting hearings like this that a tendency develops for 
the later arrivals to address themselves to the particular ques­
tions of interest that came up in earlier discussions. Well, I 
haven't attended the hearings prior to this morning, and although
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I have read all the papers submitted in advance that I could get 
my hands on, I'm not aware of the issues that have come up in the 
discussion. So perhaps what we lose in repetition we might gain 
in freshness. If it results in repetition, I apologize.
You have all received a paper from my firm. I under­
stand it was the first one submitted. I hope it's not an indi­
cation of fair value that the first paper submitted results in 
the last appearance before the Board.
In any case, it may be helpful if I draw attention to 
the two principal points made in our paper.
The first point had to do with the purpose of the Study 
Group. This is the kind of issue that could have emotional over­
tones, but our objective in raising it was at the other end of 
the scale. This Group was originally called upon to examine the 
objectives of corporate financial statements. My source for this 
statement is the ARA Newsletter of August 16, 1971, which I may 
say corresponds to my recollection of the proceedings at the 
Sterling Institute that gave rise to the Group. Somehow or other, 
by October it had become the Accounting Objectives Study Group.
This change in wording could, I believe, signal a major 
change in direction which would expand the work of the Study 
Group enormously and could at the same time lead it off in the 
wrong direction. Expansion per se is no cause of dismay to me.
The fact that the Study Group is willing to take on a larger role 
is a cause for congratulations as to its energy and sense of ob­
ligations, assuming of course— as I am--that no unnecessary delay 
results, and provided it does not result in the fulfillment of
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that direful prediction by your Chairman, who was reported in 
the New York Times to have said that the task of the Study Group 
is a terrifying one that may come to zero.
But the point is, the need now is for a statement of 
purpose of financial statements. I cannot say it any better 
than Bill Werntz did in the very quotation you used in your own 
October 1971 progress report. You said he— and I quote you— em­
phasized the overriding need for an explicit statement of frame 
of reference within which to argue the acceptability of a par­
ticular practice, and a set of criteria by which to test proposed 
solutions.
The words "frame of reference" are the key words.
The end product of financial reporting is financial statements, 
and it is these statements that need a frame of reference. If 
they ever had a clear one, it's been lost in the effort to deal 
with the complexities and pressures, both internal and external, 
to which financial accounting has been subjected in the past 15 
years.
In my opinion, this has resulted from a situation where­
by each accountant has a slightly different perception of the fi­
nancial reporting process, and perceives the solutions to par­
ticular problems differently in the light of his previously form­
ed mental image. Let me give you an example Mr. Reinhart has 
heard before.
There are two major classes of institutions in this 
country that marshal the savings of individuals and put them to 
productive use. They are banks and insurance companies. Ten
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years ago, neither was influenced much by accounting theory, their 
primary reporting concern being the requirements of the states.
The accounting profession became interested in this situation, 
and perceiving that it could not last indefinitely, set about to 
deal with some of the problems of applying GAAP to these indus­
tries. Special committees of the AICPA were organized.
Because they have related functions, the two types of 
institutions had a related accounting problem: what to do with
marketable securities. The Banks Committee concluded that banks 
had an amount invested in securities that had lower limits, and 
to a large degree funds from securities sold were reinvested in 
similar securities. To the Banks Committee, this was just trad­
ing paper, and they proposed a deferred recognition of profit and 
loss on sales.
The Insurance Committee noted that the necessity for a 
sale to establish a profit on a good investment had elements of 
artificiality about it, and by a majority vote proposed that 
some method be devised to record profit on securities on an an­
nual yield basis that would take into account quoted values.
So there you have it. The insurance companies would 
show a profit without any sale, but the banks would not show a 
profit even after a sale.
The important thing is, despite their superficial con­
flicting conclusions, both proposals make sense. They make sense 
only because their proponents start off at different places. But 
what is also important to recognize is that the APB bought nei­
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ther view.
Accounting is a conventional practice. It has been 
devised by human beings to deal with a specific objective--the 
choice of deployment of financial resources in our economy.
Change the economy, or eliminate the choice, and you change the 
thrust of accounting.
But accounting is a discipline that covers a lot of 
territory, much of which is not being severely criticized at the 
present time. Though there are always those who would make changes 
in the management aspects of accounting, the primary criticism at 
the moment is in the public summaries we call financial statements. 
And so I urge the Committee to give us a frame of reference for 
the preparation of those statements so that those who compile 
them, those who read them, and those who analyze them have the 
same understanding.
The second point made in our paper is an exhibition of 
what in our judgment the frame of reference should be. It's hard 
to miss that conclusion. We followed the instructions of the 
country preacher in preparing a sermon, and we put it in three 
times in these words: General purpose financial statements are
designed to report to investors on the use of funds they have in­
vested in their enterprise, in such a way as to facilitate their 
investment decisions of the future.
Some of the key words emphasized in this simple state­
ment are: "general purpose," meaning— as they used to say on
railroad bills of lading--NOIBN, not otherwise indicated by name;
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"investors" --which eliminates employees, creditors, estates, and 
others as the primary viewpoint. It tells us that if you use 
general purpose statements for rate making, taxation, economic 
forecasting, or most of the other purposes for which they have 
not been devised— you are, in the words of G.L. May, eating peas 
with your knife; "funds," which emphasizes money as against val­
ue; "investment decisions of the future," emphasizing the con­
tinuity and the potential for short term action.
I could go on, but you have read our paper, and I 
should like to wind up with a quotation. It's from a letter to 
the Editor of Business Week that appeared in the January 8, 1972 
issue. I have no idea who the writer is. He may not be one of 
the quotable accounting greats, but he's got something for us to 
think about.
"As a major stockholder, director, and employee of a 
small manufacturing business, I have more recently come to a 
deeper understanding of the term 'profit' and its vagaries. A­
mong even our handful of more or less equal principles, not all 
of whom are number-minded, the term incites argument, suspicion, 
and misunderstanding. Everyone still likes to peek into a cash 
drawer."
Arch R. Newton
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Thank you, Henry. Your superbly
done paper was indeed received first— not to suggest that we now 
have a new terminology called first in, last out— FILO.
I would respond to the Accounting Study Group termi-
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nology. Frankly, we found ourselves, in our early meetings, 
using the words "financial statements." “financial accounting," 
and “accounting" almost interchangeably. It was not nearly the 
deliberate decision that you may think it to be, and we do 
not intend it to change our charter or objective or our role in 
any way.
You start out your paper by being very startling, and 
continue in a very lucid, clear fashion, page by page and sen­
tence by sentence, contending that this is a conservative paper. 
Is it really that conservative?
For example, you move over somewhere along the line in­
to a rather strong emphasis on cash presentations which are not 
typical, which are new, and which are one of the subjects some of 
our members are significantly interested in. And you also talk 
in some places about prospective results and analyses, as well 
as retrospective results and analyses.
Would you care to comment about your initial sentence, 
in relation to what you believe the general tone of your paper 
to be?
MR. HILL: Well, I thought it characterized the tone
of the paper. "Conservative” means you save what you have, or 
preserve what you have. I don't visualize if the recommendations 
in our paper were followed that accounting would instantaneously 
change substantially, and that's really what I meant by the use 
of the word "conservative."
Beyond that, I guess it's in your own mind what is 
conservative and what is not. I view this as a paper of the
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right rather than a paper of the left. I would view the left as 
being a fair value paper, or something like that.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: One more question, and then I’ll
ask Oscar to proceed.
In this very simple and well written sentence on the 
first page which you quoted "General purpose financial statements 
are designed to report to the investor”--I presume you mean the 
actual investor as well as the potential investor; that is, the 
public in the large sense.
MR. HILL: Yes, I do. I intended to cover the invest­
ing function.
MR. GELLEIN: Henry, my first question really relates
to what is at the bottom of page 13 and at the top of page 14, 
and I’m really asking for a little elaboration, if you don't 
mind. I was kind of fascinated by this. It's the emphasis on 
the short term decisions that underly the investor's action.
Then you refer to some things not based on the account­
ing for money. I don't know— maybe that’s my term— but you con­
clude by saying that if accounting is to depart from the cash 
basis, the burden of proof is on those who justify the departure 
from the cash basis--and I think I see what you mean.
Then you talk about pension costs, accounting for 
deferred taxes, and the like. I know, for instance, as to ac­
counting for pension costs, some actuaries said at the time Opin­
ion 8 was written that if you went to the maximum, and you fund­
ed that amount, you'd be putting cash into a fund that you would
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never have to pay out, and that sort of thing.
On the other hand, you see, to me that may mean that 
maybe we measured it wrong. I'm going to ask you a question in 
a minute, when I get through here.
When you come to deferred taxes, you again say, or you 
imply, it will never be paid. Well, again, maybe we measured it 
wrong. Maybe we should have been on the liability approach, and 
maybe we should have had a present value number on it, or what­
ever it may be.
But my real question, then, is this. If all of this 
derives from the emphasis on the short range decision, which I 
read into this as a key part of what you deem to be objectives 
relating to investors, then why do we record depreciation on a 
50-year asset? How do you conclude that you don’t account for 
deferred taxes, based on this objective in relation to a tax- 
book difference on a 50-year asset, in accounting for the de­
preciation itself?
I don't mean to argue the technical matter.
MR. HILL: Well, if I may, Oscar— we don’t mean to
say that you should not record any deferred tax. If that comes 
through, that’s the problem.
MR. GELLEIN: No, I was trying to get away from a tech­
nical point to a philosophical point.
MR. HILL: But I think I can address it in philosoph­
ical terms.
I believe the real necessity for accounting for de-
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ferred taxes is a short term one. I think it's significant that 
you account for deferred taxes in a case where the expense may 
he in next year's profit-and-loss statement, and the deduction 
may be in this year’s tax return. In that case, it’s quite sim­
ple to flip from one year to another the profit that results 
from the tax saving.
On the other hand, when you get this enormous pool of 
deferred taxes, as you get down to the bottom of the pool the 
probabilities of their being paid get lower and lower. And what’s 
really indicated, it seems to me, is some kind of a probability 
analysis at the bottom of that pool.
MR. GELLEIN: But aren’t you really saying, then, Henry, 
that in that regard we came up with the wrong answer? That we 
had the right objective— purpose— but we came up with the wrong 
answer?
MR. HILL: To some degree I think we did, yes. Not
completely.
MR. GELLEIN: So I was really trying to explore wheth­
er there was some other objective in here that cuts across more 
broadly.
MR. HILL: No, I think we came up with the wrong answer,
and you can say the same thing about pensions. The bottom of 
this pool will never be paid, because if the company stays alive 
it won’t need to be, et cetera, et cetera, as we say in the paper.
MR. WESTON: Henry, at the bottom of page 7 there's a
comment which other speakers have quoted here at our session.
This is the statement that the manner in which the most success­
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ful real estate investments regularly report a loss is an ac­
counting scandal.
I wonder if you could enlarge on that, and tell us how 
we could phrase an objective of accounting which would overcome 
that. And particularly with respect to real estate, my impres­
sion is that, in addition to the timing of depreciation, which 
may he the reason for this loss which you say is a scandal, pos­
sibly the value increment in real estate is where the problem 
and the scandalous accounting is, in terms of nonrecognition.
Would you care to comment on that particular sentence? 
Because it is a rather strong sentence in an otherwise conserva­
tive paper.
MR. HILL: Well, it has been noted by several people.
I saw it in the press somewhere. It’s a bit of hyperbole that 
perhaps we shouldn’t have indulged in.
We have a situation now where, if you try to find fi­
nancial statements of real estate syndicates— I’m speaking now 
of the small groups who combine to engage in real estate trans­
actions --you find that they almost never prepare a statement, 
even under GAAP. They prepare a tax statement and a cash flow 
statement, and stop there. I can give you numerous quotes. I 
sent you some, which I assume you circulated to the Group, from 
annual reports which say, in effect: Here are our financial
statements, but don't look at them. They don't mean very much.
I believe it’s pretty well acknowledged that financial 
statements of real estate transactions under GAAP are not used
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by real estate people.
MR. WESTON: How could we improve them? What would
be the objective that would improve them?
MR. HILL: Well, I didn’t intend to solve all the real
estate problems, which are pretty tough problems, and I don’t 
think that this Group can come up with the answers to all pro­
blems. It seems to me that if we can set the frame of reference, 
we can then devote ourselves to the problems individually within 
that frame. I believe there’d be a heavy emphasis on cash flow.
I believe there'd be a reexamination of depreciation under real 
estate accounting. As you know full well, at least two of the 
National Institutes--the Canadian and the Australian--have been 
reexamining whether they should take depreciation on real prop­
erty under conventional methods. We have proposals that depre­
ciation be taken on an inclining basis in real estate in order 
to counteract the declining interest, and come up with a kind of 
level cash, or level profit reporting.
MR. WESTON: But isn’t the thrust of many of these syn­
dications the fact that the value of the land is increasing con­
siderably at the same time depreciation is being accelerated, so 
we have a compounding of reality, in a sense?
I’m really trying to find out whether an objective in 
real estate might not be phrased in an investment environment; 
say, real estate syndication--where value is really the economic 
reality of the situation, and an objective of accounting should 
be to reflect that, rather than historical cost and depreciation
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accounting.
MR. HILL: Well, if I could focus on the word "value",
except for that one word I think you would he right. It may be 
that it's the implied diminution of value in depreciation that's 
wrong, and the diminution of value as measured by original cost.
We have in downtown New York several buildings that 
were built in the '20s that are practically prime buildings, and 
I don't know how many times they have been depreciated, but they 
stand alongside new buildings as prime rental properties.
MR. GELLEIN: Henry, could I turn to the thing you
said three times— and put it in italics three times?
I'm looking at the last page, or you can look at the 
first page. It's both places.
MR. REINHART: Page l4 too.
MR. GELLEIN: Taking the illustration that you used,
Henry, of the banks and the insurance companies and marketable 
securities, do you see this frame of reference, as stated here-- 
that its application by people expert in its application within 
that frame would result in a unique answer in the treatment of 
marketable securities in the financial statements of banks and 
insurance companies?
In other words, will this once and for all lead us to 
a unique answer?
MR. HILL: Well, what do you mean by unique? I'm not
sure I know what you mean by unique.
MR. GELLEIN: I mean a common answer.
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MR. HILL: You mean unique to banks or...?
MR. GELLEIN: No, unique to the circumstances, what­
ever they are.
MR. HILL: Yes, I do. I feel, for example, that you
would take into account the fact that banks invest in debt se­
curities. At one time they had a very high tax advantage, which 
encouraged them to trade artificially. There were cases, and I 
know of them in fact, where three banks sat around the table, 
and A sold to B and B sold to C and C sold to A, just to estab­
lish profits and losses.
I believe within this you would say; Well, having in­
vested the bank’s funds in securities, we are locked into this 
kind of security until we decide to get rid of the total port­
folio, and therefore you would then structure a kind of yield 
approach, and a deferred approach, which the Committee came up 
with.
MR. GELLEIN: Do you think it would lead to a yield
approach?
MR. HILL: Yes, I do.
MR. GELLEIN: The direct application of this stated
objective?
MR. HILL: Yes, I do.
DEAN CYERT: I was interested in the fact that you
seemed to restrict the actual users of financial statements in 
this definition that we are talking about. We have been concern­
ed on the Committee with looking at the number of users. I would 
be interested in your rationale for restricting other users than
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the investor. And I assume from what you have said, you would 
think of creditors as being also included in the investor group-- 
or not?
MR. HILL: Well, that’s a two part question.
DEAN CYERT: Yes.
MR. HILL: When we speak of establishing a frame of
reference, we’re asking for the rules of the game we’re playing.
We could play golf with a croquet ball. I’ve never tried it. I 
have a pretty good understanding that it wouldn’t work very well, 
because a golf course wasn’t designed for playing golf with a 
croquet ball.
All I'm saying is that it doesn't restrict their use 
by establishing a frame of reference that says these statements 
were prepared with the investor in mind. It means that you, 
other than investors, who use them know that we prepared them 
with the investor in mind, and if you use them for some other 
purpose, you should make the appropriate adjustments.
If you are a bank, for example, and you're lending, 
you're not interested in the depreciated value of, let's say, 
vessels of a shipping company. You’re interested in what the 
vessels are, what models they are. You ask certain kinds of ques­
tions. You start off knowing that the number on the balance sheet 
isn’t put there for your purpose.
Now, this doesn't restrict you. It simply establishes 
the rules under which we prepare these statements.
DEAN CYERT: So you are sort of saying,then, that his­
torically, that really has been the purpose of financial state-
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merits, and we should make it more explicit and clear?
MR. HILL: That's why I used the word "conservative,"
to get hack to the first question.
DEAN CYERT: The second part of your definition says
that we should report in such a way as to facilitate investment deci­
sions of the future. To me this implies to some extent that we 
should know more about that investment decision process; that 
we should in fact, know the kinds of information that investors 
do try to use; that we should really have some sort of a model 
of that process, and then try to develop as much as possible of 
the information consistent with that broad model.
Would this be consistent with what you are thinking 
of there, or are you thinking more in the line of— well, let's 
do a little introspection about how we would make a decision, 
and try to provide the information needed? Would you talk about 
that aspect?
MR. HILL: Well, I think you are leading into a dis­
cussion of whether investments are made on a rational basis.
DEAN CYERT: I think that's one element of it. Another
is: Shall we facilitate the way they should make decisions, or 
the way they do make decisions, if there is a difference?
MR. HILL: All right. I think it has to be "do". I
don't think it has to be "should". I don't think we can ride 
herd on the intellectual processes, or selling process, or what­
ever we are talking about in the investment decision making.
DEAN CYERT: Do you think we know enough about how
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those decisions are made now to be able to go from there to de­
tailing the information we should have on financial statements?
MR. HILL: Well, I think we have at our disposal ma­
terial which is prepared and intended to influence investment 
decisions. For example, we see prospectuses, and then we see 
how the salesmen don't even pass out the prospectuses, and in­
stead emphasize something else in discussing a sale with a pros­
pective investor. I think we know quite a bit about how the in­
vesting process works today. I would agree that I could not 
construct a model of one, or...
DEAN CYERT: I'm sorry. I didn't hear the last thing
you said. After you said we know quite a bit about the way de­
cisions are made, then...
MR. HILL: I would agree that we can't construct a
mathematical model, a scientific linear equation that shows the 
factors that go in and how the investment comes out.
DEAN CYERT: Well, I guess one of the things is that
there is quite a bit of information which, let’s say, some so­
phisticated investors use, and others don’t. I'm trying to find 
out how far you would go in facilitating the investment decisions 
of the future, in terms of this broader range of material.
Do you have in mind any broad criterion?
MR. HILL: I can be concrete about a few things. For
example, I believe that a summary of earnings as now prepared in 
a prospectus, which is a historical recitation of income state­
ments that have been previously circulated, is not necessarily
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the right document for an investment decision. In a prospectus, 
we have a five-year-old income statement; we got that five-year- 
old income statement together within six weeks or two months af­
ter the end of that fifth year back. We know a lot more about 
that year at this point.
We might very well say the accounting principles that 
apply to a summary of earnings are not necessarily the ones we 
had to apply the day we prepared the annual financial report. 
That's one of the kinds of things I’m thinking about.
DEAN CYERT: Good.
MR. HILL: A second one is, I believe that--as collat­
eral information, and not the frame of reference--we owe the in­
vestor other information. We owe him the information that we're 
going to tear this plant down, and we’re going to leave New Eng­
land and go to South Carolina, which doesn’t necessarily mean we 
need to show him next year’s profit-and-loss statement, but it 
means we need to show him something about what’s going to happen, 
in order that he may make some kind of an intelligent decision.
DEAN CYERT: What about things like, say, concentra­
tion ratios of the firm, and its various product lines? In other 
words, is the firm one of two or three firms in a number of pro­
duct lines, and is it in a highly competitive industry in another 
one. Would this information be some of the kind that you would 
want to show?
MR. HILL: I would certainly believe that product line
information is basic information, yes.
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DEAN CYERT: But along the lines of something like the
economic characteristics of the industry that the firm is in, 
would you extend it that way, or would you argue that that's not 
really financial information?
MR. HILL: To me, that's not accounting information.
I would like to say this company is in the business of the pill, 
but I wouldn't like to forecast whether the pill is a good pro­
duct or not. Somebody else has to do that.
DEAN EDWARDS: Henry, do you visualize your statement
on page 17 as serving--as some people have indicated--as the Con­
stitution for the new Financial Accounting Standards Board, in 
solving some of the complex problems that it's going to be fac­
ing?
MR. HILL: Yes. That's really the thrust of our re­
commendation, that coming behind this Committee is probably the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, and they are going to have 
to solve the details of accounting applications.
DEAN EDWARDS: Well, do you think the objectives, as
you have stated them, realizing your report was in before the 
Standards Board was approved, or even its recommendations were 
known, are pervasive enough to serve as a constitution for such 
an organization?
MR. HILL: Yes, I think so. They are pretty general.
DEAN EDWARDS: I have one other question related to
this. Is one of the purposes of your statement to establish 
some parameters for accounting? There is certain material, for 
example within the material that has been submitted, that in-
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dicates that anything you can count is accounting.
Was that one of your premises to establish some param­
eters on accounting?
MR. HILL: Absolutely. I believe it's said in here
somewhere that our reach should not exceed our grasp; there’s a 
limit to what accounting can encompass, and just because a thing 
is expressed in numbers doesn’t make it accounting.
MR. GELLEIN: Henry, if you would like to comment on
this, do do; if not, you can simply say so.
You indicate that in a five year summary, for example 
in a registration statement, maybe the accounting applied to the 
five years might be different from what actually had been applied 
to each year of the report. Would you care to comment on whether 
that same information on that same basis ought to be a part of 
the shareholders' report?
MR. HILL: Yes. I can see it would be suitable to
just put a summary in the shareholders' report which reflects 
the decisions that we now see were inadequately made years be­
fore. When you get to things like reserves for bad debts, and 
you discover that we had a big investment in Penn Central that’s 
now all gone down the tube, and here we took a nice, big, fat 
interest on these loans all those years, and then in the fourth 
year of the five years we suffered a big, fat loss, it seems to 
me we might reconsider carefully whether we don’t want to read­
just all years for that interest, and show that we were really 
just building up a loss, not building up a profit.
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MR. GELLEIN: I guess an easy way to make a transition
to this, if this should he a desirable goal, would be to work on 
this basis on the historical summaries that are there right now.
MR. HILL: Yes.
MR. WESTON: Under those conditions, though, Henry,
what kind of reporting would the CPA make? He’d say: "This is
the statement today, but two years from now I’ll give you the 
right figures"?
MR. HILL: Well, he does that many times now.
MR. WESTON: A few times, but very rarely. Those are
the rare exceptions.
MR. HILL: Well, they're growing, and they’re growing
defensively, as we all will admit.
MR. WESTON: But would statements of that type be use­
ful to investors?
MR. HILL: I believe they would, yes.
MR. WESTON: Particularly to short term investors that
you indicate are in and out?
MR. HILL: Well, you know, you can never get a Price
Waterhouse partner out without having him quote G. O. May, and 
G. O. said that short term accounting would be indefensible if 
it were not indispensable; and it’s a perfectly valid position 
even today. But that doesn't mean we have to live with it for­
ever. We have to make our decisions now.
MR. WESTON: But would you, in effect, go back and ap­
ply subsequent information to an earlier period?
MR. HILL: I can visualize coming up with a brand new
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summary of earnings which shows what we know now.
MR. PARKER: I think you might he aware that a good
number of financial analytical tools make rations out of things 
that are in the income statement and the balance sheet, and re­
late them to other things going on in the economy, either eco­
nomic factors or down to and including market prices. You can 
adjust the figures later on for the income statement and the bal­
ance sheet. I don't suppose you would go back and adjust market 
prices, and things like that.
What happens to that process if you are going to be re­
vising the figures all the time? If you don't leave the old fig­
ures available as well, then you leave, I suggest, a very sub­
stantial tool in the hands of the sophisticated analyst who keeps 
all the old figures and can use them, as opposed to the investors 
you have now provided.
MR. HILL: Obviously, we can't lose the historical num­
bers. We have to have some kind of firm foundation for our read­
ers. Otherwise they are driving an automobile with a speedometer 
on which both the needle and the numbers move, and then they have 
nothing.
MR. GELLEIN: Henry, I just wanted to clarify one thing.
I think you have, but just to be sure it's understood as we in­
terpret on page 7, the middle paragraph, where you end the first 
sentence : We should show the plans that have been made for the
future. I think a moment ago you referred to some illustrations 
of that sort of thing, but could you elaborate just a little bit
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more, so we understand it?
MR. HILL: Well, Oscar, I think if you will accept a
degree of accountability as implicit in them, think of the kinds 
of things the presidents of corporations stand up and tell the 
analysts at the lunches they go to. They tell them what's going 
to happen to our product. Sure, they make a forecast of earnings 
per share, and, sure, their correlation is pretty low. But the 
important thing is, they stand up there and say what this company 
is going to do-what its plans are. And without that, the his­
torical financial statements have got to be of low utility.
MR. GELLEIN: Again, if we embrace this--or the exten­
sion of it— as an objective, would you think we'd have to do it 
more often than once a year? At least quarterly? Maybe when 
the plans change?
MR. HILL: As appropriate, yes. That's what I would
think.
DEAN CYERT: Do you think that one of the important as­
pects of developing this frame of reference that we have talked 
about is a more precise definition of what we mean by income?
MR. HILL: I'd like to think about that. It seems im­
plicit, but I’m not sure what’s behind the question. It just 
seems to come out that income is the number one thing the in­
vestor wants to know, and I'm not quite sure what you have in 
mind.
DEAN CYERT: Well, I'm really just getting a little
guidance on methodology for our procedure, and I wanted to know
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whether you felt that there is a need for a better definition 
of income than we are using, or let's say a different defini­
tion. I then would be interested in asking you what areas we 
should be concerned about in defining income.
I guess maybe I see where the confusion in the question 
is. What I’m thinking of is whether we should, for instance, try 
to get a little broader definition than accounting has tradition­
lly used. Should we be moving more toward concepts like opportu­
nity cost, or should we be considering trying to separate out in 
the profit those things that may come about because of historical 
accident a low-rent lease things of this kind?
Is this a direction toward the definition of income, 
let’s say, as an economist defines it, if you are familiar with 
that.
MR. HILL: Well, I’m still a little confused, and not
able to deal with your question.
If your question is directed toward the definition of 
income do we need to expand the income details? Should we pull 
out things— unusual things, or remarkable things? I would say 
yes. I believe, where the tendency is today toward a rigid format 
of profit-and-loss statement, it really should be the other way.
We should have a kind of free-flowing profit-and-loss statement 
whereby you put the things down in a way that most clearly dis­
closes what happens, rather than try to force them into the extra­
ordinary and the non-extraordinary, for example, which leads to 
artificial rules. What’s extraordinary to you may be ordinary
to me.
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DEAN CYERT: Let me just give you a simple example to
help me get a better feeling of what you are thinking about.
Let’s suppose that this company made a lease twenty years ago, 
and it pays a very low rent. And we could compute what the rent 
would be if the lease were made today, so what happens is that 
in the profits there really is rent.
Now, would you see it desirable to essentially impute 
the actual rent and get that out of the profit, so that the in­
vestor is not misled in terms of saying: "Well, the firm is real­
ly making this money in its business operation— this kind of de­
finition?
MR. HILL: No, I don’t think you can set up this kind
of bogey, and I would not impute under that circumstance.
DEAN CYERT: You’d try to keep it still as objective
as one can.
MR. GELLEIN: I think we have delayed your lunch long
enough, really. Henry and Bob, we thank you very, very much for 
your time and efforts, and your explanations and observations.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: I think it’s impossible to sum­
marize a proceedings such as this in any adequate way, at least 
so soon after the heat of the debate, but I would like just to 
make a few closing remarks and some general comments.
I was quite impressed by the consistently well done 
presentations and their temperateness. I was very impressed, 
as I’m sure my peers are, by the welcome and encouraging will­
ingness on the part of the witnesses to join in the efforts to
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improve financial reporting. I think there is evidence present­
ed by each of the participants of their very broad concern about 
all of the matters which have been under discussion.
It's in some respects really overwhelming that it is 
possible to channel such a substantial commitment of time and 
manpower our way, in order to assist us in our forward deliber­
ations. I can assure you that all members of the Study Group 
are most appreciative, and everything that has been said and sub­
mitted will be considered very carefully and with deep sincerity.
I think we can pull out just a very few broad areas of 
wide agreement. I think we can say that we agree that objectives 
are needed to guide improvements in financial reporting, that 
they should be stated explicitly, rather than left unsaid or poor­
ly formed or ill defined. It seems to me that, even though not 
implicit in some of the statements, there is a tendency to re­
gard a kind of trichotomy here in our practice, with objectives 
at the highest level, principles or standards at a second level, 
practice and procedure at a third level. We tend to get them 
mixed up, because we use them as examples, as it were. Clearly, 
our purpose is to think mostly at the highest level. The situ­
ation then leaves to the Standards Board, probably, even some of 
the more difficult things.
Another area of significance, I think, is that there 
is recognition that several categories of interested parties must 
be served, that their legitimate interests can be stated, and so­
lutions should be directed to varied points of view. I can think
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of at least three that have been stated by many: first those
direct users of financial statements, which are, in a sense, the 
primary parties at interest; then there are the preparers of fi­
nancial statements, the managements of enterprises who act as re­
presentatives of owners and potential owners.
Perhaps most importantly, I read out of many of the pre­
sentations a recognition that society at large, as distinguished 
from the individual investor, has a continuing direct and in­
direct interest in all of the professional work of the accountant. 
And, finally, in that area I think there is some agreement that 
broad concepts, principles, and reporting formats for financial 
accounting are not sacred. They need to be reexamined to see if 
they have continuing utility and validity, and determine appro­
priate modifications and substitutions in some cases. Clearly, 
all of us feel, on the witness stand and around the table, that 
nothing should be retained merely because we have always done it, 
or because many people have believed in it for a very long time.
But there is also coming out of these meetings, I think, 
a wide range of viewpoints that do not have agreement, and on 
which there has been a variety of response, a diversity of con­
clusion, about how those issues should be approached, and for 
that matter, how those issues may relate to the broad objectives.
Very generally, these views range from a total endorse­
ment of present practice, with no change whatsoever, to a sugges­
tion here and there for substantial changes across the board, not 
only in concepts but in principles and formats. Clearly, at this
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level, no endorsement of any one viewpoint was unanimous, so the 
Study Group will have to examine each of these in detail, giving 
attention to all of the arguments on either side which have been 
presented, and for that matter which will become available to us 
through our other courses of research.
I think we should agree that our ultimate conclusions—  
and I now talk about "our" in the professional sense, as distin­
guished from the Study Group sense— really should not be formu­
lated on a head count basis, if we are going to come up with that 
larger frame of reference that Bill Werntz and Henry Hill have 
talked about.
I’ll just take one minute to talk about some of the 
principal issues that I see emerging. Clearly, the first two 
days took current and fair value up and down and back and forth, 
and forecasting in the same way. Large questions were raised a­
bout the completed transaction concept and our historical notions 
of realization. In the forecasting area there is a diversity of 
points of view about availability and the right to know. And 
there’s the whole problem of the changing environment of the at­
test function as it might be extended to such issues as forecast­
ing.
I think one of the happier things that I observed as 
an individual was that the strict debate about uniformity versus 
flexibility of some years ago has at least diminished in its in­
tensity. It is not solved, but I don’t detect quite the same 
strength of position on that subject. We’ve talked a good bit
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about price level distorting effects, as tied in in some ways to 
the fair value and the realization concept.
One thing not explicitly on our agenda--I don’t know 
how it might be worked into our ultimate product— is a concern 
expressed also by the New York Stock Exchange on the enforce­
ment of professional standards and the formalization of institu­
tional groups for purposes of that enforcement.
Again, perhaps somewhat outside our area of direct res­
ponsibility, comments were made very interestingly, about train­
ing, education, objectivity, and professional stature of account­
ants, as these issues relate to the accountant’s role in serving 
the legitimate interests of society.
Finally, let me thank you again. Let me urge you to 
continue to monitor our program. Let me remind you that tran­
scripts of these entire proceedings will be available shortly, 
on request, for what we trust will be a modest fee.
The Study Group continues to look forward to making a 
meaningful contribution to the profession, to the financial com­
munity, and to me, what should be our most important interest—  
the general public.
Thank you for your patience, your consideration, and 
your excellent attention and considerable help. Goodbye.
